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For much of the seventeenth-century, Bridgetown, Barbados was one of England’s 
principal ports in the early modern Caribbean and wider Atlantic world. It was a dynamic center 
of colonial trade; the product of its location at the heart of an immensely wealth and vastly unequal 
sugar plantation slave society on Barbados. Despite the port’s value and vital place in the history 
of England’s first commercial empire in the Americas, Bridgetown’s seventeenth-century social 
history remains relatively under-studied. This dissertation examines the ways its inhabitants, free 
and enslaved, navigated the maritime landscapes of the early modern Caribbean. A consideration 
of Bridgetown’s seventeenth-century history reveals an unstable and fractious social, economic, 
political, and cultural landscape, the product of a shifting array of actors, institutions, and 
circumstances rather than seamless colonial development and imperial integration. Local struggles 
on Barbados, shaped by the fluid and feverish uncertainty of the seventeenth-century Caribbean, 
informed the actions of Bridgetown’s inhabitants as they worked to carve out an urban space of 
mobility in a maritime world revolutionized by the dramatic expansion of sugar plantations, a 
vastly expanded transatlantic slave trade, and the rise of global capitalism in the early modern 
Caribbean. As English settlers grappled with the problems of imposing social and economic 
control over rapidly urbanizing spaces like Bridgetown, they relied on fragmented systems of 
colonial power. In fits and starts, English settlers acted through multiple institutions to govern 
 v 
Bridgetown’s fragmented social, cultural, and economic landscapes producing a system of 
governance that persisted into the eighteenth century as a central component in the colony’s slave 
society. The realities of colonial power and governance in ports like Bridgetown were complicated 
by the divergent interests of colonists themselves, the aspirations of transient sailors and settlers, 
and the struggles of enslaved people to shape the cities and towns they lived in. By recovering 
these histories, this dissertation argues that the fragmented nature of colonial power systems, 
evident in Bridgetown’s early history, enabled the creation and expansion of remarkably durable 
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1.0 Introduction 
Samuel Copen’s 1695 “A Prospect of Bridge Town, In Barbados”, the earliest panoramic 
representation of an English colonial harbor in the Americas, captures Barbados’s principal port 
town at a critical inflection point in the history of the early modern Caribbean.1 Copen celebrated 
the port’s wealth and the town’s place in England’s mercantile empire in the Caribbean founded 
on the twin pillars of plantation agriculture and transatlantic slave trade that flourished and 
expanded by the end of the seventeenth century with profound consequences for the entire region. 
Dozens of ships – many flying English flags - dominate the foreground, firing cannons in salute 
as they rest at anchor in a fortified Carlisle Bay. Moving closer to shore, wharfs and docks run 
along the water’s edge, each section of the waterfront labeled with the name of a prominent 
colonial merchant. Moving inland, toward the panorama’s background, the rest of the town is a 
blur of unidentified houses and churches. Beyond the ragged edges of the bustling port Copen lays 
out a sanitized bucolic scene. As a portrait, Copen’s panoramic vision celebrates England’s first 
commercial empire in the Americas, while obscuring the human histories animating this space and 
the ways its inhabitants, free and enslaved, navigated the maritime landscapes of the early modern 
Caribbean.2  
 
1 Kristen Block, Ordinary Lives in the Early Caribbean: Religion, Colonial Competition, and the Politics of Profit 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012), 205. 
2 Samuel Copen, “A Prospect of Bridge Town (In Barbados, 1695)” En695 C782 in John Carter Brown Archive of 
Early American Images. https://jcb.lunaimaging.com/luna/servlet/detail/JCB~1~1~1318~1670003:A-Prospect-of-
Bridge-Town--in-Barba. 
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Copen’s prospect, like much written about Bridgetown’s seventeenth-century history, 
shrinks the town’s inhabitants until they are barely visible. The viewer must strain to distinguish 
abstract figures scuttling about the harbor in lighter-crafts, hauling dockside the bags and barrels 
of valuable goods and commodities that tied Barbados to an early modern world moved by 
maritime commerce.3 Yet it was these people - some free, but mostly enslaved – who toiled, lived, 
and struggled in the port that shaped the island’s history in profound and often underappreciated 
ways.  
A consideration of the history behind this imagined waterfront scene reveals an unstable 
and fractious social, economic, political, and cultural landscape, the product of a shifting array of 
actors, institutions, and circumstances rather than Copen’s fantasy of seamless colonial 
development and imperial integration. Local struggles on Barbados, shaped by the fluid and 
feverish uncertainty of the seventeenth-century Caribbean, informed the actions of Bridgetown’s 
inhabitants as they worked to carve out an urban space of mobility in a maritime world 
revolutionized by the dramatic expansion of sugar plantations, a vastly expanded transatlantic 
slave trade, and the rise of global capitalism in the early modern Caribbean.4 
 
3 Pedro Welch’s study remains the most comprehensive scholarship on Bridgetown’s colonial history, it is 
predominantly focused on the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Pedro Welch, Slave Society in the City: 
Bridgetown, Barbados: 1680-1834 (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003). Martyn Bowden provides a historical-
geographic examination of Bridgetown’s colonial development from its founding and compares it to Boston, in New 
England. Martyn Bowden, “Three Centuries of Bridgetown: An Historical Geography” in Journal of the Barbados 
Museum and Historical Society volume XLIX (2003), 3-138.  
4 Carla Gardina Pestana, The English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 1640-1661 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2007); Wim Klooster, The Dutch Moment: War, Trade and Settlement in the Seventeenth-Century Atlantic 
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As English settlers grappled with the problems of imposing social and economic control 
over rapidly urbanizing spaces like Bridgetown, they relied on fragmented systems of colonial 
power. In fits and starts, English settlers acted through multiple institutions to govern Bridgetown’s 
fragmented social, cultural, and economic landscapes producing a system of governance that 
persisted into the eighteenth century as a central component in the colony’s slave society. While 
Copen’s engraving projects order, wealth, and power, the realities of colonial power and 
governance in ports like Bridgetown were complicated by the divergent interests of colonists 
themselves, the aspirations of transient sailors and settlers, and the struggles of enslaved people to 
shape the cities and towns they lived in. By recovering these histories, this dissertation argues that 
the fragmented nature of colonial power systems, evident in Bridgetown’s early history, enabled 
the creation and expansion of remarkably durable and adaptive, if not violent and repressive, 
Caribbean slave societies.   
1.1 The Caribbean Context 
While the geographic boundaries of the circum-Caribbean are its archipelagic islands and 
the coasts of North and South America, it was the region’s port towns and cities that gave the early 
 
World (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2016); B W Higman, “The Sugar Revolution,” Economic History Review 53, 
no. 2 (February 14, 2000): 213–36, Jenny Shaw, Everyday Life in the Early English Caribbean: Irish, Africans, and 
the Construction of Difference (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2013). 
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modern Caribbean its coherence and character in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.5 The 
islands of the Greater Antilles, the sites of cataclysmic contact in the early sixteenth century, were 
home to thousands of Spanish settlers and both free and enslaved African peoples who primarily 
concentrated around the region’s port towns and cities by the end of the century.6 These towns and 
cities situated throughout the Greater Antilles and the coastal Caribbean were centers of cultural 
contact, production, and exchange; facilitators of transatlantic trade and commerce; and spaces of 
social conflict and negotiation.7 Years before the rise of the Caribbean plantation complex, as 
David Wheat has shown, these urban spaces of the Spanish Caribbean were critical to facilitating 
inter-regional trade in provisions that sustained the economies of the Spanish Caribbean as mining, 
 
5 Maritime connections often feature in the geographic and historical definitions of the circum-Caribbean, B.W. 
Higman, A Concise History of the Caribbean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 1-3; Stuart Schwartz,  
A Sea of Storms: A History of Hurricanes in the Greater Caribbean from Columbus to Katrina (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2015) ix -xxi; Bonham Richardson. The Caribbean in the Wider World, 1492–1992: A Regional 
Geography, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Watts, David. The West Indies: Patterns of 
Development, Culture, and Environmental Change since 1492. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
6 David Wheat, Atlantic Africa and the Spanish Caribbean, 1570-1640 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2016).  
7 In Pablo Gomez’s study of experiential knowledge production in the circum-Caribbean, port towns are critical sites 
of production and exchange, Pablo Gomez, The Experiential Caribbean: Creating Knowledge and Healing in the 
Early Modern Atlantic (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 2017); Alejandro De la Fuente, Havana and the 
Atlantic in the Sixteenth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008). 
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sugar cultivation, and pearl fishing industries declined in the region.8 Long considered ancillary to 
Spain’s mainland empire, port towns and cities are now considered to have been a critical part of 
how new economies of provisioning and trade replaced earlier extractive economies.9 The Atlantic 
economies of these port towns built solid foundations for the arrival of English, Dutch, and French 
settlement in the seventeenth-century.   
Bridgetown’s settlement in the late 1620s coincided with a period of growing entanglement 
between northern Europeans, including the English, Dutch and French, with the urban-maritime 
world of the early modern Spanish Caribbean.10 Throughout the sixteenth century, English 
adventurers joined Dutch and French raiders in attempts to pilfer, profit, and trade with the 
Spanish. Spanish Caribbean ports became the focal points for this illicit inter-imperial trade in the 
late-sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.11  But by the early seventeenth-century, English 
settlers had established footholds across the circum-Caribbean and the Atlantic coasts of North 
America.12 In search of profit, they drew from Spanish, African, and indigenous agriculture 
 
8 David Wheat, Atlantic Africa and the Spanish Caribbean, 1570-1640 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2016)10-16; Molly Warsh, American Baroque: Pearls and the Nature of Empire, 1492-1700 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2018) 
9 For earlier narratives of Spanish decline in the circum-Caribbean see: Carl Sauer, The Early Spanish Main, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966).  
10 Elijah Gould, “Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Peripher,” AHR 
112, 3 (2007) 764-86.  
11 Block, Ordinary Lives in the Early Caribbean: Religion, Colonial Competition, and the Politics of Profit 9 . 
12 For general overviews of these processes of colonization see: Jack P. Greene. Pursuits of Happiness: The Social 
Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture.,(Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1988); J. H. Elliott Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830. 
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throughout the circum-Caribbean to experiment in the production of a wide variety of crops.13 The 
center of gravity in the circum-Caribbean shifted from the Spanish colonies of the Greater Antilles 
towards a more diverse and fluid set of imperial and colonial actors spread across the region. While 
the agricultural experiments and discovery of sugar are well-known processes, less well-known 
are the histories of the small towns and colonial outposts that facilitated colonial projects on islands 
like Barbados.  
Across the circum-Caribbean, wherever French, Dutch, and English interlopers settled, 
new forts and outposts followed, anchoring a variety of colonial projects in actual territorial 
possession.  By the second half of the seventeenth century, most of these settlements had 
experimented with and developed plantation economies devoted to agricultural commodity 
production. Yet this generation of port towns and communities remain sparsely studied with a few 
notable exceptions. As Linda Rupert has shown, between 1634 and 1674 the Dutch West India 
Company used the port of Curaçao as a naval base and shipping point for free trade in the region.14 
Similarly, Anne Pérotin-Dumon’s study of the French ports of Basse-Terre and Pointe-à-Pitre on 
 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); and for the English settlement on Bermuda, Michael Jarvis, In the Eye of 
All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime Atlantic World, 1680-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2010) 11-63. 
13 For these experiments, their results, and roots in the circum-Caribbean see: Melissa Morris, “Spanish and Indigenous 
influences on Virginian Tobacco Cultivation,” Atlantic Environments and the American South eds. Thomas Earle and 
D. Andrew Johnson (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2020); Philip D. Morgan, “Virginia’s Other Prototype” The 
Atlantic World and Virginia, 1550-1624 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007) 342-380.  
14 Linda Rupert, Creolization and Contraband: Curacao in the Early Modern Atlantic World (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2012), 17–42, 68–69. 
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Guadeloupe, recounts the towns’ early history as a fort and Atlantic market under the rule of the 
first Compagnie des Indies occidentales.15 Interest in the port towns of the seventeenth-century 
English Caribbean, however, remains predominantly focused around Port Royal, Jamaica, rather 
than Bridgetown to the south.16 In stark contrast to this neglect, the seventeenth-century origins of 
Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Charleston are well known, well-established, and venerable 
components of literature on early America.17 As Pérotin-Dumon notes, scholars who saw the 
plantation societies of the early modern Caribbean as dependent on European empire were less 
likely to see in Basse-Terre or Bridgetown anything more than shipping points for plantation 
commodities.18  
 
15 Anne Perotin-Dumon, La Ville Aux Iles, La Ville Dans l’ile: Basse-Terre et Pointe-a-Pitre, Gaudeloupe, 1650-1820 
(Paris: Karthala, 2000), 47–88. 
16 Nuala Zahedieh, “The Merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish Contraband Trade, 1655–1692.” William 
and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 43 (1986): 570–593; Michael Pawson, and David Buisseret. Port Royal, Jamaica. 2d ed. 
(Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2000); Mulcahy, Matthew. “‘That Fatal Spot’: The Rise and Fall—
and Rise and Fall Again—of Port Royal, Jamaica.” In Investing in the Early Modern Built Environment: Europeans, 
Asians, Settlers and Indigenous Societies. Edited by Carole Shammas (Leiden: Brill 2012) 191-218. 
17 Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in the Wilderness (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1938); Christian Koot, Empire at 
the Periphery: British Colonists, Anglo-Dutch Trade, and the Development of the British Atlantic, 1621–1713. (New 
York: New York University Press, 2011); Jessica Roney. Governed by a Spirit of Opposition: The Origins of American 
Political Practice in Colonial Philadelphia. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Emma Hart, Building 
Charleston: Town and Society in the Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic World (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2010). 
18 Perotin-Dumon, La Ville Aux Iles, La Ville Dans l’ile: Basse-Terre et Pointe-a-Pitre, Gaudeloupe, 1650-1820, 63–
65. 
 8 
The seventeenth-century rise of Barbados’s plantation economy lends itself particularly 
well to narratives of imperial dependency and social failure that have obscured Bridgetown’s 
complex social history. Drawing from Iberian traditions and knowledge of sugar production, 
Barbados’s planters embraced monoculture far earlier than English settlers elsewhere in the 
circum-Caribbean. Producing crystallized sugar demanded proto-industrial processes, high 
volumes of capital investment, and precise labor discipline.19 On Barbados, planters met these 
demands by creating new systems of bound labor for British indentured servants and enslaved 
Africans.20 On the island’s integrated plantations, planters pioneered a durable form of racial 
slavery adapted on Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, and eventually South Carolina.21 By 1660, the 
majority of Barbados’s population were enslaved, hardening categories of racial difference and 
demanding the ever-present threat of violence to maintain colonial power over a large enslaved 
population.22 In such a context, much of the wealth derived from Barbados’s plantations not only 
ended up in England, but depended on imperial protection and investment from London. By tracing 
the history of Bridgetown and its structures of colonial governance, this dissertation demonstrates 
 
19 Sidney Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Viking, 1986); B.W. 
Higman, "The Sugar Revolution" Economic History Review, 53, 2, (2000) 213-236. 
20 For an analysis of this “New World” of labor see: Simon Newman, A New World of Labor: The Development of 
Plantation Slavery in the British Atlantic (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
21 Jack P. Greene “Colonial South Carolina and the Caribbean Connection.” South Carolina Historical Magazine 88.4 
(1987): 192–210; David Barry Gaspar,.“With a Rod of Iron: Barbados Slave Laws as a Model for Jamaica, South 
Carolina, and Antigua, 1661–1697.” In Crossing Boundaries: Comparative History of Black People in Diaspora. 
Edited by Darlene Clark Hine and Jacqueline McLeod, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). 343–366.  
22 Trevor G Burnard, Planters, Merchants, and Slaves : Plantation Societies in British America, 1650 - 1820, American 
Beginnings, 1500-1900 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015),53-97. 
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how the port did not merely reflect the steady march of the plantation complex or Barbados’s 
dependence upon English empire, but rather, an inherent and persistent instability within what is 
often portrayed as one of the most stable slave societies of the English Caribbean.     
1.2 Bridgetown, Barbados, and the Plantation Complex 
The longevity of Barbados’s commitment to the sugar plantation complex projects a sense 
of stability onto Barbados’s colonial system belied by Bridgetown’s history of colonial 
governance.  Adopting sugar and slavery as the colony’s central social and economic systems, 
Barbados’s planters remained committed to the model of the integrated plantation pioneered in the 
1640s well into the early nineteenth century. Bridgetown’s economy, social structures, and systems 
of colonial power in the seventeenth century never displayed the same consistency; offering a 
counterpoint to how scholarship on Barbados has interpreted Bridgetown simply as a shipping 
point and extension of the island’s sugar plantations.  
After experimenting in a range of crops in the 1630s, planters quickly embraced a 
monoculture that persisted well into the eighteenth-century.23 On Barbados, fields of grassy sugar 
cane came to cover most of the island’s 166 square miles. Deforestation and soil exhaustion 
followed, a challenge met by the island’s planters armed with a spirit of innovation and maximizing 
 
23 For these early experiments in colonial agriculture on Barbados see: Larry Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted: The 
English Colonization of Barbados, 1627-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Russell R Menard, Sweet 
Negotiations: Sugar, Slavery, and Plantation Agriculture in Early Barbados (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 2006). 
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profits in a sugar market prone to volatility and fluctuation.24 By the mid-eighteenth-century, 
Barbados’s planters had earned a reputation for deft management as the integrated plantation 
model they pioneered took hold and flourished to the north in the Leeward Islands and Jamaica.25 
In contrast to this model of monoculture, in the seventeenth-century, Bridgetown’s inhabitants 
worked and survived through a range of economic and maritime labor. Over the course of the 
seventeenth century, the building industry and local maritime labor took on greater significance 
and importance to the port’s economy alongside the Atlantic trade that formed the center of the 
town’s economic life.  
Likewise, while the island’s plantations became more rigidly defined by the hierarchies of 
racial slavery in the mid-seventeenth century, Bridgetown grew in social and cultural complexity. 
Over the course of the 1640s and 1650s, Barbados’s planters met the growing demands of the 
 
24 Richard B. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British West Indies (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1973); Justin Roberts, Slavery and the Enlightenment in the British Atlantic; 1750-1807 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013); Ryan Dennis Mcguinness, “‘They Can Now Digest Strong Meats:’ Two Decades 
of Expansion, Adaptation, Innovation, and Maturation on Barbados, 1680-1700,” Phd Dissertation (University of 
Edinburgh, 2016); David Watts, Man’s Influence on the Vegetation of Barbados, 1627 to 1800 (Hull: Hull University 
Press, 1966). 
25 For the early movement of sugar cultivation into the rest of English Caribbean see: Richard Ormrod, “The Evolution 
of Soil Management Practices in Early Jamaican Sugar Planting.” Journal of Historical Geography 5.2 (1979): 157–
170; Justin Roberts, “Surrendering Surinam: The Barbadian Diaspora and the Expansion of the English Sugar Frontier, 
1650–1675.” William and Mary Quarterly 73.2 (April 2016): 225–256. For the limits of this seventeenth-century 
expansion of sugar cultivation in the Lesser Antilles see: Tessa Murphy, “Kalinago Colonizers: Indigenous People 
and the Settlement of the Lesser Antilles” The Torrid Zone: Caribbean Colonization and Cultural Interaction in the 
Long Seventeenth Century ed. L.H. Roper (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2018)17-30.  
 11 
sugar plantation complex by replacing white Irish and English indentured servants with enslaved 
African labor.26 In the colony’s legal systems, racial categories hardened ensuring the principles 
of inheritable chattel slavery over enslaved peoples drawn from across West Africa.27 As Jenny 
Shaw and Larry Gragg have shown, planters’ religious bias against Irish settlers as well as Quakers 
continued to play a prominent role in Barbados’s settler society well into the seventeenth century.28 
Over the course of the seventeenth-century, as racial categories hardened across Barbados’s 
plantations, Bridgetown grew in social and cultural complexity. In addition to the thousands of 
captives from the Bight of Biafra, Senegambia, the Gold Coast, and West Central Africa moved 
by slave trades through Bridgetown, the port was home to multiple converging Atlantic 
 
26 The classic interpretation of this transition remains Beckles work, while recent archeaological work by Douglas 
Armstrong and Matthew Reilly have uncovered the material record of this transition on Barbados’s early plantations. 
Hilary Beckles, White Servitude and Black Slavery in Barbados, 1627-1715 /, 1st ed. (University of Tennessee Press, 
1989); Douglas V Armstrong and Matthew C Reilly, “The Archaeology of Settler Farms and Early Plantation Life in 
Seventeenth-Century Barbados,” Slavery & Abolition 35, no. 3 (February 2014): 399–417. 
27 In addition to more recent work by Burnard and Newman, Jennifer Morgan’s analysis of gender and race in 
seventeenth-century Barbados and South Carolina is critical to understanding the hardening of social cateogies on the 
island’s sugar plantations in this period. Burnard, Planters, Merchants, and Slaves : Plantation Societies in British 
America, 1650 - 1820; Newman, A New World of Labor: The Development of Plantation Slavery in the British 
Atlantic; Jennifer Morgan, Laboring Women: Reproduction and Gender in New World Slavery (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennyslvania Press, 2004). 
28 Shaw, Everyday Life in the Early English Caribbean: Irish, Africans, and the Construction of Difference; Larry 
Dale Gragg, The Quaker Community on Barbados: Challenging the Culture of the Planter Class (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2009). 
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diasporas.29 In the 1650s and 1660s, Quaker and Sephardi diasporas established durable 
communities in Bridgetown. Simultaneously, former indentured servants and poorer whites 
increasingly turned to the port, its streets and markets as spaces of survival beyond the plantation 
system of colonial militia. In Bridgetown, the port’s motley inhabitants presented an alternative 
space on Barbados to the rigid social hierarchies of the island’s sugar plantations.  
Planter’s embrace of slave labor in the entangled colonial world of the early modern 
circum-Caribbean demanded metropolitan support and protection. The wealth and value of the 
island’s trade from the 1640s onward easily convinced authorities in London the need to lay claim 
to the colony’s wealth within an emergent mercantilist empire. After a brief flirtation with 
autonomy during the upheaval of the English Revolution, planters clung to their ties with England, 
developing, by the eighteenth century a colonial culture that saw in its settler society a “Little 
England.”30 In the seventeenth-century, Barbados contributed more to England’s colonial trade 
than elsewhere in the Atlantic world, a fact not missed on contemporaries like Francis Willoughby, 
Barbados’s governor in the 1660s, who called the island “that fair jewell in your Majesty’s 
 
29 On Bridgetown’s rise as a critical market in transatlantic and intercolonial slave trades see: Gregory O’Malley, Final 
Passages: Intercolonial Slave Trade of British America, 1619-1807 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2014). 
30 For an overview of this moment of autonomy and subsuquent embrace of English empire by planters as well as thier 
growing abiltiy to articulate thier rights as subjects within an English Atlantic world see: Pestana, The English Atlantic 
in an Age of Revolution, 1640-1661; For these changes in the colony's identity as a "Little England" see: Jack P Greene, 
“Changing Identity in the British Caribbean: Barbados as a Case Study,” in Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 
1500-1800 (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
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Crown.”31 When compared to the Port Royal in the seventeenth-century and Kingston in the 
eighteenth century with their robust contraband trades, seventeenth century Bridgetown and 
Barbados appears fully integrated with an English mercantilist system by the end of the 1650s.32 
The colonial structures governing Bridgetown, however, remained in flux and fragmented 
throughout the seventeenth century.  
Moments of crisis in Barbados’s colonial society consolidated colonial power in 
Bridgetown, focusing the colony’s attention on policing the mobility of enslaved people through 
the port above all other considerations. The result was a particular geography of colonial power in 
Bridgetown designed to control and limit enslaved mobility within the town’s urban-maritime 
spaces.33 Organized chronologically, this dissertation traces the emergence of this colonial 
landscape over the course of the seventeenth-century from the earliest days of Bridgetown’s 
settlement to the early decades of the eighteenth-century as Jamaica and the Leeward Island’s 
began to eclipse Barbados as the center of sugar production and colonial power in the region.  
 
31 David Eltis, “New Estimates of Exports from Barbados and Jamaica, 1665-1701,” WMQ 3rd series, no. 52 (1995). 
32 For contraband trades from Jamaica, particularly with Cuba see: Nuala Zahedieh, “The Merchants of Port Royal, 
Jamaica, and the Spanish Contraband Trade, 1655–1692.” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 43 (1986): 570–593; 
Elena Schneider, The Occupation of Havana: War, Trade, and Slavery in the Atlantic World (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2018); Casey Schmitt “Virtue in Corruption: Privateers, Smugglers, and the Shape of Empire 
in the Eighteenth-Century Caribbean” Early American Studies, vol. 13 (1) p 80-110; Ernesto Bassi, An Agueous 
Territory: Sailors Geographies and New Granada’s Transimperial Greater Caribbean World. (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2016). 
33 Marisa Fuentes, Dispossessed Lives: Enslaved Women, Violence, and the Archive (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2016) 30-45. 
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In the eighteenth-century, the center of gravity in the early modern Caribbean shifted 
towards the north, settling in the English and French colonies of Jamaica and Saint Domingue. 
While Barbados is frequently credited with pioneering the integrated sugar plantation, these 
colonies represented the apogee of the early modern Caribbean plantation complex.34 While the 
sugar plantation complex was the source of these societies’ wealth, the ports of Jamaica, Saint 
Domingue, and Cuba played crucial roles in the transformative dramas of the age of revolutions. 
From port to port, across and within imperial boundaries, rumors of revolution in France and slave 
revolt in Saint Domingue sparked a wave of uprisings throughout the circum-Caribbean that shook 
the region’s plantation complex to its core.35 In the struggles of seventeenth-century Bridgetown, 
 
34 For an examination of these two colonies as the apogee of early modern Caribbean plantation societies see: Trevor 
Burnard and John Garrigus, The Plantation Machine: Atlantic capitalism in French Saint-Domingue and British 
Jamaica, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); a crucial study of Jamaica at the height of its power: 
Vincent Brown, The Reaper’s Garden: Death and Power in the world of Atlantic Slavery (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2008).  
35 The pioneering work of Julius Scott on the important role of the region’s port towns in spreading the rumors of 
revolution has been significantly enhanced by a new generation of scholarship on the region’s ports during the age of 
revolutions, see: Jullius Scott, The Common Wind: Afro-American Currents in the Age of the Haitian Revolution 
(London: Verso, 2018); Jesse Cromwell, The Smugglers’ World: Illicit Trade and Atlantic Communities in Eighteenth-
Century Venezuela, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018); Ernesto Bassi, An Agueous Territory: 
Sailors Geographies and New Granada’s Transimperial Greater Caribbean World. (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2016); for the larger role of port towns and the circulation of revolutionary knowledge and practice in the seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century Atlantic world see: Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker The Many-Headed Hyrda: Sailors, 
Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000).  
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we can begin to trace more fully the seventeenth-century roots of the urban-maritime world of the 
eighteenth-century Caribbean so crucial to the global age of revolutions.  
1.3 Labor and Colonial Government 
At the heart of this study of the struggles over Bridgetown and its urban-maritime spaces, 
are the themes of labor and urban colonial governance. The port towns and cities of the early 
modern Atlantic world brought together multiple labor systems within confined geographic spaces 
to move commodities through an expanding global economy in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.36 Bridgetown, as this dissertation shows, was no exception, providing a valuable case-
study on early American labor systems in the circum-Caribbean. Studying Bridgetown’s 
seventeenth-century labor history presents unique challenges. While sugar plantations demanded 
and produced significant paper trails in the form of ledgers and correspondence between managers 
and plantation-owners, private records from Bridgetown merchants dating from the seventeenth-
century are exceptionally rare.37 Wills and deeds held in Barbados’s archives, however, provide 
 
36 For overviews on the labor history of early modern Atlantic port towns and cities see: Pepijn Brandon, Niklas 
Frykman, and Pernille Røge, “Free and Unfree Labor in Atlantic and Indian Ocean Cities (Seventeenth-Nineteenth 
Centuries) International Review of Social History 64 (2019) 1-18; Seth Rockman “Work in the cities of colonial 
British North America” Journal of Urban History Vol 33. 6. (2007) 1021-1032.   
37 A notable exception is the account book of Richard Poor: S D Smith, Slavery, Family, and Gentry Capitalism in the 
British Atlantic: The World of the Lascelles, 1648-1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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valuable insights into the town’s social composition and evolving labor systems in the seventeenth-
century.  
The existence of multiple labor systems and the town’s diverse social composition in the 
eighteenth-century provoked an evolving set of institutional responses to governing the port and 
its motely inhabitants. As Barbados’s principal port and colonial capital since the 1630s, the town 
hosted several key institutions governing the colony; the island’s colonial assembly, the governor’s 
council, and the residence of the governor. But while these institutions had their homes in 
Bridgetown, governance of the port remained fragmented between an array of colonial institutions 
that included the parish government of St. Michael’s parish. While the records produced by these 
institutions were sent to London to the Lords of Trade and Foreign Plantations, the minutes of the 
parish were crucial to uncovering how urban colonial governance was shared and organized in 
Bridgetown. Evidence derived from these parochial and colonial records form the backbone of this 
dissertation providing a window into the social histories of Bridgetown’s seventeenth-century 
waterfront town.  
The first three chapters of this dissertation are chronologically organized, following 
Bridgetown’s settlement from the late 1620s to the first decade of the eighteenth-century. Each 
chapter in these chapters takes a different thematic focus. For Chapter one, this thematic focus is 
governance and imperial integration during the upheaval of the English Revolution of the 1640s 
and 1650s. Chapter two addresses the social and cultural diversity of Bridgetown’s inhabitants 
from the late 1650s to the 1690s, with a focus on sailors, poorer white settlers, Quakers and 
Sephardim. Chapter three addresses the role of slavery in the development of the port’s governance 
and labor systems with an emphasis on the informal social geographies that emerged over the 
course of the second half of the seventeenth-century. Chapter four extends the dissertation’s 
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chronology farther into the eighteenth century, but is thematically focused on Bridgetown’s 




2.0 Making Bridgetown English: The Port and Colonial Governance in Early Seventeenth-
Century Barbados 
For seaport towns throughout the seventeenth-century Atlantic world, water dominated life 
and shaped urban foundations, including Bridgetown’s origins.38 The port’s earliest years of 
settlement in the 1630s, indeed the very name the town would take, were shaped by these 
indigenous geographies and the futility of early English attempts to effectively direct Barbados’s 
settlement from across the Atlantic Ocean. Early English colonists’ choice to settle on Carlisle Bay 
proceeded from the sheltered harbor’s calm waters on southwestern coast of the island, the same 
geographic features used by indigenous Kalinago settlers generations before.39 The history of the 
port’s place-name preserved this early connection to the region’s indigenous patterns of maritime 
exploitation and settlement. The sea also played a crucial role limiting this early settlement. 
Founded in 1629 to defend the Earl of Carlisle’s proprietary claim to Barbados, Bridgetown 
remained largely undeveloped until the 1640s with little commercial, public, or colonial 
infrastructure to speak of. The port’s slow development had as much to do with the limits the 
distance of the Atlantic Ocean posed on English imperial governance in the 1630s as the vagaries 
and struggles of the island’s nascent plantation economy.  
 
38 Gary B Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American 
Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 3. 
39 Ana Catarina Abrantes Garcia, “New Ports of the New World: Angra, Funchal, Port Royal, and Bridgetown,” 
International Journal of Maritime History Vol 29(I) (2017) 155-174.  
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When about 70 English settlers sponsored by the Earl of Carlisle arrived in Carlisle Bay in 
1628, they found evidence on Barbados of a long-settled indigenous maritime world pre-dating 
the fifteenth-century European arrival in the Caribbean.40 This evidence, however, was not 
immediately apparent. When the English settlers arrived, the ground around Carlisle Bay consisted 
of rolling sand dunes, mangrove trees, and salt-tolerant plants. Brackish swamps indicated regular 
coastal flooding, particularly during the hurricane and rainy seasons that stretched between August 
and January. Torrential rains frequently swelled the small river flowing into the bay and fed a 
mangrove swamp that covered most of the low-lying ground around the coast.41 The calm waters 
of Carlisle Bay promised sound moorings for European ships to resupply the settlers but 
immediately inland the swamp and flooding made for unpromising ground upon which to cultivate 
colonial America’s staple crops. The constant flooding and torrential rains, however, sometimes 
washed out enough of the sandy soil to unearth pottery shards, small but unmistakable tokens of 
the Kalinago peoples of the eastern Caribbean who had settled and exploited the calm waters of 
the sheltered bay for centuries.  
Although archaeologists and anthropologists continue to debate the timing and means of 
indigenous settlement throughout the Caribbean, migration into the Lesser Antilles began as early 
as 2000BCE. Located 62 miles from Martinique, the nearest island, migrants from the South 
American mainland settled Barbados much later than the rest of the Lesser Antilles, around 
 
40 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted: The English Colonization of Barbados, 1627-1660, 33. 
41 Frederick H Smith and Karl Watson, “Urbanity, Sociability, and Commercial Exchange in the Barbados Sugar 
Trade: A Comparative Colonial Archaeological Perspective on Bridgetown, Barbados in the Seventeenth Century,” 
International Journal of Historical Archaeology 13, no. 1 (June 7, 2009): 63–79, 
http://www.jstor.org.pitt.idm.oclc.org/stable/20853182. 
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350CE.42 Evidence for this indigenous settlement remains abundant. To date, archaeological 
excavations in Bridgetown have recovered over 1,000 ceramic shards from Amerindian pottery 
and shell tools suggesting indigenous peoples extensively exploited the bay and its marine 
resources centuries before European arrival disrupted the region’s patterns of indigenous 
settlement. The indigenous people who frequented the island’s bays and made the island their 
home were part of Kalinago-speaking culture that spanned the eastern Caribbean and had its 
origins in several waves of migrations from the coast of Venezuela.  Despite this presence, 
Barbados represented the periphery of an indigenous Caribbean world defined by inter-island 
maritime mobility.   
By the time English settlers arrived in Carlisle Bay in 1628, Iberian conquest had 
fundamentally transformed the indigenous Caribbean. With the demographic collapse of Taino 
and Arawak peoples of the Greater Antilles, Iberian colonists conducted slave raids in the Lesser 
Antilles to replace rapidly declining populations of enslaved Taino people working on 
encomiendas in Cuba and Hispaniola.43 With the arrival of the Spanish, indigenous Barbadian 
communities likely joined other Kalinago-speaking people for safety on the islands of St. Vincent, 
Dominica, and St. Lucia where Carib communities remain today. While permanent indigenous 
settlement on Barbados ceased in the sixteenth century, seventeenth-century observers speculated 
that indigenous people continued to use the island:  
Natives of the leeward Islands, that were at a distance of site, coming hither in their 
Cannoas, and Periagos and finding such Game to hunt… and stayed sometimes a month 
 
42 Frederick H Smith,  “Volatile Spirits: The Historical Archaeology of Alcohol and Drinking in the Caribbean.” PhD 
diss. University of Florida, 2001” (2001) 425-428. 
43 Rouse, Tainos, 150-155.  
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together, and so returned again at pleasure leaving behind them certain tokens of their being 
there, which were Pots, of several sizes, in which they boyled their meat, made of clay.44  
 
Memory of this indigenous connection formed a part of early English attempts to claim 
territorial possession over Barbados.45 Bridgetown’s earliest settlers discovered a wealth of 
material and cultural artifacts produced by Barbados’s indigenous population near the dunes and 
swampland around Carlisle Bay.46 Finding indigenous artifacts clustered around the swamp, they 
called the river trickling into the harbor the “Indian river”.47 When the settlers built a basic wooden 
bridge or footpath to span the swampy ground and river, they called it the Indian River Bridge or 
simply the Indian Bridge. As their small settlement grew around the harbor in the 1630s, deeds 
begin to identify properties by their proximity to the bridge, employing the phrase, “neare the 
Indyan Bridge.” In 1629, the governor of this early settlement, Sir William Tufton, divided the 
 
44 Ligon A True History of Barbados, 23.  
45 Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
46 Barbados’s indigenous inhabitants were the seasonally mobile Kalinago (Carib) people who occupied the eastern 
Caribbean islands and Venezuelan coast since the mid-13th century. During early Spanish incursions in the region in 
the 16th century much of these populations avoided Spanish enslavers by settling deeper into what is today Venezuela 
and consolidating communities in islands like St Lucia, St Vincent, Dominica, Grenada, and Tobago. For discussion 
of the mobility and circulation of Amerindians in the Caribbean see Philip Boucher, Cannibal Encounters: Europeans 
and Island Caribs, 1492-176 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992); Peter Hulme, Colonial Encounters: 
Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797 (London ; New York: Routledge, 1992). 
47 Frederick H Smith and Karl Watson, “Urbanity, Sociability, and Commercial Exchange in the Barbados Sugar 
Trade: A Comparative Colonial Archaeological Perspective on Bridgetown, Barbados in the Seventeenth Century,” 
International Journal of Historical Archaeology 13, no. 1 (June 7, 2009): 63–79.. 
 22 
island into 9 parishes, denominating the parish surrounding Carlisle Bay St Michael, and in the 
colony’s administrative and legal documents, colonial officials called the port St. Michael’s town. 
Yet settlers and visitors to the island continued to favor “the Indyan Bridge.” The place-name 
persisted, morphing into Bridgetown, and out-lasting colonial officials’ use of St Michael’s Town 
-- an important part of how settlers used evidence of previous indigenous settlement to justify 
colonial possession.  
Although English interlopers in the Spanish Caribbean used islands like Barbados to 
replenish ship’s stocks and provisions in the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries, 
English colonial presence on Barbados did not begin until the late 1620s. Early chronicles of the 
island’s settlement credit a London ship’s captain and merchant, John Powell, with erecting a cross 
and inscribing the name of James I on Barbados in 1625 on his way back to England. Powell, like 
a generation of northern European interlopers before him, sailed past Barbados after trading with 
Portuguese settlers in northern Brazil. When he returned to London, Powel described Barbados to 
his patron, the Anglo-Dutch Sir William Courteen. Encouraged by the prospects of settling the 
island, Courteen successfully requested a patent from the English crown to settle the island. Two 
years later, in 1627, Powell returned to Barbados with three ships outfitted from London with 
“Men, Ammunition, Arms, and all kind of Necessaries fit for Planting and Fortfying” and under 
200 primarily male English settlers. On the transatlantic voyage, Powell seized an Iberian ship as 
a prize and added ten enslaved Africans as captives to bring to Barbados. When he arrived on 
Barbados, Powell sailed again to the fledgling Dutch settlement in Guiana to gather crops to grow 
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for profit and subsistence on Barbados: potatoes, cassava, plantain, corn, cotton, tobacco, and sugar 
cane as well as thirty Arawak individuals to instruct the English in their cultivation.48     
Hearing of the expedition, the Earl Carlisle, a loyal but heavily indebted courtier of James 
I and Charles I and already interested in the settlement on St Christopher’s to the north, secured a 
charter giving him ownership of the province of Carliola, which consisted of all the “Caribbee 
islands.” In 1628, in pursuit of establishing the Earl of Carlisle’s proprietary claim over Barbados, 
the English adventurer, Charles Wolverston arrived with 70 English settlers in Carlisle Bay. Faced 
with enforcing two competing claims to Barbados in London, the two settlements fell into a tense 
and uneasy co-existence, with one centered around a settlement called Jamestown and the other 
Bridgetown near Carlisle Bay. 
This competition, born of confusion and disorganization in London, immediately 
militarized the island’s earliest colonial landscape. Competing groups of English colonists used 
coastal settlements as strategic outposts to assert their respective claims. Some hoped to eventually 
launch privateering expeditions against Iberian colonies rather than further settlers’ interests in 
land and cash-crop production. Most of the early settlers, predominantly young English men and 
indentured servants, expressed an interest in securing titles to land, an early modern marker of 
wealth and status, rather than build outposts of English or proprietary power. Colonial leaders in 
Virginia and Bermuda faced similar problems balancing the need of military defense over the 
settlers’ general interest in land and autonomy.49  Where in Virginia the presence of indigenous 
 
48 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted: The English Colonization of Barbados, 1627-1660, 31. 
49 Emily Mann, “To Build and Fortify: Defensive Architecture in the Early Atlantic Colonies,” in Building the British 
Atlantic World: Spaces, Places, and Material Culture, 1600-1850 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2016), 31–52; Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, Many-Headed Hydra (Boston, US: Beacon Press, 2000), 8–35. 
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people spurred colonial leaders to adopt martial law and military discipline, they felt no such need 
on the relatively isolated Barbados. Consequently, the lack of any immediate threat from Iberians 
or indigenous groups stunted colonial efforts to fully militarize the English settlements on 
Barbados.  
Visitors to Barbados in these early days commented on how colonial agents had little 
control over settlers from their strongholds in Bridgetown. Observers saw this lack of military 
discipline as disorder undermining the colonial project. Sir Henry Colt represented one of these 
early adventurers and recorded Barbados’s early social conditions. From the few days he spent on 
Barbados, Colt thought of the island’s settlers as idle, drunken, young men whose self-interest 
threatened any effort to use such colonies as bases to launch attacks against Catholic-Iberian 
enemies.  
A member of the Essex gentry, Colt represented a particularly militaristic strain of English 
migration to the early modern Caribbean, one focused primarily on establishing English outposts 
like Barbados as means to challenge Iberian control of the region. Driven by anti-Catholic and 
anti-Iberian animus, they saw the English colonial project as a venue for religious warfare and an 
opportunity to plunder the wealth of Spain’s colonial possessions in the Americas, largely through 
supporting privateers. They differed dramatically from the bulk of settlers who joined these 
expeditions with expectations of land and its corresponding social status. Proximity to Iberian 
colonies and the continued presence of indigenous peoples who resisted European colonization 
meant that most colonies adopted a military posture. The earliest English settlers on Bermuda, for 
instance, built a string of fortifications on the tiny mid-Atlantic island, while the Earl of Warwick 
explicitly sponsored the settlement of Providence island off the coast of Nicaragua as a base for 
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raiding Iberian colonies.50 For Colt and others, forts and disciplined settler-soldiers promised 
Protestant English glory as well as imperial order.    
For English adventurers like Colt, the lack of a militarized colonial landscape reflected 
poorly on the island’s social order and planters’ discipline over their bound labor. Confirming his 
suspicions that the settlers were either lazy, drunk, or both, the grounds of their plantations seemed 
hastily cleared. “There stands a stubb of a tree…” Colt recalled, “all ye earth covered black with 
cenders nothing is clear.” Completing the dismal picture, he found no effective administrative and 
defensive center where settlers gathered together for either commerce or military exercise. The 
landscape featured abandoned, half-built fortifications and partially-cleared plantations: “all things 
caryinge ye face of a desolate and disorderly shew to ye beholder.” 51 Colt scolded the island’s 
settlers:  
Wher are your court of gards? Wher your assembly for armes? Whatt places have you of 
defence? Wher cann you make head? Your houses beinge soe far distant ye one from ye 
other, yt upon a suddayne occasion you cannot unite any strong forces to resist.  
 
Expecting a militarized colonial landscape, Colt found an island largely populated by 
isolated, self-interested settlers clearing their own plantations along the coasts and paying little or 
no attention to the demands of a robust, militarized colonial project. 
 
50 Emily Mann, “To Build and Fortify: Defensive Architecture in the Early Atlantic Colonies” in Building the British 
Atlantic World edited by Daniel Maudlin and Bernard Herman, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2016) pgs 31-53. For Providence Island settlement see, Karen Kupperman, Providence Island, 1630-1641: The Other 
Puritan Colony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).  
51 Vincent Harlow, ed., Colonizing Expeditions to the West Indies and Guiana, 1623-1667 (London, 1925) 54-103.  
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During the “Great Migration” of 1630s, most of the English migrants to the island came as 
indentured servants, lured by merchants, hired by the proprietor’s agents, or kidnapped from the 
streets of London or Bristol.52 In 1635, only one out of every sixteen migrants from London to 
Barbados was female, confirming Colt’s impression of the island’s demography.53 Drawn from 
the masses of English vagrants that swelled the populations of Britain’s largest towns and cities in 
the wake of economic collapse, famine, and enclosure, American colonies like Barbados, 
Bermuda, Virginia, and St Christopher offered a fairly good chance to acquire colonized land as a 
reward for surviving indentured servitude in dismal colonial conditions. In English-American 
colonies like Barbados, indentured servitude proved the surest way to recruit cheap labor.54 In this 
early decade of settlement, most Barbadian settlers were servants or former servants hoping to 
survive their contracts, acquire ten acres of land, and join the colonial society as planters. 
Consequently, investment in commercial infrastructure beyond the island’s struggling plantations 
remained limited until the island’s commodity boom of the early 1640s.  
Like indigenous Kalinago settlers before them, Bridgetown’s earliest English settlers chose 
to settle near Carlisle Bay for the harbor’s natural shelter. The distance of the Atlantic Ocean 
contributed to the settlement’s uncertain first years. In the competition for proprietary possession, 
 
52 Alison Games, Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World, Harvard Historical Studies (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999); and for the role of the 'Great Migration" of the 1630s on the development of 
English coloneis throughout the Atlantic world see:Bernard Bailyn, Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling 
of America on the Eve of the Revolution  (New York: Knopf Press, 1986,. 
53 Menard, Sweet Negotiations: Sugar, Slavery, and Plantation Agriculture in Early Barbados, 25–26. 
54 David W. Galenson, White Servitude in Colonial America: An Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981). 
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land, and governance, the settlement remained largely under-developed, lacking basic commercial 
infrastructure, meaningful fortifications, or a basic administrative center for the colony. By the end 
of the decade, however, there were signs on the island’s plantations that the prospects of 
Barbados’s early settlers had improved. Crops of cotton and tobacco were finding some success in 
Europe’s markets, enticing the investment of both Dutch and English merchants in the island’s 
colonial development.  
2.1 Atlantic Merchants and the Commodity Boom 
In the 1630s and 1640s, Barbados’s plantation economy began to flourish. However, the 
island had yet to settle on sugar cultivation as the primary staple crop from which English planters 
would reap the benefit. It was a time of uncertainty, experimentation, and great expectations for 
the planters and merchants investing in the island’s nascent plantation economy. It was not yet 
clear which industry would emerge as the dominant economic force on the island, nor was it clear 
how spaces like Barbados would be governed. In this period of uncertainty, a variety of Dutch and 
English merchants were able to shape the emerging town around Carlisle Bay, improvising a set 
of solutions to commercial and practical problems in and around Bridgetown. These 
improvisations helped establish Bridgetown as an Atlantic port and emergent center of the 
transatlantic slave trade, while the significant presence of Dutch merchants in the port suggests the 
depth of the island’s early entanglement with the Dutch Atlantic world.55  
 
55 Between 1620 and 1670, Dutch merchants in the circum-Caribbean played a critical role in the expansion and 
entanglement of northern European settlements into the predominantly Spanish early modern Caribbean. Wim 
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Long identified as the source of sugar and African slavery on Barbados, recent scholarship 
has questioned the role of Dutch merchants in Barbados’s commodity boom.56 The town’s earliest 
deeds, however, shows that Dutch merchants played more than a passing role in Barbados’s 
commodity boom of the 1630s and 1640s. In this early, formative period, Dutch merchants owned 
and trade actual property in Bridgetown, indicating a significant stake in the port’s early 
development. They helped build structures near the waterfront, contributing to more than the 
island’s emergent transatlantic trade by taking part in the town’s crucial early growth.  
The expansion of the island’s cotton, tobacco, and early sugar plantations demanded the 
extensive importation of labor and provisions, creating the need for merchant-factors to establish 
themselves in spaces like Bridgetown. Forging relationships with both planters and ship’s captains, 
local merchants began to act as crucial middlemen in the island’s early transatlantic trade, 
establishing themselves near Carlisle Bay to better deal with newly arriving ships. In 1643, for 
example, Christopher Nevison, who owned a plot of land “in St Michaels near the Indian Bridge,” 
acted as attorney to John Severne, commander of the 400-ton Elias of London.57 Severne, a captain 
experienced in the early West Indies trade, commissioned Nevison to administer his business 
 
Klooster, The Dutch Moment: War, Trade, and Settlement in the Seventeenth-Century Atlantic World (Ithica: Cornell 
University, Press, 2016).  
56 Both Larry Gragg and Russell Menard have downplayed the role of the Dutch identifying that the majority of 
enslaved Africans brought to Barbados in its early years of settlement came from English ships and traders: Larry 
Gragg, “‘To Procure Negroes’: The English Slave Trade to Barbados, 1627–60.” Slavery & Abolition 16.1 (1995): 
65–84; Menard, Russell R. Sweet Negotiations: Sugar, Slavery, and Plantation Agriculture in Early Barbados, 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006). 
57 RB3/1/81, BDA.  
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interests in Barbados. Nevison agreed to sell the indentured servants, goods, and other merchandise 
Severne carried to the island. Beyond distributing and selling the indentured servants and other 
goods to the island’s planters, he also agreed to collect payments (likely in the form of tobacco or 
cotton) and record debts owed to Severne. Nevison’s presence in Bridgetown, allowed the 
merchant to act as a factor and agent for ship-owners like Severne, facilitating the island’s trade 
during the commodity boom.  
The commercial relationships shaping Bridgetown in this period were not confined to 
English transatlantic trade with Dutch and German merchants contributing to the island’s 
commodity boom by providing planters sources of credit, provisions, and cheap labor. In 
December 1643, Samuel Clark promised to load onto the St. John Baptist from Hamburg “all the 
tobacco of Ares Hermenstopp from the St. Mary,” about 4 hogsheads worth of Virginia tobacco. 
Local merchants like Clark acted from their position in Bridgetown as inter-colonial and inter-
imperial traders and middlemen indicating the complex entanglements driving the island’s 
commodity boom in the 1630s and 1640s. Some of these relationships had their origins in Europe. 
In 1644, George Rock, a Bristol surgeon, commissioned John Freisenborn on Barbados to load the 
Armes of Holland under the command of Peter Remerson with 300 rolls of tobacco. After a brief 
stop at the English colony in St Christopher, Remerson was then supposed to sail to Rotterdam 
and market Rock’s tobacco to the Dutch.58 More than just buyers of tobacco, the Dutch in the 
1630s and 1640s were also sellers of slaves. Dutch colonial conquest and expansion in Brazil and 
the West African Gold Coast in the 1630s helped dislodge the Portuguese and open the 
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transatlantic slave trade to other European traders and merchants.59 As early leaders in the 
seventeenth-century expansion of the transatlantic slave trade, Dutch merchants tied to the West-
Indische Compagnie (WIC) colonies in the Americas were well placed to supply growing but 
relatively isolated plantation colonies like Barbados. In the 1630s and early 1640s, Bridgetown’s 
built environment and social geography came to reflect the complexity of the island’s Atlantic 
trade.   
Dutch merchants anchored their commercial interests in Barbados’s plantation economy 
by purchasing property in Bridgetown and helping to build the town’s early commercial 
infrastructure. In 1643, Cornelius Garbenson, a Dutch captain from Amsterdam, purchased a plot 
of land of his own in town. Likewise, Cornelius Hartgaas a Dutch captain from Medenblicke, a 
small seaport near the northern Dutch border, sold “all that little island by the Indian Bridge” to 
an English settler, Thomas Ratford.60 In 1644, another Amsterdam merchant, Jacob Whyte bought 
a half-share of a storehouse in partnership with Thomas Brough, an English settler and merchant.61 
Brough expected Whyte to help defray the costs of maintaining the building’s thatched roof. In 
return, Whyte had use of not only the building, but Brough’s weights and seals, vital tools for 
merchants buying and trading the island’s tobacco and cotton. Dutch merchants like Whyte, 
Hartgaas, and Garbenson held as much of a stake in the town’s early development as the island’s 
early settlers or London merchants.  
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In the context of the emergent Atlantic port, Bridgetown’s storehouses came to serve 
critical functions in shaping the island’s earliest systems of credit and debt. The complexity of the 
island’s trade posed new problems for planters, merchants, and ship’s captains alike. Merchants 
and planters in Bridgetown used the town’s existing infrastructure to solve these problems. In 
1642, Thomas Wall sold 31 acres to Henry Hammond and William Sloye. Like other debts 
between planters, Wall expected Hammond and Sloye to pay their debts in future crops destined 
for European markets. To this end, the deed of sale ordered the two planters to pay their debt to 
Wall through a third party, the planter and merchant James Holdipp or at “a convenient store house 
near the Indian Bridge.”62 Likewise, in 1646 James Marshait owed Owen Daniel, Edward Brown, 
and Robert Solace a significant amount of tobacco. Acknowledging his debts, Marshait signed an 
agreement to pay the three in “current receipts or else Tobacco in role in his owne store house.”63 
Given the importance of storehouses to the way local systems of credit and debt operated in 
Barbados during the commodity boom, it’s unsurprising that merchants scrambled for ownership 
and control of land as close to the waterfront as possible.  
Bridgetown’s growth within the context of the island’s early commodity boom provided 
opportunities for a range of historical actors to buy property in the town. These figures were not 
exclusively merchants, but rather carried on a variety of professions and trades. While planters 
exchanged plots measured in acreage -- some estates consisted of 100 acres by the mid-1640s – 
Bridgetown’s propertied classes measured plots of land in feet. A barber-surgeon, Philip Roe, for 
example, bought “three score square feet containing Thomas Bagnall’s former house” in 
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Bridgetown to carry on a business in the early West Indies trade.64 A tailor, Henry Landors, bought 
a 20 square-foot parcel to provision settlers and merchants with clothes. Likewise, in 1643, Henry 
Cleaver leased 100 square feet “from the Cricke to the bridge” to Captain Jeremiah Hawe in a 21-
year-lease. Cleaver amended the lease in 1646 to allow Hawe to build a house on the rented 
ground.65 While merchants were not the only residents of Bridgetown early in the 1640s, 
transatlantic trade, predominantly in enslaved people, marked a central aspect of the town’s 
commercial life.  
One of the central challenges Bridgetown’s merchants faced in the 1640s was controlling 
the movement of forced labor bound for the island’s plantations. Similar to the use of storehouses 
to resolve issues around credit and debt, merchants early on used infrastructure in Bridgetown to 
control the movement of bound labor from ships in Carlisle Bay to plantations in the island’s 
interior. In 1647, nineteen-year-old Joyes Rolins described how some of Bridgetown’s merchants 
bought and sold her contract between them in a matter of days after arrival in Carlisle Bay. In a 
deposition to the island’s government, Rolins recounted how after arriving in the “Good Shipp 
called ye June” under a contract in the “accompt” of Roger Pill, a local merchant named Clinkett 
ferried her over from ship to shore. Staying in Clinkett’s house for two days, Clinkett brought her 
“downe to the storehouses wch formerly was Mr Pars,” in Bridgetown. From there, a third 
Bridgetown merchant, Marshall, sold her to a planter, Morgan Davis.66 In Bridgetown, Rolins 
experienced what other indentured servants described of the period described; a bewildering, 
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seemingly arbitrary series of exchanges that moved indentured servants rapidly between merchants 
and planters. As the slave trade grew in the 1640s, Bridgetown’s merchants also had access to 
enslaved African captives entering Barbados through Carlisle Bay.  
From these early days of the commodity boom, Bridgetown’s merchants participated in the 
transatlantic slave trade, giving them additional sources of cheap labor alongside the trade of 
indentured servants. In 1645, the Mary of London and its captain John Wadloe anchored in Carlisle 
Bay with a mixed cargo that included, among provisions and livestock, two indentured servants 
and 26 captives from West Africa. Wadloe exchanged the captives for tobacco, cotton, and ginger 
with planters as well as merchants. John Holmes bought ten captives, the largest single purchase, 
for £260 sterling in tobacco and ginger.67 The contract they signed confirms Holmes’s role as a 
middleman in the island’s local slave trade. Holmes, according to the agreement, could not sell 
any of the enslaved people to another planter or merchant until Wadloe had the tobacco and ginger 
secure in the Mary of London’s hold. Merchants like Holmes, with their ties to the island’s 
transatlantic slave trade, had easy access to enslaved labor either to sell to other planters or use in 
the town’s growing urban-maritime economy.   
2.2 Sugar and the Making of an Atlantic Market 
If the captives aboard the Mary of London survived the first five years of their enslavement 
in Barbados, they would have witnessed a profound change in the island’s economy and colonial 
society. These well-known changes in the late1640s had a profound effect on Bridgetown. It 
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cemented the town’s role as an Atlantic port and introduced a new set of property-owners who 
helped direct the flow of wealth and trade towards London and out of the hands of the Anglo-
Dutch merchants of the 1630s and 1640s. Although driven less by imperial ambition than personal 
and familial wealth and capital accumulation, these sugar planters and merchants helped make a 
Bridgetown shared between Dutch and English merchants just a little more English in the late-
1640s.  
Barbados’s transition from a cotton and tobacco economy to a sugar producer is a well-
studied evolution.68 Less familiar are the changes this transition brought to Bridgetown. These 
changes are best told through the histories of the sugar planters and merchants who began to invest 
and lay claim to commercial space and infrastructure in Bridgetown in the 1640s. The names of 
the island’s earliest sugar planters can be found among the deeds and property records in 
Bridgetown. For scholars of Barbados and the rise of its planter class, these are familiar names: 
James Holdip, James Drax, Constant Silvester, Thomas Modyford, Humphrey Walrond, and the 
Noell family.69 The scale of their agricultural enterprises, investments in slave labor, and 
commercial connections rested on access and control over storehouses in Bridgetown.  
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While some of these sugar planters had been present on Barbados since the earliest days of 
settlement, their investment in Bridgetown only began after they had established their fortunes in 
the late-1640s. For example, both James Holdip and James Drax were among the island’s first 
English settlers.  Compared to the bulk of the island’s earliest settlers caught up in the Great 
Migration of the 1630s, both Holdip and Drax came from positions of relative privilege, power, 
and social authority even before they had established phenomenal wealth as sugar planters. 
Holdip’s involvement with Barbados began in the late 1620s as an agent of the proprietary 
government of the Earl of Carlisle. A London merchant, Holdip first travelled to Barbados to help 
collect the revenue owed to the Earl of Carlisle from the settlers and represent the interests of the 
merchant syndicate that invested in 10,000 acres of land around Bridgetown. By 1643, Holdip 
owned a significant amount of land on Barbados, planted sugar cane, and had access to the labor 
of numerous indentured servants. While Holdip initially arrived as an agent of the Earl of Carlisle 
and London merchants, by 1643, the island’s planters selected Holdip to represent their interests 
to the embattled Charles I by attempting – unsuccessfully – to secure a Barbadian monopoly over 
English sugar markets.  
Likewise, James Drax arrived on Barbados during the 1620s, translating his relative wealth 
into a position of power, authority and wealth in Barbados. According to his own account of his 
early settlement, Drax had little more than £300 sterling when he arrived on Barbados. Without a 
cleared plantation, Drax reportedly lived in caves and subsisted on hunting the island’s wild hogs 
before laying down more permanent roots. By the end of the 1630s, however, Drax acquired great 
power and prestige in Barbados. In the 1630s, like his neighbors, he had experimented with 
growing tobacco, cotton, and ginger, purchasing at least 50 indentured servants before turning to 
the work of sugar production around 1640. His modest efforts as a planter in the 1630s translated 
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into early positions of authority. Drax served as a captain in the militia and sat on the Assembly 
and governor’s Council, the island’s earliest institutions of colonial power, in both the 1630s and 
1650s. As an early proponent of sugar cultivation in the 1640s, Drax invested in the transatlantic 
slave trade. By 1654, he boasted an estate of 700 acres and 200 enslaved people.  70 From this 
position of wealth and power Drax would begin to invest in Bridgetown in the late-1640s and 
1650s.  
Drax’s engagement with the transatlantic slave trade drove his investments in Bridgetown’s 
storehouses in the 1650s. In the mid-1650s, Drax organized a series of slave trade voyages with 
Robert Hooper and Martin Bentley, sugar planters and merchants like himself. In March 1654, 
James Drax bought “One great storehouse lyeing and being in the Bridgetown,” from Robert 
Hooper and Martin Bentley, both sugar magnates. In addition to the “One great storehouse,” 
described as being “commonly knowne and called by the name of Vandesteere house,” Hooper 
and Bentley sold Drax “one New store house which is built on the said land by the said Robert 
Hooper and Martin Bentley.” Access to the slave trade was at the center of this exchange, with 
Drax releasing his share of two slave voyages to “the Coaste of Africa and thence bound hither” 
in exchange for the urban property. Drax apparently had shares in two separate vessels engaged in 
bringing African captives to Barbados: the “good ship the Samuell” captained by Samuel Cooke 
and the Pinnace Hope mastered by William Goodlord. Drax was to pay £454 sterling by October 
31 of 1655, and deposit £54,480 in muscovado sugar in another of Bentley and Hooper’s 
storehouses before March 31, 1655.71 Drax’s purchase of the “Vandesteere house” recorded an 
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older social geography in Bridgetown as well as the processes through which English sugar 
planters replaced this older Anglo-Dutch port in the 1640s and 1650s.  
Like Drax, Constant Silvester became an early adopter of sugar cultivation and translated 
his commercial enterprises and wealth from sugar planting into investment in Bridgetown. By the 
1680s, the Silvester family ranked among the island’s leading sugar planters, owning two 
plantations in the St. George valley, a center of sugar production on the island. By 1680, when the 
first census-takers recorded the island’s wealth and enslaved population, 200 enslaved people 
worked on the Silvester family’s multiple plantations. In 1652, Constant Silvester, his brother 
Nathaniel, Thomas Middleton, and Thomas Rouse purchased Shelter Island off the coast of Long 
Island near the Dutch settlement of New Amsterdam. Constant’s brother used the New York 
plantation to supply the family’s sugar operations in Barbados.72 As sugar planters, the Silvester 
family, began investing in Bridgetown in this period transforming the composition of the town’s 
propertied class.  
Silvester’s earliest investments in Barbados were in Bridgetown and its storehouses. When 
Constant Silvester arrived on Barbados in 1645, he bought a storehouse in Bridgetown from John 
Crispe, a successful carpenter who had plied his trade during the early years of the colony. Crispe’s 
storehouse was ideally located, being 40 square feet, “near the seaside” with “free egress and 
regress from the seaside.” The plot also contained “one storehouse thereupon erected of fifty foot 
in length and nineteen foot broad, with thirty foot land behind the sd storehouse.”73 Silvester 
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bought out the carpenter Crispe for his land’s access to the sea and the conveniently located 
storehouse already there.   
While families like the Silvesters emerged from an Anglo-Dutch mercantile world, the 
Noells were closely tied to emergent patterns of English imperial and colonial power in the Atlantic 
world that ultimately directed Bridgetown’s trade toward London. When they became sugar 
planters in the 1640s, the Noell family’s commercial interests stretched from Scotland and Ireland 
to New England and Virginia. The family’s meteoric rise to power and political influence in 
England and the English Atlantic world began in the London neighborhood of old Jewry and 
expanded around the English commercial world. A scrivener by trade, Martin Noell acquired great 
political and commercial power during the tumultuous period of the English revolution, building 
his success on the foundation of investments in Barbados’s sugar economy. By 1647, Martin Noell 
and members of his family-owned plantations in Barbados concentrated in the northern parish of 
St. Peters totaled around 510 acres. By the 1650s, he had expanded his investments to include 
commercial properties in Ireland and shares in the East India Company. Noell also boasted a 
sprawling salt manufacture works in London. His leading role in the salt manufacturing industry 
earned him the title “Great Salt Master of England.” During Oliver Cromwell’s rule, he became a 
member of Parliament, commissioner of naval prize goods, and sat on the government’s Trade 
Committee. Noell and his family translated wealth from investments in Barbados’s early sugar 
industry and global commercial connections into political power in England during the 1650s. 
While perhaps not the most impressive part of the Noell’s enterprises, their holdings on Barbados 
included storehouses in Bridgetown.  
In addition to their plantations in St. Peters, the Noells purchases land near Bridgetown 
with close access to the colonial government that met in town. In 1647, the Noells bought “part of 
 39 
the plantation lately purchased from John Perrott” from Thomas Clarke for 12,000 pounds of 
tobacco. The land was “abuting and bounding upon the end of the Sessions house and windward 
on the fustick path” leading into and from town.74 From their experiences elsewhere in the Atlantic 
world, the Noells were familiar with urban property and investment. In their investments in 
Wexford, a center of Ireland’s fishing industry, the family owned nearly 200 houses valued at 
£3697 sterling in the 1640s.75 Additional records produced by the Noells in Barbados in the 1640s 
suggest that the storehouses the family owned played an important role to their plantation’s 
operations. 
The Noells operated their sugar plantations as part of a sprawling family business, 
necessitating the periodic oversight of agents from London to oversee their accounts on the island. 
In 1648, William Henry, a Barbadian merchant, entered an instrument of protest in the island’s 
Secretary’s office in Bridgetown, on behalf of James Noell against Thomas Noell. William Henry, 
an agent of James Noell, accused Thomas Noell of mismanaging the estate on Barbados and using 
the profits from their plantation for his personal use. In his instrument of protest, William Henry 
accused Thomas Noell of not only embezzlement but also failing to include the new agent from 
England in the estate’s financial decisions. “Thomas Noell doth from hence send for and take ye 
receipt from ye store house wch are cash and imployed them to his own proper use and advantage 
and accomplsh not with ye said Henry.”76 The Noells, with their sprawling commercial enterprises 
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and close ties to English power in London, found investment in Bridgetown a critical part of their 
operations on Barbados as sugar planters and merchants.  
Not all the new planters coming to Barbados in the 1640s were as well affected to the 
revolutionary regime in London as the Noells, but they nevertheless shared investments in 
Bridgetown. Arriving in 1647 as an émigré from English Civil War, Thomas Modyford quickly 
translated his wealth into sugar planting. Advised by other leading planters of the 1640s, Modyford 
spent several months negotiating with other planters to purchase a sugar plantation, indentured 
servants, enslaved Africans and indigenous people following a newly established pattern for sugar-
planting on Barbados.  Loyalist migrants like Modyford, motivated to flee the upheaval of 
England’s civil war and revolution, initially kept quietly to themselves in pursuit of profit, but 
eventually more radical royalist elements arrived.77 Leading these more outspoken and disaffected 
royalists was Humphrey Walrond, who quickly invested in the island’s sugar industry and engaged 
in the island’s politics. A planter with a plantation along the island’s coasts, Walrond found it 
necessary to provide his plantation with boats to transport goods and supply his table with freshly 
caught fish. Walrond, who had extensive holdings on the coast, owned a boat, a Siene, on which 
he sent servants and enslaved people out to catch fish as often as three times a week. With access 
to the sea and in possession of small coastal vessels, Walrond could easily load and transport wines 
and other goods from Bridgetown to his plantation. Despite the differences between figures like 
Modyford, Walrond, Drax, and the Noells, all these sugar planters shared common investments in 
Bridgetown in the late-1640s and early 1650s.  
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In the scale of their agricultural enterprises, investment in slave labor, and commercial 
connections, sugar planters like Holdip, Drax, Silvester, Modyford, Walrond and the Noells 
represented a clear departure from earlier generations of cotton and tobacco planters. The scale of 
their operations and scope of their commercial connections helped integrate Bridgetown into the 
broader currents of transatlantic and global commerce and mercantile capitalism in the second half 
of the 1640s. As these sugar planters amassed their fortunes on the backs of slave labor, the 
Bridgetown of Dutch and English merchants shipping a variety of colonial products disappeared. 
It was replaced by a bustling market importing greater number of goods from around the Atlantic 
oceanic basin, and increasingly focusing its export trade in sugar towards London. 
While quantitative shipping data for mid-seventeenth-century Barbados are scarce, 
qualitative descriptions and archaeological evidence of the island’s commerce hint at the growing 
scale and scope of Bridgetown’s trade from around the Atlantic world at this moment that the 
town’s elite property-owners became more uniformly English. The trade with Barbados had had a 
global dimension since the 1630s. Excavations throughout the island reveal French, Dutch, and 
English ceramics including plate brought from as far from the early modern Caribbean as Ming 
China. Such material evidence suggests a great degree of inter-colonial commerce in the early 
years of the 1630s. With the expansion of the sugar industry, the quantities of imported 
earthenware increased while the geographic scope of where these imports originated shrunk to a 
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certain degree. Trade with Barbados grew alongside the sugar industry but became more and more 
concentrated with the British Isles.78  
The contemporary account of Richard Ligon complements this material record, offering a 
glimpse into the transatlantic commerce animating the port. He estimated that around 100 ships 
visited the island yearly to receive provisions from the island and carry sugar, cotton, tobacco, and 
ginger back to Europe. In return, these ships brought forced labor, livestock, manufactured goods, 
and workmen’s tools.  
The Commodities of these Ships bring to this Island, are Servants and Slaves, both men 
and women; Horses, Cattle, Assinigoes, Camels, Utensils for boiling Sugar as, Coppers, 
Taches, Gouges, and Sockets; all manner of working tools for Tradesmen, as, Carpenters 
Joiners, Smiths, Masons, Mill-wrights, Wheel-wrights, Tinkers, Coopers, &c. Victuals 
Stuffs, Hats, Hose, Shoes, Gloves, Swords, Knives, Locks, Keys, &c. Victuals of all kinds, 
that will endure the Sea, in so long a voyage. Olives, Capers, Anchovies, salted Flesh and 
Fish, pickled Mackerels and Herrings, Wine of all sorts, and the boon Beer, d’Angleterre.79 
 
As the work of sugar production intensified on the island’s large estates, imported food 
became a necessity for sustaining Barbados’s working population and the luxuriant culinary habits 
of the elite. Ligon noted that many of these victuals came from a wide array of places in the Atlantic 
world, “Holland, from Old and New England, Virginia, and some from Russia” while planters 
imported wines from France and Madiera. With the rise of sugar, Bridgetown’s commerce 
expanded and drew from a wider range of producers in the early modern Atlantic while the town’s 
inhabitants increasingly came from among the English mercantile and planter elites.  
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When Ligon arrived on Barbados in 1647, he witnessed and recorded a critical moment in 
England’s imperial history. Two decades earlier, in 1627, English settlers had first arrived on 
Barbados seeking, like Ligon, to make their fortunes extracting wealth from tropical soil. At first, 
a volatile environment, restive workers, and the hostility of Iberian and indigenous neighbors 
seemed to threaten this project. It was during these pivotal decades that English settlers and their 
enslaved and indentured workers began planting and processing sugar cane into the coarse 
muscovado sugars sold throughout Europe at great profit to the planters. To English observers like 
Ligon, the success of this colonial project showed in the cultivation of the island’s landscape as 
well as the scale of commerce evident in the island’s ports. From the sea, Barbados’s plantations 
appeared to Ligon and his shipmates “one above another: like several stories in stately buildings.” 
They were a sign to the observers of the planters’ ability to tame and take possession of an 
unfamiliar Caribbean landscape. And in Carlisle Bay, which harbored the island’s principal town 
and port, Bridgetown, Ligon found “riding at Anchor, 22 good ships, with boats plying to and fro, 
with Sails and Oars … so quick-stirring, and numerous, as I have seen it below the bridge at 
London.” These ships evidenced the colony’s commercial viability. 80  
By evoking London in Bridgetown, Ligon painted the town as an outpost of English 
imperial power. The port’s early history, however, shows that making Bridgetown English was a 
far more complicated project than Ligon’s description suggests. It was contested by the trans-
imperial connections of its local merchants and challenged by the island’s working people who 
connected Barbados to the revolutionary Atlantic world of the 1640s and 1650s. The arrival of a 
new generation of sugar planters transformed the composition of the town’s principal property-
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owners. By the late 1640s, the town’s wealthiest inhabitants were powerful sugar planters and 
merchants like Drax and members of the Noell family rather than the Dutch merchants of a 
previous generation. The presence of English planters and merchants in Bridgetown did not, 
however, immediately translate into the seamless imposition of imperial political power and 
control over the town’s Atlantic trade.  
2.3 Bridgetown and the Navigation Acts 
On January 11, 1652, Francis Willoughby, Barbados’s Royalist governor, surrendered the 
colony to the Parliamentarian admiral Sir George Ascyue, marking the end of a brief military 
struggle and the beginning of an eight-year period of fraught negotiations over how London’s 
agents would control the island’s centers of trade and commerce. Departing Barbados months later, 
Ascyue left Daniel Searle, a London merchant, in charge of governing the island and keeping its 
factions of restive planters and large population of bound labor loyal to the interests of Protectorate 
England.  
For Searle to enforce the newly passed Navigation Acts required not only new customs 
mechanisms and officers to enforce such acts, but a physical place from which Searle could control 
key aspects of the island’s trade. To this end, one of Searle’s earliest acts as governor was to 
expand the island’s Secretary’s Office and empower Barbados’s Secretary to enforce the island’s 
new commercial laws. Central to the new customs procedures was the issuance of tickets to trade 
with the island, gained by depositing a £1000 in sugar security with the colony’s Secretary.81 As a 
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repository for these “securities,” the Secretary’s office came to play a key role in the colony’s 
finances as well as customs enforcement.  
The office of the secretary took on new and vital importance during Searle’s governorship 
as a crucial part of how Searle tried to establish imperial power through infrastructure in 
Bridgetown. Initially, Barbados’s Secretary had been a very minor office which had little more 
than the power to register and write “all matters and Acts of State,” predominantly the activities 
of the government and courts.82 The island’s earliest Secretaries mostly preserved contracts and 
other deeds of sale and conveyance. In June 1655, Searle expanded the Secretary’s office, both 
physically and in the responsibilities the office assumed. Searle ordered the governor’s council 
“that ye Secretary’s Office be enlarged that the Charges thereof be paid out of ye Public Treasury,” 
as the Secretary came to take on new functions as an enforcer of the Navigation Acts and 
Bridgetown’s customs. With the physical expansion of the office where the island’s administrative 
and legal documentation was recorded, Searle recognized the need for greater administration to 
control the island’s economy and commerce. In addition to the preservation of public documents 
and the distribution of securities for ship’s captains and masters, Searle’s newly expanded 
Secretary’s office established standard measurements of the containers used in the island’s 
commerce and customs processes.  
Efficient customs regulation and trade depended on standardizing measurements used in 
the commodities entering and existing Bridgetown’s ports, a project Searle placed in the 
Secretary’s Office. As discussed earlier, the Atlantic trade that shaped the port in the 1640s drew 
from the circum-Caribbean and Anglo-Dutch mercantile systems, likely introducing a multiplicity 
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of units and containers in Bridgetown’s trade during the early period of the port’s growth.83 
Intending to crack down on the use of different scales and measurements for trade, Searle enacted 
a law to protect against “false Weights, Measures, and Numbers,” meaning the multiplicity of 
measurements and standards used in the circum-Caribbean and transatlantic trades with the island. 
Passed in December 1652, this law required traders to Barbados as well as storehouse keepers to 
sell all commodities and merchandize according to English measurements and commercial 
specifications. To publicize the new measurements, the secretary would put up in the Secretary’s 
Office a “Table of the true, and exact Weights, Measures, and Numbers used in the Common-
wealth of England.”84 While the newly expanded Secretary’s office tried to establish the new 
standards of English mercantilism in Bridgetown, Searle took steps to regulate the commerce 
taking place in privately-owned storehouses. 
Not all customs enforcement resided within the Secretary’s Office, with Searle assuming a 
large amount of responsibility for enforcing the Navigation Acts in Bridgetown. An act passed on 
October 7, 1652 laid out that “no Marchant, or Commander of any ship, shall presume to land any 
goods, or Trade with any man on this Island, before he hath been with the Governour.”85 In 
practice, Searle deputized officials to act on his behalf in this capacity, coming aboard ships that 
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arrived in Carlisle Bay to greet the captains before they landed their goods. In turn, captains or 
ship’s masters would visit and wait on the Governor and council shortly after their arrival in port.86   
Searle’s efforts to regulate trade went beyond enforcing customs through the Secretary’s 
Office, extending into the town’s storehouses. Among these early laws passed towards the end of 
1652, Searle passed a law stipulating that “no person shall presume to keep any common Store-
house to receive the Countrey’s goods” without first giving a ten-thousand pound in island-
currency security. Like the securities given by ship’s captains, the island’s Secretary gathered and 
kept the securities given by storehouse keepers. Searle designed the law to prevent unscrupulous 
merchants and factors in Bridgetown from defrauding the island’s planters. In return for “Countrey 
goods” received by the merchants, the merchants in turn were ordered to “give out receipts for the 
same,” to ensure that merchants did not issue false receipts used to sue or defraud planters. In 
addition to losing the ten-thousand-pound security, the penalty for violating the law was severe. 
Any person convicted of handing out false receipts would pay double the amount defrauded to the 
victim, stand in the town’s pillory for two hours and have both ears publicly severed. Governing 
Bridgetown’s commerce meant not only creating new customs mechanisms, but also violently 
enforcing laws meant to protect the island’s planters.   
With Barbados’s sugar industry dependent on the harsh exploitation of restive indentured 
servants, enslaved Africans, and indigenous people, Searle’s early laws targeted maritime 
mobility. The customs mechanism of the tickets issued to visiting ship’s captains and masters 
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doubled as a means for ensuring that bound labor stayed tied to Barbados’s planters. Searle warned 
captains “not to transport any person of this Island, without a ticket under the Governours hand 
first obtained for his so doing,” concentrating the power to control maritime mobility into his 
residence in Bridgetown. Along with acquiring a ticket from Searle, the new laws required 
passengers to enter their names in the Secretary’s Office three weeks before departing. The 
Secretary kept these names posted in the office in Bridgetown for planters and merchants to check 
to see if debtors or servants were among the lists of would-be passengers. Searle coupled these 
laws with punishments for ship’s captains that carried bound labor off Barbados. English ships 
discovered carrying passengers from Barbados without tickets forfeited their securities, with the 
harshest punishments reserved for those carrying off the island’s enslaved.87 Those helping an 
enslaved person flee the island by boat or ship “shall be adjudged a servant for seven years to the 
Owner of the said Negroes, any Law, Custom, or Usage to the contrary hereof notwithstanding.” 
Searle’s efforts to circumscribe maritime mobility depended on the involvement of the Secretary 
Office in Bridgetown.  
2.4 Bridgetown, Plantation Labor, and the Western Design 
In 1654, the clerk of Barbados’s assembly, John Jennings, published the acts and laws 
passed on Barbados since Searle’s arrival. Published in London by the press owned by William 
Bentley, The Acts and Statutes of Barbados met the metropolitan demand for information about 
England’s fastest growing and wealthiest plantation colony. Armed with knowledge of Searle’s 
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new laws, London merchants with access to the printed Acts might better navigate Bridgetown’s 
new commercial and legal infrastructure. While London merchants read the newly passed laws of 
Barbados, in 1654 and 1655, English interest in the Caribbean reached a fever-pitch in Cromwell’s 
protectorate regime.  This interest resulted in England’s first major military excursion into the 
region, and culminated in the English conquest of Jamaica but very nearly ended in disaster. 
Cromwell’s Western Design depended on places like Barbados to supply the English fleet with 
arms, soldiers, and provisions. 88  The realities of colonial Barbados, however, never matched 
Cromwell’s high expectations, and contributed to the struggles the expedition faced in the 
Caribbean. The arrival of the Western Design posed a distinct challenge of colonial governance 
for Searle, one that he largely met through expanding colonial infrastructure in Bridgetown.  
Despite having created a complex set of laws and colonial infrastructures in the early 1650s 
to enforce customs and direct the island’s trade to benefit English empire, Searle and his allies in 
England found the task of supplying arms to English soldiers on Barbados a near impossible task. 
Months before William Penn’s fleet sailed from London, Martin Noell shipped around 1500 
firearms to Bridgetown. Noell intended these arms to anticipate the arrival of the English fleet and 
supply its army. When the Penn fleet arrived, only 100 arms remained for the expedition, the rest 
having been taken up and distributed across the island to supply the colony’s militia, completely 
by-passing any effort by Searle to control the flow of weapons through Bridgetown.  
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Even with Searle’s efforts to create new customs mechanisms and expansion of the 
Secretary’s Office, Penn’s fleet found Bridgetown a center of illicit trade with England’s Dutch 
rivals. Arriving in Janaury 1655, Penn found and seized fourteen Dutch ship’s anchored in Carlisle 
Bay. While the Dutch presence may have reflected poorly on Searle’s actual ability to control and 
direct the island’s trade from Bridgetown, the Dutch ships proved a windfall. Seizing the ships and 
cargoes, the expedition turned the Dutch trade into leverage to acquire much needed supplies and 
provisions as well as ships for the expedition. Such actions may have delivered the fleet an 
unexpected windfall, the disruption of Bridgetown’s trade with the Dutch likely inflated the price 
of provisions, impounding the struggling expeditions problems in Barbados.  
While Searle ended up doing little to successfully control Bridgetown’s trade and direct 
the port’s market to benefit the Western Design, the arrival of the English fleet encouraged greater 
efforts to control the island’s population of bound plantation labor. The mid-1650s marked a 
critical point in Searle’s efforts to limit the mobility and resistance of indentured servants, political 
prisoners, and enslaved peoples on Barbados. Searle concentrated much of these efforts in 
Bridgetown, cementing the port’s early role in defending the social order of the plantation society.  
In the 1650s, the composition of Barbados’s plantation labor changed dramatically with 
the introduction of thousands of prisoners, who were enemies of Cromwell’s regime in England.  
This sparked resistance and prompted colonial backlash. While indentured servitude had already 
begun to morph into a harsh labor system in the 1640s with the rise of the island’s sugar 
plantations, the introduction of Irish prisoners and enslaved Africans created a volatile mix, leading 
at time to moments of joint resistance against English settlers. In these moments of resistance, Irish 
prisoners and enslaved Africans turned fugitive and hid themselves in the island’s last remains of 
uncleared ground, likely along the island’s hilly northeastern coast.  
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In November 1655, with the fast approach of Cromwell’s Western Design, Searle and his 
government began to take steps to remove these nascent maroons from the relatively inaccessible 
parts of the island. Searle and his council received “Information given by Capt Richard Goodell 
and Mr John Jones as also by a letter from Lt. Col. John Higgenbotham that there are several Irish 
servants and Negroes out in Rebellion in ye Thicketts and thereabouts.” For these planters and 
Searle, there was a direct connection between this fugitivity and the existence of inaccessible 
places in the interior, “ye Thicketts.” In the short term, Searle ordered Higgenbotham to raise “any 
of the Companies of Henry Hawley’s regiment” to search these places for the runaways. The 
militia’s orders were to “cause them forthwith to be secured and to send them before the Governor 
and or some Justice of the Peace, to be dealth with according to Justice.”89 If they resisted, Searle 
directed Higgenbotham to “use his utmost Endeavour to suppress or destroy them.” The immediate 
solution for Searle to the problem of their fugitivity was overt use of the militia and colonial 
violence to suppress their challenge to the plantation economy.   
In the long term, however, Searle used newly passed “Highway Acts” to improve the 
island’s roads and overall infrastructure. Such measures made forming maroon communities on 
the fringe of the plantation system more difficult.  Often overlooked, in the context of the 1650s 
and the issues of fugitivity Searle faced around the island, these acts were a crucial part of 
Bridgetown’s colonial history. In the 1650s, Searle fashioned a durable system for building new 
roads connecting Barbados’s plantations to Bridgetown. The 1652 act, “for mending of the High-
wayes, with an addition to the same,” divided the island into five districts, and appointed members 
of the island’s assembly, who were wealthy planters and merchants, to serve as committees to 
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mend and make new highways. Each district encompassed multiple parishes and the committees 
had the ability to “alter and change any way for the good of the Countrey, and lay the way where 
it was not before, and make null or annihilate such ways as are not usefull.” These committees 
worked with “any sworn Surveyor in this Island” to lay out the new roads. Each committee would 
nominate and appoint Surveyors for each individual parish to oversee the work taking place within 
the parochial borders. Surveyors could “require” or compel the inhabitants of any parish to “fall 
their woods and clear the ways from wood, stumps, grass and weeds in their own ground and so 
to keep them,” establishing the surveyors as colonial officers. Once the new roads were built, the 
inhabitants of each parish were responsible for the upkeep and maintenance including providing 
the forced labor, resources, and tools needed to build and maintain the roads, a critical part in 
opening up previously inaccessible parts of the island.90  
Linking Bridgetown to this new road system through the Highway Acts helped establish 
parish role in governing the port. Emphasizing the importance of Bridgetown, Searle established 
particular measures to deal with the port’s infrastructure in the newly passed Highway Acts. 
According to the preamble, Bridgetown “receiveth a great benefit by the trading thither,” and he 
held the town’s inhabitants responsible for much of the port’s upkeep. Searle ordered all 
inhabitants, owners of land or houses or anyone renting “Dwelling houses or Store-houses for one 
whole year” as well as storehouse keepers employed in town to be assessed and taxed separately 
within St Michael’s parish. The law required parishioners of St Michael to “make a sufficient 
Gravel-way home to the Gully where the Stone-bridge now stands and build a substantial Bridge 
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upon it and keep the same Bridge and Way in good repair.”91 Renewed after one year, this law laid 
the institutional foundations for St Michael parish and vestry taking responsibility for the port’s 
public infrastructure.  
Empowered by the Highway Act, St Michael’s parish began exercising its authority over 
Bridgetown’s inhabitants in the 1650s. In September 1656, the parish ordered “That for every five 
acres ye each man doe possess he shall find one able working Servant for a day with sufficient 
Tooles for the performance of ye said worke according as ye surveyor in his general precincts shall 
order.” The bulk of the parish’s labor remained in the plantations on the outskirts of Bridgetown, 
but the town presented the parish with unique challenges to maintaining its public ways and spaces. 
To deal with keeping the town ordered and orderly, the vestry directed the inhabitants of “ye 
Towne of St. Michael,” to “mender his door according to the discretion of ye Surveyors.” Finally, 
the parish ordered that the surveyor’s tax each house separately to fund the construction of a new 
bridge and causeway.92 In the 1650s, Searle’s Highway Acts established St Michael’s parish 
authority over Bridgetown and its public infrastructure.  
Establishing parish control over Bridgetown’s public space, however, did not preclude 
Searle from continuing to intervene in the port and its public and commercial spaces. Following 
the establishment of the highway system, Searle took steps to ensure that the town’s “Landing 
place” remained clear and usable for ships trading with Bridgetown improving the island’s 
commerce.93 In July 1655, Searle ordered a fine of £10,000 sugar currency for any person 
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obstructing the entrance to the Indian River by placing rocks “before the Barr at ye Indian Bridge 
town.” His orders described this practice as “very prejudicial to many the inhabitants of this town 
and others trading to this Island,” justifying the costs.94 A month later, in August 1655, Searle 
issued another order banning merchants or planters from building on the town’s public land places. 
No persons were “to Erect or Cause to be Erected any house or houses upon the Landing place 
commonly called by the name of the Stepping Stones, at ye Indian Bridge Town.”95 These 
interventions in Bridgetown focused on keeping the port accessible to trade and shipping.  
Searle’s interventions in Bridgetown included efforts to control vagrancy, maritime 
mobility, and disorder as part of a broader move to impose social order in the mid-1650s. While 
forced labor on plantations made up the largest segment of Barbados’s unruly working-class 
population, Searle and the island’s planters also expressed concerns in the years before and after 
the Western Design about the mingling of vagrants and rowdy sailors in Bridgetown. Among 
Searle’s reforms of the mid-1650s, one law addressed the problem of “great number of loose, idle, 
and Vagrant persons, in & about this Island, who are of no certain employment, and have no 
constant residence, or place of aboade.” Vagrants, according to the law’s pre-amble, cause “the 
disturbance of the peace and quiet.”96  The law required a list of all such vagrants sent to the 
governor and for the island’s administration to put such people to work, “to the defence of this 
Island.” Likewise, in the months leading up to the arrival of the Penn fleet, Searle and his council 
dealt with “a Riot … Committed by some hundreds of Seamen in ye Indian Bridge Towne.” On 
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Barbados, this riot formed part of a larger problem of seamen frequenting taverns, racking up 
debts, disrupting the peace, and failing to pay their creditors among the island’s merchants and 
planters.97 In the 1650s, riotous sailors joined Irish rebels and African maroons in disturbing the 
deferential social order valued by not only planters, but the colonial officials tasked with 
welcoming English imperial soldiers.  
While Searle addressed the problem of maroons in part through improving the island’s 
infrastructure beyond Bridgetown, his government dealt with rioting sailors in port by building 
new structures of public confinement in the town. Searle’s reaction to these rioting sailors focused 
specifically on building new disciplinary infrastructure in Bridgetown. After ordering the island’s 
marshals to round up and take by force the suspected participants and leaders of the riot, he directed 
the Justices of the Peace and “Capt Edward Thorneborough to take speedy cause for ye causing a 
very strong and sufficient Cage, 16 foot square, with a pair of stocks in it and a Pillory on ye top 
thereof.” Citing the insufficiency of the town’s “Prison House,” the newly built cage would hold 
the “many Disorderly Persons” in “some convenient place in ye Bridge town.”98 Unlike the town’s 
prison, the cage was meant not only to be highly visible, public, and literally transparent, but also 
hold large groups collectively. In this respect, such infrastructure departed from other architectures 
of confinement common in other parts of the Atlantic world.  
Searle’s decision to build a cage in Bridgetown to publicly confine large groups of rioting 
sailors served as the culmination of a set of legal reforms designed to limit the mobility of maritime 
workers in the 1650s. As early as 1652, the government enacted a law to “prevent the frequenting 
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of Taverns and Ale-houses by Sea men.” Rowdy and prone to drunkenness, Searle and Barbados’s 
colonial authorities viewed sailors as disrupting the island’s precariously balanced social order, 
particularly when sailors tried to evade the payments of debts they incurred on shore. Given the 
town and island’s dependence on commerce, Searle tried to limit and circumscribe sailors’ 
mobility within the island. He imposed a curfew:  
whatsoever Sea-man shall be found on shore after eight of the Clock at night, and shall not 
shew a Certificate for his so being on shore from the Master, or Owner whom he serves, or 
cannot give a good account thereof shall be apprehended by the next Constable or Officer, 
and conveyed to the common Goal.  
 
Alongside laws against vagrancy, Searle’s efforts to impose order on Barbados in the 1650s 
required the control and immobilization of certain populations in Bridgetown. A year after the 
council ordered the construction of a Cage to incarcerate rioting sailors, in July 1655 the council 
finalized a £3000 sugar-currency contract with William Winthington to repair the island’s prison.99 
The first half of Searle’s tenure represented a period in which the island’s colonial government 
tried to confine and immobilize debtors, vagrants, maroon communities, and rowdy sailors. The 
common thread running through Searle’s responses to these problems is a focus on infrastructure, 
particularly in Bridgetown.  
While Searle tried to impose social order over Barbados and Bridgetown, the island and 
town remained diverse in ways that continued to trouble English visitors with imperial hopes and 
ambitions. Henry Whistler, who arrived on Barbados with the Penn fleet in 1655, described the 
island as “the dunghill whereon England doth cast forth its rubbish.”100 In general, Whistler praised 
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the wealth of the island. He left Barbados impressed with the extent of trade and power of the 
planters who “doth live far better then ours doe in England.” Part of what troubled Whistler, 
however, was the dangerous mixture of non-English people, particularly in the island’s ports. 
Noting the island’s population he remarked, “This island is inhabited with all sorts, English, 
French, Dutch, Scotes, Irrish Spaniards thay being [Jews] with Ingones and Miserabell Negors 
borne to perpetual slavery.” 101 The account of Antoine Biet, a French priest visiting Barbados after 
a mission to the French settlements on the South American mainland, confirms Whistler’s 
impression of Bridgetown as a haven for non-English and non-Protestant elements of the island’s 
colonial society. Arriving in Carlisle Bay near Holy Week, Biet recalled how he encountered 
numerous Catholics during his time on the island. Some were English planters, but many more 
were Irish servants and prisoners. When Biet attempted to pray in privacy just outside of 
Bridgetown, he was accosted by an Irishman, who tried to communicate to the Frenchman in a 
broken Latinate patois that he was “Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman.” After the encounter, the 
Irish servant continued to visit Biet “during the eight or ten days that we stayed in the Town,” 
sometimes at his home, other times in the town’s taverns. 102 Alongside English Catholics and Irish 
servants, Biet made sure to note the presence and successes of French migrants in Bridgetown.  
Biet and the group of French settlers he travelled to Barbados with were not the first 
Frenchmen to participate in Barbados’s sugar boom. To greet the missionary were French doctors 
and tailors, who apparently found success filling the niches in Bridgetown’s service economy. For 
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example, Besse, a Paris-trained tailor, plied a good trade in Bridgetown and gave one of Biet’s 
travel companions a job in his trade to earn £500 sugar currency to arrange a return voyage to 
France. Biet and his companions also became acquainted during their stay with Cesar du Mesnil, 
a “fort habile Chirurgien,” who joined the waves of royalists fleeing to Barbados after having 
fought for Charles I during the civil wars in the late 1640s. Taking his fellow French settlers under 
his wing, Mesnil served as Biet’s interlocutor with Barbados’s colonial society during his stay on 
the island.  Alongside culturally and religiously alien Irish and French Catholics, Bridgetown 
harbored waves of religious radicals and dissidents from England that emerged and circulated in 
the revolutionary English Atlantic of the 1650s.  
A year after Biet’s visits with Barbados’s Catholics in Bridgetown, two Quaker 
missionaries on their way to Massachusetts arrived in Barbados. Ann Austin and Mary Fisher 
represented pioneers in the radical mission of mid-seventeenth century Quakers to bring the 
Society of Friends to England’s colonies. Emerging in the radical religious milieu of revolutionary 
and Interregnum England, the Society of Friends (or Quakers as they came to be known) 
encouraged figures like Austin and Fisher to bring their levelling and pacifist theology to colonial 
societies like Barbados. Quakers joined other religious dissidents that circulated in the English 
Atlantic like the leveler Evans, who ran afoul of the island’s authorities in the 1650s. Sentenced 
by a “court martial” to “stand on the pillory the next market day for an hour, and six months 
confignment,” Evans’s levelling proved more troubling to Searle’s authority than Quaker meetings 
and evangelism.103 Such religious dissidents contributed to making Bridgetown a particularly 
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volatile mix of peoples culturally alien or hostile to the traditionally English culture of the island’s 
planter class.  
      Searle came down hardest on social dissidents while extending concessions and protections 
to cultural minorities who proved friendly to the town’s commerce. In November 1654, Searle 
granted the petition of “several members of the Dutch nation” that asked to “convene and meet on 
the Sabbath day to worship god.” The governor informed the petitioners that he could revoke these 
concessions if they disturbed public peace, a warning to the Dutch to keep their heads down in the 
coming months of increased English imperial presence on the island.104 He went further in his 
concessions to non-English merchants in Bridgetown. In January 1655, the same month that the 
first ships from England arrived, Searle granted “several Jews and Hebrews inhabiting in and about 
this Island” open status in the colony declaring that they could “enjoy ye privilages of Law and 
Statutes of the ye Commonwealth of England and of this Island relating to foreigners and 
strangers.”105  
When faced with the recalcitrance of levelers like Evans or openly hostile Irish indentured 
servants, Searle ordered public punishments in Bridgetown. When Cornelius Bryan, “an Irishman” 
who boasted in January 1656 “as he was eating meat in a Tray, that if there was as much English 
Blood in the Tray as there was meat, he would eat it,” Searle responded with such public 
punishment. After hearing depositions about his “Mutinous Language,” Searle ordered Bryan 
“have one and twenty lashes on the bare back, by the Common Hangman, before the Cage at ye 
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Indian Bridge.”106 At the same meeting, the council considered the case of Daniel Wallsee who 
stood accused of “slandering of Justice, and scandalizing ye Inhabitants of this Island.” Again, 
Searle ordered Wallsee pilloried in front of the Cage for two hours. Faced with the contempt of 
English imperial authority expressed by figures like Evans, Wallsee and Bryan, Searle used 
Bridgetown as the site for demonstrating English ability to punish dissidents at the farthest reaches 
of empire.  
Searle came to power on the heels of England’s earliest attempts to transform a sprawling 
network of colonial enclaves into a transatlantic empire. His tenure, especially during the first half 
of the 1650s, reflected a concerted project to put into practice this imperial vision articulated in 
London. There were limits to this project. Despite enacting a series of legal reforms, Searle still 
allowed merchants in Bridgetown to violate the Navigation Acts. The greater challenge to Searle’s 
colonial authority and project came from the island’s laboring people who formed maroon 
communities in the interior, frequented taverns, rioted in Bridgetown, cleaved to religious 
dissidence, and resisted English authority. Searle made concessions to those who did not outright 
threaten settler power. Those who openly resisted English authority faced punishment in 
Bridgetown’s newly built Cage, prisons, and pillories. Faced with the challenge of making 
Barbados English, Searle focused his efforts on improving Bridgetown and the island’s 
infrastructure to control commerce and impose social order. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
Just as the upheavals of the English revolution made their way to Carlisle Bay and 
Bridgetown, Bridgetown and Carlisle Bay helped bring revolutionary change back to London. 
Nearly a decade of making Barbadian plantations the dumping ground for politically and ethnically 
undesirable people in the British Isles had earned the island and its wealthy planters and merchants 
a reputation for cruelty, dishonesty, and tyranny incompatible with emergent ideals concerning the 
rights owed to English subjects emerging around liberty in England. In London and Bristol, the 
practice of kidnapping young children to serve as indentured servants abroad in the Americas 
became commonly known as being “Barbadoes’d.”107 Pamphlets written in 1659 by Marcellus 
Rivers and Oxenbridge Foyle, who escaped servitude on Barbados, brought added scrutiny to the 
practices of merchants like Martin Noell, now a member of Parliament. The pamphlet they 
published, Englands Slavery, or Barbados Merchandize, told a harrowing tale of survival and 
redemption borne from the sea. 
Reflecting the turn against merchants trading English poor to Barbados, Hugh Boscowen 
of Cornwall argued for the rights of Englishmen on plantation colonies like Barbados. If English 
servants lost the rights to trial or to petition Parliament for redress, “our lives will be as cheap as 
those negroes. They look upon them as their goods, horses, &c and rack them only to make their 
time out of them, and cherish them to perform their work.”108 An enthusiastic embrace of the 
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transatlantic slave trade as part of England’s imperial political economy ended the unfettered 
access to England’s poor and vulnerable that Barbados’s planters enjoyed in the 1640s and 1650s.  
Maritime mobility and connections in Bridgetown made Rivers and Foyles made these 
debates possible. Their pamphlet describes not only their capture, imprisonment in England, 
transportation, and toils in Barbados, but also how some of the petitioners mentioned in their 
pamphlet collected their writings and escaped Barbados by sea. Such an escape would have 
depended on making connections with the sailors that frequented Bridgetown’s streets and taverns 
to find a group willing to hide stowaways amongst the cargo leaving Carlisle Bay and heading to 
London.109 As a center for moving goods and people Bridgetown proved capable of circulating 
ideologies of Englishness that rejected the use of English men with a certain degree of social status 
as menial labor in the dismal conditions of Barbados’s sugar plantations.  
The fortunes made in sugar transformed Bridgetown and Barbados, drawing the attention 
of London merchants like Noell and godly authoritarians like Oliver Cromwell. They tried turning 
an Atlantic market into an outpost of English commercial and imperial power. Through their agent 
Searle they succeeded in part but Barbados’s integration into an English empire was never as 
seamless, nor as complete by the end of the 1650s, as historians have tended to think. It was a 
messy process and one that continued into the second half of the seventeenth century as the labor 
needs of sugar production pushed the island’s planters towards the transatlantic slave trade and 
Barbados became the model for slave-based plantation societies throughout the Americas. While 
Barbados’s governors and administrators in London continued to struggle with integrating the 
island into an English imperial structure, the island’s colonists confronted the challenges of making 
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race a meaningful social category of difference and hierarchy.  Just as Searle’s efforts to make 
Barbados English focused on Bridgetown, the project of making race and articulating difference 
had crucial intersections with port’s development in the second half of the seventeenth century.  
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3.0 Strangers to the Plantation: Sailors, Quakers, Sephardim, and Poor Whites 
In March 1667, dozens of English ships lay at anchor in Carlisle Bay, preparing to attack 
French forces occupying parts of the English Leeward Islands to the north of Barbados.110  Inland, 
the island’s militia searched, on foot and horse, for deserters: sailors avoiding naval service by 
hiding in port town taverns and in servants’ quarters on the edges of the island’s plantation. With 
the militia out in force searching for these absent seamen, planters wrote to the governor to 
complain of ship’s captains harboring fugitives from their plantations. Planters in the island’s 
colonial Assembly petitioned the governor, William Willoughby, to permit plantation masters “to 
make enquiry… for any lost servants or slaves.”111 The flight of sailors on the one hand, and the 
desertion of servants and enslaved people on the other, reminded the island’s wealthiest planters 
that even as their principal port brought them immense wealth in Atlantic trade, it provided the 
island’s bound labor anonymity and access to the sea that enabled mass fugitivity. Bridgetown, 
despite the efforts of the colonial government in the 1650s, remained in many senses an 
ungovernable space. Bridgetown in the late seventeenth century was a town characterized by social 
flux and diversity of inhabitants and economic activities, even as the sugar economy helped create 
a stark and violent racial order. The co-existence of the Barbadian sugar plantation of the 
seventeenth-century alongside spaces like Bridgetown created unresolved challenges to English 
efforts to impose a new colonial order.  
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The existence of this complex urban-maritime space prompted new challenges of colonial 
governance not easily addressed within the context of an emergent slave society. In the 1660s, 
roughly 3,000 permanent inhabitants lived, worked, bargained, and bartered in Bridgetown’s 
streets among a thousand or so structures and buildings clustered near the busy harbor of Carlisle 
Bay.112  The expansion of an Atlantic port and the rise of the town’s complex urbanity in the mid-
seventeenth century emerged alongside the complete establishment of racial slavery on the island’s 
integration plantations. Plantations, as a geographic space, contained land for sugar cane 
cultivation as well as the proto-industrial architectures and machinery necessary for processing 
sugars and sugar-cane products like molasses and rum, which demanded the imposition of precise 
work-discipline and gang labor. Empowered by Barbados’s slave codes, planters governed 
plantations authoritatively, largely without interference from the colonial government. While the 
colonial government had, in the 1650s, attempted to control Bridgetown’s commerce and create 
the semblance of loyalty and order to the emergent English empire, it took the second-half of the 
seventeenth-century for the colonial government to address the problem of governing the social 
and cultural complexity of settler society in Bridgetown.  
In the 1660s, defining categories of race and articulating the boundaries of social and 
cultural difference became a central project of Barbados’s colonial elites.113 To Barbadian planters, 
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enslaved people represented not only workers to create wealth on their plantations, but embodied 
property and capital. While early modern England had a long experience with many forms of 
forced and unfree labor, Barbadian colonists sought out new legal mechanisms to preserve their 
new-found wealth in African bodies.114 In 1661, Barbados’s assembly gathered together the 
island’s laws concerning enslaved African peoples and laid out a series of arguments justifying 
perpetual and inheritable enslavement. The law’s language expressed a racial ideology. The 
preamble to Barbados’s 1661 slave code described African peoples, regardless of cultural and 
social origins, as “an heathenish brutish and uncertain dangerous pride of people to whom if surely 
in any thing we may extend the legislative power given us of punishionary Laws for the benefit 
and good of this plantation.”115  
To tell the story of Barbados’s colonial project of making race and re-defining social 
difference, scholars have turned mostly to the brutal world of the sugar plantation or the abstract 
realm of colonial and imperial law. From law codes, plantation inventories, shipping reports to 
material evidence, historians have tracked the transition on Barbados from mixed-labor systems 
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towards a total economic dependency on enslaved African labor.116 Over the course of two decades 
in the middle of the seventeenth century, material conditions and legal provisions turned 
dramatically against African peoples on Barbados, transforming a form of unfree labor into a 
totalizing social system. The exploitation of the bodies and labor of enslaved people grew while 
planters extended legal protections and material benefits to people of recognizable European 
backgrounds.117 Colonial elites re-purposed ideologies around cultural and ethnic difference to 
justify the exploitation of black people.   
The traditional narrative of how the planter class engineered the project of making race and 
re-defining social difference privileges a particular set of colonial institutions and actors. First and 
foremost, this literature focuses on the actions of the island’s wealthiest inhabitants, the planter 
class whose rise Richard Dunn authoritatively chronicled. Such narratives not only privilege the 
planter class as the principal and sole agents of this project, but also focus on the institutional 
avenues of the colonial assembly controlled by the planter class as the only corporate means 
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through which settlers exercised power.118 Studying the institutional responses to the challenges 
posed by maritime mobility, poverty and religious diversity within Bridgetown’s settler society in 
the second-half of the seventeenth century, this chapter illustrates how the colonial government 
and planters shared power with the parish system in Bridgetown to establish the boundaries of race 
and difference in settler society. For much of the seventeenth century, colonial power remained 
fragmented in Bridgetown, only slowly consolidating during moments of acute crisis in Barbados. 
3.1 The Cage 
In 1657, St Michael’s parish paid William Withington £605 Barbados-currency for “Iron 
worke and Carpenters worke… some timber for ye stockes with Carridge” to expand a simple 
structure in Bridgetown used to hold runaway servants and slaves.119 In the decades that followed, 
this simple structure in the port came to be known as the Cage. Over the next century and a half, 
thousands of enslaved people suspected of being runaways from plantations found themselves at 
one point or another held for hours, weeks, or months in Bridgetown’s Cage. When the parish paid 
Withington for his work, however, colonists used the structure indiscriminately as a holding cell 
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for all types of bound and unfree labor that worked Barbados’s earliest sugar plantations. Until the 
early nineteenth century, some version of this crudely designed structure stood several hundred 
feet from Carlisle Bay’s waterfront where thousands of sailors arrived in Bridgetown from around 
the Atlantic Ocean and circum-Caribbean annually, unaware of the Cage’s original purpose to 
limit maritime mobility.  
Built in August 1654, after colonial officers arrested hundreds of sailors rioting overnight 
in Bridgetown, the Cage’s early history illustrates how sailors moved from the margins of the 
island’s settler society to its center over the course of the seventeenth century. Faced with the task 
of immediately confining hundreds of rowdy men in a colony dependent on forced labor tied to 
plantations, the island’s governor, Daniel Searle, quickly commissioned the structure while the 
governor’s council sorted through the riot’s aftermath. Searle’s reaction to the riot of 1654 was 
emblematic of planter class’s distrust of maritime labor as strangers and outsiders to the plantation 
system; masterless men without true landed interests. As such, sailors were subjected to colonial 
laws that regulated their movements and ability to interact with the island’s settlers. Over the 
course of the seventeenth century, the colony’s attitude and governance of this maritime 
community, largely concentrated in Bridgetown, changed and therefore reconfigured how colonial 
power worked in a port like Bridgetown. 
Despite Barbados’s origins in the early modern Atlantic world, studies of seventeenth-
century Barbados oddly omit the history of the island’s maritime labor concentrated in its port 
towns. Through the plantation’s connections to the transatlantic slave trade, there is a robust 
literature on the conditions of the slave ship, patterns of the transatlantic and intercolonial slave 
trades to and from Barbados, and studies of the maritime communities that animated the island’s 
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maritime trade.120 However, little has been written on the lives of transatlantic and local maritime 
communities on Barbados. Bridgetown connected the worlds of the transatlantic sailor and the 
plantation society in the seventeenth century and it is here we can best trace the colonial 
government’s changing relationship to this highly transient community of outsiders to slave 
society. Rather than remaining stable, as it is often portrayed, the attitudes of lander settler society 
towards maritime labor changed over time. Through the examination of colonial law and the 
actions of the colonial government over the course of the seventeenth-century, we can trace the 
slow adoption of these positive attitudes towards maritime communities on the island, a sharp 
departure from the distrust sailors in Bridgetown faced in the 1650s.  
By the 1650s, planters depended on their absolute control over bound labor to operate 
profitable sugar plantations turning towards new labor system while the port continued to depend 
on traditional forms of English maritime labor. As Simon Newman and others have shown, 
Barbados’s early planters transformed traditional British bound labor systems into something 
radically different, treating indentured English, Scottish, and Irish servants essentially as chattel in 
ways that laid the foundation for plantation slavery in the decades that followed.121 The 
transatlantic sailors that made Bridgetown an Atlantic port held few common interests with the 
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island’s planters or the merchants and ships’ captains they worked for. When their ships stayed in 
Bridgetown, sailors were strangers within Barbados’s plantation system and were treated as such 
in the 1650s. Through the island’s earliest laws and statutes, the planters in control of the island’s 
colonial government sought to limit their mobility on Barbados.  
Within his first year as Barbados’s governor, Daniel Searle, the London merchant 
Cromwell’s regime appointed to the position in 1652, signed into law “An Act to prevent the 
frequenting of Taverns and Ale-houses by Sea-men.” Citing the “several ships… much hindered 
and prejudiced, and great damage sustained,” Searle imposed a curfew on sailors on Barbados. 
Any seaman found on shore after eight o’clock risked arrest and being dragged in front of the next 
available Justice of the Peace to pay a fine. The law instructed tavern keepers to close their doors 
to sailors out and about the island past curfew. Tavern-keepers, if caught, risked paying a £50 
Barbados-currency fine. To enforce the law, the new act required sailors ashore after dark to 
present “a Certificate for his being ashore” to any constables or officers representing the colonial 
government.122 In an island built upon and centered around sugar plantations and their bounded 
laborers, the colonial government sought to limit sailors’ mobility and ability to interact with 
colonial society through their access to the port’s numerous taverns and public houses.  
Acts limiting sailors’ mobility mimicked the island’s statutes regulating indentured 
servitude and slavery in crucial ways. Statutes in the early 1650s empowered planters by restricting 
the mobility of enslaved people and indentured servants. Like the act barring sailors from visiting 
taverns after curfew, the colony fined settlers entertaining or harboring indentured servants or 
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enslaved people.123 Adding to these strictures, Searle’s government restricted settlers from buying 
or selling goods to bound laborers in ways that echoed the fears the colonial government expressed 
about sailors frequenting taverns. Likewise, Searle and his council passed a law “to restrain the 
wanderings of Servants” and enslaved people by requiring these two groups of bound labor to 
carry “Liscense in writing” or a “Masters or Mistress’ Ticket” outside the plantation much in the 
same ways that past curfew sailors ashore needed a written ticket from their ship’s captain.  
Here, the similarities between the laws passed against the mobility of plantation labor and 
sailors’ end. Laws against enslaved people and indentured servants empowered any settler to 
arrest, apprehend, and interrogate bound labor and question them to see if they had tickets to be 
about the island or in the town. Sailors, on the other hand, were not subject to arrest by any settler, 
but exclusively agents of the colonial state such as justices of the peace or constables. Despite 
these differences, planters and merchants placed sailors beyond the pale of settler society. A 
category of labor distinctive from free settler society and a potential threat against the island’s 
landed interests.  
In addition to limiting maritime mobility, planters passed laws under Searle’s government 
which attempted to end sailors’ and ship captains’ practices of providing safe harbor to the island’s 
numerous debtors. Like the mobility of bound labor in general, the colonial government addressed 
fears that ships visiting Bridgetown might provide safe harbor for insolvent settlers seeking to flee 
through the mechanisms of the assembly’s laws and legislation. Weighing the necessity of 
preventing the escape of bound workers and debtors against the need to quickly unload imported 
goods, the colony’s leaders passed an act that made ships’ masters provide £1000 sterling as 
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security against transporting “any Person of(f) this Island, without a Ticket,” an act designed 
predominantly for indebted settlers.124 Much of planters’ fears about maritime labor in the 1650s 
emerged from planter struggles to control bound plantation labor. Addressing such fears of ships 
carrying servants and slaves off, Searle passed an act against “divers wicked Persons” who “lately 
attempted to steal away” enslaved people off the island. The planters and Searle blamed these 
unnamed persons using “specious pretense of promising them freedom” to lure them off the island 
aboard ships trading with the island.125  
English settlers found foreign ships and sailors particularly threatening, with the assembly 
passing laws that penalized non-English trade with the island. Building on the laws that prevented 
ships from carrying off servants or slaves, the island’s assembly passed a law that made any ship 
of the same “nation” responsible and “make satisfaction” for any other ship of that “nation” 
accused of carrying off a servant or slave.126 In times of conflict, the assembly and governor feared 
that foreign sailors on the island might circulate intelligence about the island’s defenses and 
military strength. In the 1650s, the colony’s leaders banned settlers from going aboard ships before 
the governor or his representative had collected the ship’s customs and security. This wariness of 
non-English ships in Carlisle Bay extended not only to their crews but their passengers as well. In 
November, 1654, months before the arrival of Cromwell’s Western Design, Searle ordered that 
“any foreign ships arrive ye masters of such ship or ships so arriving do bring to ye Governor list 
of ye names of his passengers and their qualities.”127 In February, 1656, when England was at war 
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with Spain, the colonial government permitted Emmanual Rogers, “a Spaniard” to have freedom 
of movement around Barbados so long as he “put in security not to depart the Island.” Searle 
further ordered that Rogers “do not navigate or cause to be navigated any boat or boats, shallop or 
shallops, till further order from the Governor,” specifically seeking to limit Roger’s access to the 
sea.128  
For Barbados’s first generation of planters, transatlantic sailors whose labor was so crucial 
to Bridgetown’s Atlantic trade were potentially dangerous outsiders with little attachment to the 
island’s nascent plantation system. The riot of 1654 underscored that sailors and maritime labor, 
particularly transatlantic sailors with no ties to the island’s landed planter class, existed beyond 
and outside of the island’s settler society to be controlled and confined by force if necessary. The 
island’s institutional response remained centered around the assembly and the governor; a power 
arrangement that firmly placed governance of the port in the hands of the island’s planters through 
the assembly. In the 1660s, colonial laws shifted away from circumscribing the liberties of 
maritime labor in Barbados towards regulating trade but still remained predominantly in the hands 
of the assembly and governor’s council.  
In the 1660s, Barbados’s governors passed laws that accepted the presence of maritime 
labor within the colony’s economy but focused on circumscribing specific economic activities 
viewed as conflicting with the strategic needs to defend the island’s shores from foreign assault. 
In March 1667, at the tail-end of the Second Anglo-Dutch war that had seen Dutch assaults on 
shipping in view of Carlisle Bay, Barbados’s governor, William Willoughby passed “An Act to 
prevent the raising, digging, breaking up, or taking away of any Stones, in any part of the Sea, or 
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Sea-Shores before this Island…” The act sought to protect the island’s rocky west coast from 
“sundry persons” who “by Boat, Vessel, or otherwise” removed the stones and rocks that jutted 
out of water close to shore. Settlers found guilty of breaking this law forfeited the boats used to 
break down these coastal rocks and stones. A year later, the colonial government extended their 
protection over the island’s coasts to the sandy shores around Carlisle Bay. The new law passed in 
February 1668, outlawed “several Masters of Ships and Vessels…daily take and dig Sand at, and 
near the Forts and Breast-works in and about the Town of St. Michaels.” The lawmakers noted 
that the “Sea doth daily encroach upon the Shore” as ship owners and captains filled ballast with 
sand from around Carlisle Bay. The new law extended the same penalties to the new act against 
taking sand away from shore.129 
In a similar vein, in 1671, the colonial government signed “An Act to prohibit the 
transporting of uncured Ginger off this Island.” Like the previous act against taking up stones and 
sand from the island’s shores, sought to limit maritime activities and trade. In this case, the colonial 
government sought to better regulate the marginal trade in ginger grown on the island’s plantations. 
The law required “every Commander, or Master of any Ship, Bark or Vessel” from taking aboard 
any cargo of uncured ginger or risk forfeit £10,000 Barbados-currency. The act went on to 
authorize the governor to appoint commissioners to search any vessel for illicit cargoes of ginger. 
These acts from the 1660s and early 1670s departed from the laws of the 1650s that had sought to 
significantly curb the movement of sailors in Barbados, imposing a system of curfews meant to 
separate maritime labor from the bound labor of the island’s plantation economy. The new laws 
focused on regulating specific aspects of the island’s trade and maritime activities and while 
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introducing penalties to ship-owners that did not seek to limit the activities or movement of 
sailors.130  
3.2 Commerce, Conflict, and Maritime Labor on the Waterfront 
While the laws limiting or circumscribing maritime mobility in Bridgetown and Barbados 
emerged from the island’s assembly and governor’s council, in the seventeenth-century, the office 
of the Island’s colonial Secretary regulated the daily conflicts between merchants, planters, ship’s 
captains and sailors that emerged from the island’s Atlantic trade.131 When cooperation or 
negotiation in the course of the maritime trade in Bridgetown broke down, ship’s captains and 
merchants asked the colonial government to intervene by filing formal complaints with the 
Secretary’s Office. The documents produced by such conflicts reveal not only the messiness of 
transatlantic commerce but also the central role played by the Secretary’s Office in Bridgetown in 
governing the port’s maritime activities and communities, taking over the role of the governor as 
the first arbiter in conflicts that emerged from the island’s trade.  
Delays vexed merchants, planters, and ship captains alike, becoming one of the most 
common complaints ship captains raised with the colonial government’s Secretary’s Office. Of the 
101 bills of protest recorded in the Secretary’s office between January 1668 and February 1670, 
47 bills of protest were lodged by ships’ captains against merchants failing to deliver sugar or other 
goods promised in a contract with a ship’s master or captain. In June 1668, Captain Richard Terry 
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of the Exchange of London issued a formal protest against Nathaniel Denham of London and his 
merchant-factor on Barbados, Spencer Peggot, for failing to “tender onto him ten tons of sugar to 
put on board of his ship” within the 57 days specified by contract between the parties.132  
Likewise, Barbados’s merchants filed complaints against ship’s captains that failed to 
deliver goods as and when promised. In February 1669, a Bridgetown merchant, Benjamin Batten 
filed a complaint in the Secretary’s office against Thomas Blackeman, the captain of the Hope of 
London, for failing to deposit casks of wine in a convenient place. Blackeman, according to Batten, 
“had taken fifteen tons of Madera wine from Madera islands…out of the boat unto the mire at low 
water where it lies in the same until high water.”133 Dislodging 15 tons of Madeira wine from muck 
exposed by low-tide and moving it to Batten’s near-by storehouse required manual labor. Batten’s 
complaint expressed the merchant’s belief that captains like Blackeman were responsible for 
organizing the labor to bring goods from their ships directly to the storehouse. The colonial 
Secretary’s office agreed and presented Blackeman with the complaint. 
Captains freighting sugar expected merchants to provide labor to transport and load sugar 
on ships in Carlisle Bay. In February 1668, Robert Browning, master of the Loyal Monck of 
London, complained that Richard Steele, a London merchant, and his factor in Bridgetown, John 
Johnson, failed to load 20 tons of sugar in casks onto the Loyal Monck. When Browning 
approached Johnson in Bridgetown, Browning made clear he expected Johnson to comply with 
the terms of the captain’s charter with Steele by bringing the sugar for loading onto the Loyal 
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Monck.134 In his complaint against the Bridgetown merchant Benjamin Scott, captain Charles 
Thorrowgood of The Katherine of Dublin testified that Scott by the date of his complaint “did 
neither by himself boate or seamen give any assistance or attendance of the Loading of any goods 
aboard the said ship.”135 
Captains and merchants were not the only parties active in these disputes. At times, sailors 
themselves were the subjects of captains’ complaints. Josiah Tidd, the captain of the slave ship, 
the Josiah, arrived in Bridgetown under commission from Bridgetown merchant Reid. Tidd was 
to first stop at Barbados, gain a better sense of the region’s slave market and then to sell his cargo 
at “the best market for the Negroes then on board the said ship,” which in 1668 appeared to be the 
ports and slave markets of Jamaica. Tidd’s troubles, however, began when he landed in 
Bridgetown after a costly transatlantic voyage. Tidd needed “repairs rigging and vituals” to take 
on as well as a new mate, and several seamen to replace the crew he lost on the voyage from the 
coast of West Africa to Barbados. Repairs and replacements to his crew were only one part of 
Tidd’s troubles. According to Reid’s complaint, “Tidd having communicated his voyage to 
Jamaica to the seamen on board him who generally refused to proceed there” until they received 
their promised wages. Constrained by significant losses and the need to repair the Josiah, the ship’s 
sailors, undoubtably shaken by the high mortality of the transatlantic crossing demanded their 
wages before continuing in their voyage onto Jamaica. The Josiah’s sailors forced Reid and Tidd’s 
hands. Reid and Tidd had to sell many of their captive cargo from the Josiah in the less than 
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favorable Bridgetown markets to pay their sailors’ wages and bring whoever among the captives 
survived to the less-saturated markets in Jamaica.136    
Occasionally, these complaints came from the island’s sailors that worked in the island’s 
coastal trade between the ports of Bridgetown in the south and Speightstown to the island’s north. 
Work coasting around the island could, as these complaints show, be dangerous to the largely local 
maritime population that ferried goods in sloops between Bridgetown and the island’s other ports. 
At the tail end of Barbados’s blustery rainy season, William Clement, owner of a small coasting 
vessel, likely a shallop, the Ann and Mary, attested that “on the 13th January the master set sail 
from Carlisle Road with severall persons, goods, and merchandize bound for Speights Bay, 
surprised by a sudden gust of wind and the goods were lost at sea.”137   
While the colonial assembly, governor, and council worked to circumscribe the mobility 
of sailors in Barbados in the 1650s, establishing these institutions’ authority over the island’s 
maritime labor, the island’s Secretary’s Office became a key arbiter in resolving conflict between 
merchants, ships’ captains, and sailors. Authority over the maritime community in the 1660s ended 
up split between these separate parts of the colonial government centered in Bridgetown. While 
these institutions governed these aspects of the port’s maritime trade and labor in the 1650s and 
1660s, this period also saw the introduction of new mercantile and religious diasporas into 
Bridgetown’s settler society. While the colony’s governors welcomed or largely ignored the arrival 
of greater numbers of Sephardim and Quakers in the 1660s, their presence increasingly drew the 
concern of the town’s Anglican parish.  
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3.3 “Nothing Tending to ye Disturbance of the Peace”: Barbados’s Quakers and 
Sephardim 
The island’s growing trade in the 1650s and 1660s brought, for very different reasons, two 
religious diasporas to Barbados’s shores. The settlement of Quakers and Sephardim, closely tied 
to Bridgetown’s growth, added to the town’s cultural cosmopolitanism. The presence of these 
diasporas went largely without note from the island’s colonial government, reflecting the 
indifferent attitude of the planter elite towards religious diversity in the mid-seventeenth century. 
Whereas Irish indentured servants and prisoners forced to work on plantations were a source of 
colonial anxiety and fear long into the seventeenth century, the arrival in significant numbers of 
Quakers and Sephardim from across the Atlantic world and circum-Caribbean drew little of the 
colonial government’s attention in the 1660s.  
Oliver Cromwell’s formal 1656 readmission of Jews to England opened Barbados to 
Jewish Sephardi settlers with a long-established commercial and diasporic history in the Atlantic 
world, contributing to the religious and cultural diversity of Bridgetown’s mercantile 
communities.138 On Barbados, the English governor Daniel Searle embarked on a parallel program 
of religious toleration despite England’s mercantilist distrust of foreign commercial interests in the 
colonial world. Remarkably, given the strong anti-Dutch sentiment in England during the 1650s, 
Searle tentatively offered limited freedom of worship to first Dutch Calvinists in an order made on 
November 8, 1654. A little less than a year later, on July 9, 1655, Searle offered a similar 
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arrangement for Sephardim acting on a petition of “several Jews and Hebrews inhabiting in and 
about this island.” Both concessions allowed these communities to worship privately but warned 
both to avoid anything “tending to ye disturbance of the peace and quiet.”139 After 1662 and the 
restoration of the English monarchy, Charles II’s government expanded the means for Jews to 
obtain letters of denization, allowing permanent settlement and property ownership in territories 
under English crown jurisdiction. In Barbados, as in in England, Sephardim took advantage of 
England’s growing acceptance of foreigners as a means of furthering commercial competition, 
settling into the island’s propertied classes in Bridgetown.140  
Through the 1660s, Sephardim laid the foundation for permanent settlement on Barbados 
by building in Bridgetown. The growth of this community, while transforming Bridgetown’s built 
environment, went largely un-reported by Barbados’s colonial authorities in the 1660s. 
Concentrated in Bridgetown, Sephardim transformed the port’s social, cultural, and religious 
geography as the community grew in wealth and numbers on the edge of the plantation economy. 
Freed through laws of denization, Sephardim in Barbados, as in England, established permanent 
presences in port towns through purchasing urban properties. In establishing a permanent presence 
of both sides of the Atlantic, Sephardim invested in these ports’ mercantile communities and 
helped establish the trust and credit that underpinned seventeenth-century commerce. In 
Bridgetown, the pattern of urban settlement took shape in the 1660s. Beginning in this decade, the 
bulk of Barbados’s Sephardim lived in and owned property facing Swan street, one of 
 
139 Lucas Manuscripts, “Minutes of the Council of Barbados” BPL, 67, 87.  
140 Nuala Zahedieh, “Defying Mercantilism: Illicit Trade, Trust, and the Jamaican Sephardim,” The Historical Journal 
61, no. 1 (2017): 77–102. 
 82 
Bridgetown’s back streets a short distance from the waterfront and Carlisle Bay. By the end of the 
seventeenth century, Barbadian colonists informally referred to Swan street as Jew street while 
deeds and descriptions of properties make geographic reference to the “Jews Synagogue.”141 
Searle’s extension of freedom of worship in the mid-1650s led to Sephardim buying and setting 
aside a plot of land to build a synagogue dedicated as Nidhe Yisrael (translated as the scattered of 
Israel), a mikvah (a pool of spring water used for ritual purification) and a separate cemetery 
attached to the synagogue by the 1660s.142 From these foundations in Bridgetown, Sephardim 
became enmeshed in the island’s commercial life, a process that occurred with little immediate 
backlash from formal colonial institutions.  
While the settlement of Sephardim in Bridgetown went largely un-noticed by colonial 
institutions, their involvement within transatlantic trade exposed Sephardim to the conflicts that 
typified commerce along the town’s waterfront. The Sephardim settling around the synagogue on 
Swan street built their wealth upon maritime trade, serving the need of the colony’s plantation 
economy by connecting its sugar markets to a wider diasporic community of trade. This 
commercial role across the Atlantic made Sephardim valuable trade partners for Barbados’s 
merchants and planters who struck deals with the island’s community of Jewish merchants. In 
1668, for example, Mosses Perrera of Amsterdam hired the English Kurton, commander of the 
ship Elizabeth and Mary, to load and carry twenty tons of goods from Isaack Perrera over the 
course of three weeks while anchored in Carlisle Bay. Similarly, Kurton also held a contract with 
Abraham Deurde to load ten tons of goods from Louis Dias Goutez in Bridgetown at the rate of 
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£5- and ten-shillings sterling.143 For most part, these conflicts remained isolated between 
individual English and Sephardi merchants and only peripherally involved the colonial state that 
served as arbiter of such commercial conflicts.  
Another example of Barbados’s early cultural and religious diversity can be found in the 
island’s Quaker community, which like Bridgetown’s Sephardim charted a path for themselves on 
the island that was entangled with, but not determined by, English imperial politics. For Quakers, 
too, the 1660s were a decade of quiet growth, largely ignored by the colonial government. In the 
1650s, the first itinerant Quakers from England arrived, like the Sephardim, in Barbados. 
Committed early Quaker converts like Henry Fell arrived in Barbados in 1656 and stayed into the 
1670s, settling as a merchant-factor in Bridgetown. Fell and other Quakers found early successes 
among the island’s sugar planters. Sugar plantation-owners like Lewis Morris and John Rous 
became early patrons and business partners of Quaker itinerants like Fell and pillars of the Quaker 
community in the 1650s.144 Missionaries like Fell benefited from the temperament and inclination 
of the island’s colonial leadership. Fell met Governor Searle soon after arriving in Barbados and 
found him a “very Moderate” man who proved “noble and loveing to friends.”145 In the late 1650s, 
Fell was holding 4-5 meetings a week. Another Quaker itinerant, John Burnyeat reported in 1667 
that he met with “large and full Meetings” in his travels throughout Barbados. In the 1660s, 
Quakers like Fell and Burnyeat found “many people Convinced” of their religious arguments and 
beliefs among the island’s English settlers.  
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These early successes did not mean that Quakers completely escaped the violence that 
marked colonial reaction to the spread of Quakerism in English colonies like Massachusetts 
Bay.146 Fell met with a “rude Multitude” led by Anglican priests that barred the Fell from speaking 
in Anglican churches. Individual Quakers, like Fell, still faced arrest for attempting to disrupt 
Anglican services or for refusing to serve in the militia or swear oaths. Still, these settler reactions 
targeted individual preachers viewed as troublemakers rather than the entire Quaker community 
and were largely led by Anglican clergy rather than the full force of the colonial government. For 
both Atlantic free religious diasporas, the Sephardim and Quakers, the 1650s and 1660s were 
decades of growth and conflict between with individual English and Anglican settlers that did not 
elicit the attention of the formal institutions of the colonial state until much later in the seventeenth 
century.  
3.4 “Seeming Mad Men”: Settler Poverty, Vagrancy and the Port 
While religious communities like the Sephardim and Quakers found some success and 
stability in the post-restoration years of the 1660s, the same period witnessed a sharp spike in white 
settler poverty and vagrancy as a generation of indentured servants left Barbados’s sugar 
plantations with few prospects for land-ownership.147 Throughout the 1650s, 1660s, and into the 
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1670s, the parish largely faced the problems posed by urban poverty and vagrancy alone, 
attempting to ameliorate and control the growth of settler poverty in Bridgetown beyond the 
coercive mechanisms of the plantation system.  
In Bridgetown, the problems of settler poverty and vagrancy appeared most clearly to 
port’s settlers and the vestry of St. Michael’s parish. In 1663, William Bragge, a Bridgetown rope-
maker approached St Michael’s vestry with a proposal “to employ several poor people yt are 
chargeable to the Parish and ye Vagrants and Idle persons yt lye about town, as seeming mad 
men.”148 His request vividly illustrated how artisans in Bridgetown viewed the problem poverty 
posed to the port’s propertied in the early 1660s. Without land, a trade, or significant capital, a 
generation of indentured servants carved out spaces of survival on the island’s roads and 
particularly in the streets of Bridgetown, the island’s capital and commercial center. To 
unsympathetic artisans like Bragge, the poor settlers’ efforts to survive on Bridgetown’s streets 
threatened the town and parish’s prosperity by drawing resources from the vestry without 
contributing to the port’s economy or society.  
By contrast, the colonial government largely stayed out of such matters in this period of 
settlement and plantation development, delegating to the parish issues relating to the settler 
poverty, particularly in Bridgetown. In 1655, the governor’s council referred the case of Robert 
Hickerson to the parish. “He being decrepid and not able to help himself,” the governor and council 
ordered the “Trustees” of St Michael’s parish form a three-man committee to provide some form 
 
148 St. Michael Vestry Minutes, BMHS, 90. 
 86 
of relief for the disabled and impoverished Hickerson.149 Such delegation typified the colonial 
government’s response to settler poverty in the 1650s and 1660s.  
In the 1650s, 1660s and 1670s, Bridgetown’s Anglican parish system played a critical role 
in the island’s development slave society defining social difference through the application of 
traditional English poor relief laws. Since the mid-sixteenth century, English poor relief laws 
defined the deserving poor, separating people who earned parochial alms from those considered 
idle or vagrant and subject to coercion or state violence.150 Between the 1650s and into the 1670s, 
St Michael’s minute books record how the vestry, the twelve-man lay committee governing the 
parish, articulated such distinctions as they distributed alms to the growing number of 
impoverished settlers. They viewed the sick, disabled, aged, or orphaned as particularly vulnerable 
dependents deserving of organized social relief. The alms they gave took the form of monthly 
pensions renewed yearly in a public meeting of the vestry in St Michael’s church in Bridgetown. 
Alms, however, took many forms during the seventeenth century. For example, in 1675, the vestry 
gave William Trundell and his wife ten gallons of rum, 20 pounds of sugar and five shillings in 
sterling, “in stock for a livelihood.” The gifts could also be more basic than the foundations for a 
trade or livelihood. In 1673, the vestry gave Matthew Tomlinson a new blue shirt and a pair of 
plain shoes. Whether in the form of a gift in kind, the use of parish land or a pension, the wealthy 
leaders of St Michaels parish, re-articulated the boundaries of the English colonial community 
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every time they identified and acted to relieve settlers they viewed as particularly vulnerable 
members of a coherent settler society.  
In general, the vestry attempted to preserve settler families from poverty whenever 
possible, reflecting planters growing concern about the demographic of slavery as the institution 
came to define the island’s plantation system. In 1658, the vestry gave John Lambard a six-year 
lease on 3-acres owned by the parish because he “hath six small children and is destitute of 
maintenance to mayntayne them.”151 According to the stipulations of the gift, Lambard could cut 
the wood on these three acres but could not sell the lumber without permission from the parish. 
Lambard could clear the land to eke a living from its soil, but could not benefit directly from the 
sale of a commodity like timber. In service of creating and re-creating settler families split apart 
by the island’s disease environment and dislocation, the parish paid parishioners yearly adjusted 
allowances to provide care for the parish’s orphaned settlers.  
Between 1655 and 1677, the minutes of St Michael Parish vestry are filled with references 
to children left orphaned or abandoned to the care and discretion of the vestry, signaling the value 
the parish placed on re-creating coherent settler families broken by disease and disruption in this 
period. Over the course of the 22 years at least 36 orphaned or abandoned children of English and 
Anglican settlers were taken up into parish care or placed in the care of another parishioner. Many 
entered the minute books as un-named children, with no reference to their parentage or any other 
identifying descriptors. Sometimes, the vestry clerks described orphans by a parent such as when 
the vestry entrusted “Thomas West’s child” to the care of Mary Nicholls in 1667 for £100 sugar-
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currency per month.152 Sometimes the parish dealt with children they believed abandoned. In 1675, 
Parish authorities decided that Edward Lissle, a “poor child,” be placed in the care of Mary 
Croome, until “the father of the said child be sought out to maintain the said child.”153 The mobility 
of Barbados’s transient poor settler community temporarily solved problems of vagrancy on 
Barbados but posed new challenges in the form of children left behind for the parish.  
The parish’s interest in re-creating settler families extended even to the children of settlers 
the colonial state put to death. In 1661, when the colonial government executed Elizabeth White 
for murder, the parish took care to provide for her infant child. For the most part, the parish reacted 
to the problem of parentless children in Bridgetown by re-creating settler families. The parish paid 
its parishioners in need of the extra income to open up their homes in the port and shelter and feed 
orphans and abandoned children. The system, although functioning within a colonial context, 
replicated patterns of almsgiving established by English parishes in the sixteenth-century.  
The extent to which the parish acted within Bridgetown to re-create settler families can be 
measured through the ways they attempted to organize the care of the parish orphans. Rather than 
give children alms or charity directly, elites tried to place these vulnerable children of white settler 
parents into the care of parishioners, often women who received a monthly stipend in return for 
caring for a parish child. In 1656, for example, the minute books record that “the wife of Robert 
Stone” cared for an orphaned or abandoned child in exchange for a certain sum of currency. 154 
Out of the 35 documented cases of orphan-care, only one, in 1664, indicated that an orphaned 
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child, Elizabeth Payne, would be kept and raised by a male parishioner, John Gaynes. Beyond 
filling crucial parts of the town’s service economy through operating taverns, colonial women in 
Bridgetown helped parish leaders raise vulnerable children within the boundaries of the settler 
society.   
With every passing year, however, the parish’s commitment to re-creating settler families 
weakened as the expansion of the sugar economy drove poorer settlers to greener pastures and 
raised planters and merchants needs for skilled labor.  As the labor needs of elites in Bridgetown 
and Barbados changed during the 1670s, the parish became more willing to bind orphans out to 
master-artisans as apprentices. In 1675, for example, the parish bound John Hosskins, described 
as a parish boy, to the barber John Spencer for seven years. The agreement between the parish and 
Spencer stipulates that “the said Spencer to teach ye said John Hosskins his trade and to cause him 
to be taught to read and write.”  
In the 1670s and 1680s, colonial elites grew increasingly concerned about Barbados’s 
ability to recruit working-class English men to fill crucial roles in the island’s artisan-economy 
and militia.155Given these contexts, it is unsurprising that the parish addressed these port artisans’ 
labor needs by drawing from the town and parish’s orphans. And by stipulating that artisans like 
Spencer provided good care and education, the parish tried to ensure that these orphans grew up 
firmly within the colonial society.   
Alongside the orphaned, a crucial part of the parish’s efforts to re-create poor white settler 
families, the parish considered the disabled, aged, or ill deserving of alms. In 1665, the vestry alms 
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list specified the ailments its vulnerable parishioners faced. Robert Allen had a “Canker in nose” 
and received £100 sugar-currency per month. William Hale and William Wetforte were both blind 
and received the same monthly sum of £100 sugar currency for their subsistence. The vestry 
described Hugh Addley and his wife as “aged” and gave them similar pensions. Others, like 
Anthonie Persue, the parish considered particularly vulnerable. The vestry described him as a 
“boy, sick and lame” when they recorded that he would receive £100 sugar-currency per month. 
In 1666, when Mary Bell was “at present in a very weak condition and helpless,” the vestry gave 
her the same monthly sum for an indefinite period, as long as her weakened condition persisted.156 
In these early years of Barbados’s plantation society, the parish elite proved willing to divert at 
least some token resources to maintaining those poorer white settlers without obvious value to the 
sugar economy.  
In moments of particular crisis, such as a natural disaster, the vestry re-articulated its early 
commitment to extending care to the deserving poor by diverting aid away from the sugar 
economy. In 1675, for example, the vestry gave Temperance Taylor the lump sum of £500 sugar-
currency “towards the repaire of her house” in the wake of a devastating hurricane.157 While the 
colonial government responded to the 1675 hurricane and other disasters by repairing public 
structures and infrastructure, particularly fortifications, the vestry assumed care for settlers without 
the resources of credit to rebuild broken homes and livelihoods.  
Starting in the mid-1660s, however, an alternative method for controlling the rising poverty 
of Barbados’s lower settler classes emerged in the form of a parish almshouse in Bridgetown. As 
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early as September 1666, the vestry of St Michael parish began discussing turning buildings owned 
by the parish into an almshouse to better provision those poor whites who survived on the streets 
of Bridgetown. After starting a project to improve the town’s church and cleaning the churchyard, 
the vestry ordered its churchwarden to see “That the house built for the parish be when finished 
made an almshouse of the parish and the poor kept at the Parish charge be all put there.” Separate 
from the town’s Gaol and the Cage (increasingly used in the seventeenth-century to confine 
enslaved runaways), the almshouse closely attached literally and institutionally to the island’s 
Anglican establishment dealt exclusively with Bridgetown’s population of chronically 
impoverished and vagrant.  
The first entrants into the almshouse both reveal the parish’s interest in preserving settler 
families and physically separating such vulnerable settler populations from the colony’s emergent 
plantation landscapes. Among the first people to enter Bridgetown’s almshouse in 1667 were Mary 
Hayes and her three children. Alongside the Hayes family, the vestry placed the sick in the 
almshouse to regulate and administer care, perhaps to ensure that poor white settlers did not turn 
to enslaved practitioners on sugar plantations. In 1671, the vestry appointed Oliver Gallhampton, 
“Apothecary and Surgeon” to “look after the poor of the parish at the almshouse.” The vestry 
ordered Gallhampton “to physique and care the sick from time to time during the space of one 
yeare from ye date hereof, he being to visit the sick in his own person three times in the week and 
his servant visit them every day.” For his work caring for the almshouse residents, Gallhampton 
earned £4000 a year in sugar-currency.158 The vestry’s efforts to improve the almshouse 
emphasized the central role the structure held as a site for providing medical care for the poor 
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white community. In 1670, the vestry ordered the churchwardens to “cause convenient rooms to 
be made for fluxing” in the town’s almshouse, a space for either the purging of blood or diarrhea.159 
Rather than the colonial government, the parish, acting largely independently, worked to exert 
local power and resources to create such social and physical barriers in Bridgetown in the 1660s 
and 1670s. 
While many of the almshouse inhabitants included children, family-groups, the sick or 
disabled, the vestry tried to organize the inhabitants to work somewhere in Bridgetown’s complex 
maritime economy. In 1669, vestry ordered that “ye poor be kept at work by picking acombe or 
such other reasonable work.”160 Beyond caring for the sick, the almshouse also functioned, like 
they did elsewhere in the English Atlantic world, as a mechanism of instilling discipline over the 
idle or vagrant poor. In the context of Barbados’s emergent slave society, the walls of the 
almshouse separated the white, settler poor from the emergent social geographies of the island’s 
enslaved.161 In Bridgetown, the parish played an important role in drawing these distinctions by 
physically separating and confining the poor to the town’s almshouse.  
While the almshouse separated the European poor from the rest of the island’s working 
population, increasingly made up of enslaved African peoples, the vestry removed poor whites 
from the colony altogether. Several of the alms distributed from the parish took the form of paying 
for transportation off Barbados. John Lambard, after having been given parish land to care for his 
family, received a further sum to ship him and his family to Jamaica, presumably to take advantage 
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of the plentiful land opened by the English conquest in the mid-1650s. In 1676, a woman going by 
the name Urselah, received 20 shillings sterling for passage to Boston in the next ship heading to 
that port. The parish was less specific with William Ellis and simply ordered the churchwarden to 
make a contract with any shipmaster to remove Ellis from the island altogether.162 From 
Bridgetown, the parish exercised its authority over the deserving poor white settlers, shaping the 
social geographies of the island’s emerging plantation system. 
The parish’s enforcement of social boundaries extended beyond the dismal walls of the 
almshouse with its rooms for fluxing. Bridgetown, long the center of trade and the colony’s 
political institutions, emerged a center of the island’s social elite. The Anglican church, controlled 
by St Michael’s parish, assumed a central role in the definition of the island’s settler social 
hierarchy. One method in which the vestry informed the articulation of these social boundaries and 
hierarchies within settler society was the placing of pews in the parish church of St Michael’s in 
the center of Bridgetown. In 1667, ordered “Mr Nicholas Prideaux and Mr Ralph Hartleye with all 
convient speed take order for ye placing and seating of inhabitants according to their degree and 
quality in the parish Church.”163  
Over the course of the 1670s, the parish and the island’s colonial government both began 
to take notice of growing religious minorities as the parish continued to struggle with controlling 
the settler poor. In the 1660s, while the growth of Sephardi and Quaker communities went largely 
unnoticed by the island’s planters and merchants in the colonial government, the parish acted to 
enforce new categories of social difference beyond the boundaries of the sugar plantation. Key 
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moments of colonial crisis in the mid-1670s spurred greater institutional action from the colonial 
government as it began to reckon with the implications of the religious and cultural diversity 
created by the tacit acceptance of Quaker and Sephardi diasporas in the 1660s. 
3.5 Crisis of the Mid-1670s 
In the 1670s, just a short walk the Sephardi neighborhood of Bridgetown centered on Nidhe 
Yisrael and Swan street, hundreds of English colonists gathered together to attend the yearly 
meetings the Society of Friends held at their largest meeting house on the corner of James and 
Tudor streets. Like their Sephardi neighbors on Swan street, the town’s Quakers represented a 
religious minority in Anglican Barbados despite sharing cultural origins with the island’s merchant 
and planter elite. And like the port’s Jews, Bridgetown’s Quakers made up one node in a sprawling 
Atlantic diaspora that, while centered in London, stretched from the English metropole to colonies 
in North America and the Caribbean.164 On Barbados, Bridgetown and its Meeting Houses served 
as the center of Quaker activity and spiritual life. While many aspects of the Quaker theology may 
have challenged the principles of Barbados’s slave society and the planter class, the community’s 
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leaders and most successful figures found, like some of their Jewish neighbors, a measure of 
financial success and stability in the 1650s and 1660s. This relative invisibility ended in the 1670s, 
as a growing number of colonial institutions took notice of these communities and sought to curtail 
their influence in Barbados.   
By the 1670s, the presence of Quakers in Bridgetown was marked in the town’s built 
environment. In Barbados, many of the wealthiest of the newly-convinced Quakers were 
Bridgetown merchants like Richard Forstall. Forstall owned nearly 316 acres of plantations in 
Barbados but styled himself as a merchant and held extensive properties in Bridgetown. Not only 
did he donate the use of one of his buildings to serve as the Quaker meetinghouse on James Street, 
but also gave a nearby plot of land to serve as a Quaker cemetery. Before his generous donations 
in the 1670s, the island’s Quakers used their gardens as burial grounds. Such donations and the 
needs of a growing religious community demanded centralization of the Society of Friends of 
Barbados in Bridgetown.  
With the community’s spiritual life centralized in Bridgetown in the 1670s, itinerant 
preachers could more easily reach new converts. In 1670, George Fox, the Society’s English 
founder visited Barbados, arriving first to preach in Bridgetown. Fox attracted interest from 
Quaker and non-Quaker alike. Planters and the colonial elite travelled to Bridgetown to hear Fox 
preach, energizing the convinced and enabling others to find inner light. After Fox’s visit, the 
centralization of the community in Bridgetown grew. Barbados’s Quakers began meeting not only 
for religious gatherings on Sunday but also at local meetings mapped roughly onto the island’s 
Anglican parochial system. On a more local level, Friends were now encouraged to meet once 
every six weeks and every quarter at Friends’ houses in the countryside. But the ultimate forum 
for island-wide decisions took place in Bridgetown at two monthly meetings held at the Friend’s 
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meetinghouse on James Street.165 In Bridgetown, the island’s community came together to guide 
the social life of the community and answer its most fundamental questions of spiritual life amidst 
the hostility of the colony’s Anglican church. 
Quaker centralization in Bridgetown alongside the town’s Sephardim made both 
communities more visible to the island’s colonial elite, enabling the town’s parish to view such 
communities as exploitable for their resources. Despite greater visibility, in the first half of the 
1670s, Sephardim in particular were able to earn the protection of the colonial government. The 
vestry of St Michael’s parish viewed Sephardim as a source of income for the over-stretched 
colonial institution. Beginning in the late 1660s and into the 1670s, St. Michael’s parish 
disproportionately taxed Bridgetown’s Jews. Sephardim represented at most two percent of 
Barbados’s seventeenth-century settler population in the mid-seventeenth century. Nevertheless, 
they paid a significant portion of the parish’s annual levies. In 1670, for example, the St Michael’s 
vestry ordered £50,000 of sugar-currency for repairing the parish highways. The town’s 
inhabitants would pay £34,000 of that sum, while the Jews would pay £16,000.166 In the early 
years of the 1670s, Sephardim on Barbados still felt empowered enough to seek redress from the 
island’s London-appointed governor, William Willoughby. In 1671, leading Sephardi merchants 
complained directly to Willoughby about the parish’s extortionary taxes. While the governor re-
affirmed the vestry’s ability to tax the Jewish community, Willoughby intervened on behalf of the 
community, persuading the vestry to lower its rate.  
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In the 1670s, Sephardim continued to earn the protection of the island’s colonial 
government with the arrival of a new colonial governor from London, Jonathan Atkins. In 1674, 
shortly after Atkin’s arrival, the Assembly passed an act with Atkin’s approval “appointing how 
the testimony of the People of the Hebrew nation shall be admitted in all Courts and Causes.” 
Before this act, the law only allowed for testimony in Barbados’s courts by free Englishmen willing 
to swear on a Christian bible. This act allowed Jewish people (if they were considered “Men of 
Credit and Commerce”) to swear on “the five books of Moses, in such manner and form as is usual, 
and the religion of the said Nation doth admit.167” In the context of Bridgetown’s maritime 
commerce driven by high levels of planter debt, the inability of Sephardim to present testimony in 
the island’s courts represented a serious handicap in their ability to negotiate mercantile 
relationships with the island’s planters, English merchants and ships’ captains.  
Before 1675, both Sephardim and Quakers enjoyed a period of relatively quiet growth and 
the slow extension of acceptance by the island’s colonial government if not the larger settler 
society. This changed in 1675 as a series of crises de-stabilized Barbados’s settler society and 
concerned the colonial government. First a hurricane wrecked the plantation economy, ruining 
crops and damaging buildings across the island. In the wake of the hurricane, the colonial 
government learned of a growing conspiracy among the island’s enslaved population. For the 
island’s planters and colonial government, the conspiracy of 1675 represented an especially grave 
threat to the colony’s security. The result was a shift away from the parochial power structure that 
defined elite’s management of Bridgetown’s social and cultural diversity towards a system marked 
by the greater intervention of the colonial state.  
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The crisis of the mid-1670s, while of profound importance to the ways settlers governed 
Bridgetown, originated in the island’s transatlantic slave trade and the island’s plantation system. 
The news of an island-wide conspiracy of Akan-speaking peoples to replace the colonial 
government with a reconstructed west African kingdom, proved sensational enough to merit 
inclusion in an anonymously-written pamphlet published in London in 1676.168 The pamphlet, 
Great Newes from the Barbadoes, published in London in 1676, was included alongside a raft of 
crises shaking England’s imperial projects in the Atlantic world.169 From the indigenous resistance 
led by Metacom in New England to the joint insurrection of working poor, indentured servants, 
and enslaved people of Bacon’s rebellion in the Chesapeake, the pamphlet-makers included “A 
True and Faithful Account of the Grand Conspiracy of the Negroes against the English.” The 
pamphlet described the alleged plot for enslaved African people of mostly Akan-speakers to rise-
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up and enthrone an Akan man, Cuffee, as the ruler of a liberated African state on Barbados. After 
discovering the rumors, the colonial government acted swiftly empowering the island’s justices of 
the peace and militia officers to arrest and execute the alleged ringleaders in Speightstown, the 
island’s second largest port behind Bridgetown.170 The pamphlet-writers described the 
conspiracy’s ringleader, “one Tony, a sturdy Rogue, a Jew’s Negro” who had the temerity to taunt 
his executioners and the crowd gathered to watch his body burnt alive.171  
In the wake of the 1675 conspiracy, the colonial government imposed anti-Quaker and 
antisemitic measures popular with the Anglican parochial authorities in Bridgetown. Practices that 
had largely gone unnoticed before 1675, suddenly found themselves not just the focus of irate 
Anglican clergy and antisemitic merchants but the concern of the colonial government. Of greatest 
interest to the colonial government after the Akan-conspiracy of 1675 was the unsettling Quaker 
practice of including enslaved people in their meetings.  
The first part of this broader reaction against Quakers and Sephardim built on the colonial 
government’s traditional responsibility over legislating the island’s slave codes. Starting in April 
1676, Barbados’s Assembly passed a series of laws prohibiting Quakers from allowing enslaved 
people into their meetings. The first of such laws responded to Quaker practices of bringing the 
enslaved to meetings. During his visit, Fox admonished Quaker slave-owners to ameliorate the 
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deplorable conditions of enslaved peoples and indentured servants. They should, according to Fox, 
“deal mildly and gently with them and not use cruelty as the manner of some is and hath been.” 
This care extended to the spiritual lives of the enslaved. Fox organized meetings on individual 
plantations specifically to preach to enslaved African peoples, and before departing Fox instructed 
planters and merchants to include enslaved people in the Quaker’s spiritual community. Settlers 
had long feared the Quaker practice of allowing enslaved people to attend their meetings, but it 
was not until the 1675 conspiracy that assembly and the governor passed such restrictions into law.  
The 1676 law banning the enslaved from Quaker meetings sought to foster a system of 
surveillance in places like Bridgetown to limit the practice. The law’s authors argued that enslaved 
peoples “taught in [Quaker] Principles…” represented a threat “…whereby the safety of this Island 
may be much hazarded.” Any informant who knew of and reported on the presence of enslaved 
African people at a Quaker meeting would receive half of a ten-pound sterling fine levied on either 
the Quaker owner of the enslaved person present or any of the free Quakers sharing space with an 
enslaved person.172 Two years later, Atkin’s successor to the governorship, Richard Dutton ordered 
the act to continue another two years beyond its initial mandate with slight modifications in the 
fines and punishments meted out to Quakers violating the law.  
After banning enslaved people from Quaker meetings, the colonial government took active 
measures to further limit the spread of Quakerism among the island’s Anglican settlers, extending 
the colonial reaction against Quakers into the late 1670s. Two laws passed in 1676 and 1678 laws 
required anyone trying to “keep any School or Schools, to instruct any Child or Children” to take 
the oath of allegiance and supremacy before a Justice of the Peace (JP), measures which would 
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effectively ban Quakers, unable to swear or make oaths, from operating schools. School-keepers 
refusing to take an oath, almost certainly Quakers, would face three-month imprisonment and a 
fine of £3000 in muscovado sugar. To limit proselytizing, the same laws ordered that only “no 
person or persons whatsoever, that is not an Inhabitant and resident of this Island, and hath been 
so for the space of twelve months together, shall hereafter publickly discourse or preach at the 
Meetings of the Quakers.”173 Such a clause prohibited the landless, itinerant preachers that had 
done so much to build the community in the 1650s and 1660s. The colonial crises of the mid-1670s 
ushered in a period of repression against Quaker settlers that more directly brought the colonial 
government into intervening in Bridgetown’s social and cultural geographies. 
In the 1680s, these colonial efforts to repress the challenges posed by Quaker practices 
began to specifically target the Society of Friend’s meeting house in Bridgetown. In 1680, when 
Richard Dutton arrived on Barbados to take over the governorship, he heeded the warnings of his 
council and ordered Bridgetown’s constables to go to the Tudor Street meeting house and pull 
“down the Seats, Pews, Desks or Stages” and shutter the doors to the building. Ultimately, the 
island’s deputy provost-marshall did not follow through on the whole-sale destruction of the 
meeting house but did bar the entrance to the house, forcing the town’s Quakers to gather outside 
in the town’s streets. Under Dutton, more hardships followed. Quakers refusing to serve in the 
island’s militia or pay parish taxes faced heavy fines, imprisonment, and seizure of property. Other 
members of the community faced physical violence, either at the hands of colonial officials 
according to law or spontaneous violence meted out by colonists in Anglican churches or the 
island’s towns. Such was the case when two Quakers rode through one of the island’s port towns 
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and encountered a crowd that beat them after they refused to drink at a tavern. “They tossed the 
two Quakers in front of their horses and ‘whipt the Horses to make them tread upon’ the men.” 
Then, after first pelting the pair with stones, the crowd tossed them from the wharves into the 
waters of Carlisle Bay.174 Bridgetown became not only a key site of individual Anglican violence 
against Quakers but also an arena for the colonial government to visibly repress a particularly 
threatening religious community. 
Although more directly implicated in the Akan conspiracy of 1675 than the Quakers, 
settlers reacted more slowly and haphazardly against Sephardim and the colonial government’s 
response to this popular antisemitism proved much more muted than reprisals against Quakerism. 
Unlike their Quaker neighbors, Sephardim were geographically concentrated in the island’s ports 
and largely excluded from owning the ultimate source of colonial power, sugar plantations.175 
While Quakers counted members of the planter elite among their ranks in the seventeenth-century, 
Sephardim were uniformly excluded from these powerful social circles. Individual Sephardim 
achieved wealth, stability, and stature in Bridgetown but remained significantly marginalized. 
Perhaps because of this relative marginalization, colonial reaction against Sephardim in 
Bridgetown and Barbados as a whole remained significantly less acute following the colonial 
crises of the mid-1670s.  
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At least some settlers, in particular English merchants in Bridgetown, believed that the 
governor, council, and assembly should take legislative or executive action to not only repress the 
growth of the island’s Sephardi community but effectuate their removal from the island. In 1681, 
shortly after the arrival of the newly appointed governor from London, Sir Richard Dutton, a group 
of English colonists delivered a petition to Barbados’s Assembly calling for the complete removal 
of Jews from Barbados. This was not the first time these petitioners had approached the colonial 
government with such a proposal. Before Dutton’s arrival, they had apparently sent a similar 
petition to Dutton’s predecessor, Sir Jonathan Atkins. Neither Dutton nor Atkins acted on such 
proposals, nor did they mention such requests in their frequent reports back to London. Their 
silence on these reports speaks to the apathy the imperial government felt about the presence of 
Jewish foreigners in Barbados. Most of Barbados’s planters seemed to share London’s apathy 
towards Bridgetown’s Jews. Some of Bridgetown’s merchants, at least, believed that the colonial 
government, its governor and council, might take action and support such a proposal. 
The language of the 1681 petition deployed traditional expressions of Christian 
antisemitism but originated in the specificities of mercantile competition in Bridgetown and sought 
to prompt greater intervention in Bridgetown by the island’s English colonial government. The 
petition framed its accusations of disloyalty amongst the island’s Sephardim in the broadest terms 
possible. The petitioners accused Jews of “barbarous inhumanity and subtle conspiracy… in 
general against all Christendom…”176 They narrowed their focus particularly to Jewish plotting 
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against England in the vague form of “they have already given, as there is too much reason to 
believe, intelligence to her enemies and will do the same again.” In the context of Barbados, the 
petitioners referred to the inter-colonial trade that made Bridgetown’s Sephardi community both 
an asset for the town’s trade and a potential source of tension during times of war. Submitted by 
Jeremiah Cooke, Robert Draper, Thomas Morris, and John Smith, the leaders behind this 
antisemitic petition were all English merchants in Bridgetown.   
While Barbados’s colonial government rejected such extreme measures as expulsion, the 
island’s Assembly did pass restrictive legislation that reinforced the exclusion of Sephardim from 
directly participating in the plantation economy in the 1680s. In 1688, the island’s Assembly 
passed a revised slave code that built and expanded on the earlier act passed in 1661. One of the 
new clauses to this act curtailed Sephardi ownership of enslaved people. The new clause argued 
that 
the Planter’s necessity doth compel them for the management only of their Lands, to keep 
so vast a stock of Negroes and other Slaves, whose desperate lives and great numbers 
become dangerous to them and all other the Inhabitants; that therefore such who are not 
bound up by that necessity, in having Plantations of their own, or hired Land, may not 
increase the danger to this Island, by keeping Negroes or other Slaves to hire out to others.  
 
The English law makers concluded, therefore, that “no person of the Hebrew nation 
residing in any Sea-port Town” could own or employ more than one enslaved person. They 
included only one exception for Sephardim who were made English denizens by a royal Letter 
Patent, a lengthy process reserved for the wealthiest members of the community. Even with this 
limited exception the Assembly warned that denizened Jews should “keep no more than for their 
own use.”177 Such legal codes did not share the religious antisemitism of the earlier petitions but 
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nevertheless articulated a skepticism held by English colonists of the economic relations, such as 
hiring enslaved people, with Jewish residents in Bridgetown.  
3.6 The Persistence of Religious Diversity 
By the end of the 1680s, Barbados’s colonial government had endeavored to pass and 
enforce legislation that, by intervening in Bridgetown’s emergent social and cultural geographies 
in the 1670s responded to a moment of colonial crisis and built on the settler’s popular anti-Quaker 
and antisemitic beliefs. These laws sought to regulate the degree to which religious community 
engaged with the institution of slavery. For Quakers, the laws passed in the 1670s primarily sought 
to limit Quaker meetings and their inclusion of enslaved people.  Laws passed in the 1680s sought 
to restrict Sephardim from engaging in the island’s larger slave labor markets. This period of 
colonial religious repression, however, did little to limit individual Sephardim and Quakers from 
finding fortunes, success, and building community in Barbados and Bridgetown. Despite these 
years of tightening restrictions on these communities, they nevertheless appear to have continued 
to thrive in the island’s principal port towns.   
However, in spite of these changes, these communities preserved their integrity through 
whatever means available to them, whether that was assimilation into the formal avenues of 
colonial power available to the Quakers or through diasporic connections available to the island’s 
Sephardim. Wills from the 1680s reveal the social geographies upon which Sephardim in 
Bridgetown built their lives in the context of colonial backlash against non-Anglicans. These 
scattered wills and depositions, some written in English, but for the most part written in the 
community’s native Portuguese and Spanish, recorded how the complex social geographies of 
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diaspora shaped the island’s earliest Jewish community. These connections and relations existed 
on multiple scales. In 1682, for example, depositions taken before Barbados’s secretary describes 
how Jacob Pathecoe lived in Bridgetown with his sister and brother-in-law, Rachel and Moses 
Arrobus. During Pathecoe’s final illness in his sister and brother-in-law’s house, he kept company 
with two Sephardi friends, Daniel Bueno and Samuel Navarro.178 For the most part, however, these 
wills describe diasporic connections spanning the early modern Atlantic world that connected the 
insular world of Swan street and Nidhe Yisrael to Portuguese Brazil, Amsterdam, and London.  
Diasporic and transatlantic connections enabled individual Sephardim to carve out a place 
of themselves on Barbados in this moment of planter backlash against free religious and social 
outsiders. In July 1685, for example, Aaron Navarro, the son of a prominent Sephardi merchant in 
Amsterdam, died in Bridgetown. Aaron, as his will testifies to, formed part of an expansive trade 
operation that included his two brothers (Moseh and Jacob), one described as a merchant “de 
Brazil” and another “de Amsterdam.” Dying without immediate family, Navarro asked his two 
surviving brothers to settle his business in these two major poles of the Sephardi mercantile 
diaspora in the early modern Atlantic world.179 Such connections speak to the methods Sephardim 
used to weather this moment of planter backlash. This pattern of Sephardi settlement in the Atlantic 
world may have originated in sixteenth-century mass expulsions and forced-conversions of Iberian 
Jews, but came to sustain communities in places like Bridgetown.180  
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Through such diasporic connections, Bridgetown’s Sephardim were able to face an 
increasingly hostile political climate for Sephardim and Quakers in the 1680s. By the 1690s, 
Sephardim gained a measure of economic security and status in Bridgetown through these 
mercantile connections. The wealthiest merchants of the community owned property in buildings 
closer to Carlisle Bay on the main thoroughfare, Cheapside. Listed among the Cheapside property 
owners in 1692 were prominent members of the town’s Jewish community, Lewis Dies, David 
Nameas, David Israel, and the widow Hester Navarro. From the parochial tax lists, Lewis Dies’s 
house on Cheapside ranked as the fourth highest assessed building on the street at £480 in sugar; 
just slightly above the £400 in sugar the RAC paid for its office and warehouse on the same 
street.181 More important than real estate, members of Bridgetown’s Sephardi community owned 
enslaved people, a critical marker of success and social rank in Barbados’s nascent slave society. 
In his 1685 will, David Deacosta left a bequest of “los Negros de caza, Namadas Deana, y Una 
Oria, Beas y Vos Muchacho llamado Gersou Catalina” to his son-in-law and daughter, Daniel and 
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Sarah Bueno Enriques.182 As in all slave societies, the trappings of success for Sephardim included 
direct ownership of enslaved peoples, even outside the plantation economy in ports like 
Bridgetown.  
By the 1680s, despite years of anti-Quaker measures coming from the colony’s governors 
and assembly, Bridgetown, in the large parish of St. Michael, still had the highest concentration of 
Quakers on the island. Unlike the town’s Sephardi community centered in Swan street around 
Nidhe Israel, Quaker settlers remained spread out across the town. The most successful Friends, 
however, owned property in Cheapside, the town’s commercial center and the street closest to the 
waterfront. Along with Richard Forstall, the Quaker merchants of Cheapside owned thirteen 
percent of the 102 properties listed on the parish tax lists of 1686. The town not only attracted 
wealthy Quaker merchants but also the greatest proportion of the island’s landless Quakers, 
categorized on Barbados’s censuses as freemen, lived in the island’s two ports, Bridgetown and 
Speightstown. So, while Quakers were not as geographically concentrated as the town’s 
Sephardim, they made up a significant part of the port’s free population in the latter-half of the 
seventeenth century.  
Through the town’s mercantile economy, Quakers found ways to preserve their families’ 
fortunes despite the growing hostility of the island’s colonial government to their religious lives. 
By the end of the seventeenth century, Barbados’s Quakers still came from all social classes and 
occupations in the island’s settler society, a legacy of the widespread successes itinerant preachers 
had in the 1650s and 1660s. Bridgetown’s Quaker community displayed this social stratification. 
Some, like Richard Forstall who donated land for a Quaker cemetery in Bridgetown also owned 
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sugar plantations on Barbados, while others, like Hugh Hall were merchants in Bridgetown.183 
Hall, originally a New England merchant moved to Barbados and became a Quaker sometime in 
the 1660s or 1670s. In the late 1690s, Hall left his sons, Hugh Jr, Joseph, John, and Benjamin parts 
and parcels of two significant plantations in Pennsylvania, just outside of the newly founded 
Quaker settlement of Philadelphia.184 Merchants like Hall and Forstall, in addition to having 
plantations, both on and off the island, also acted as crucial factors for larger Quaker sugar planters 
as well as other English colonists. Often through kinship ties fostered through the Society of 
Friends, these Quaker-merchants made commercial and market decisions that brought a degree of 
stability to individual Quaker families in Bridgetown.  
Quaker families like the Forstalls and Halls lived in Bridgetown with less affluent families 
of shopkeepers and minor merchants that survived the period of Quaker repression. Among these 
shopkeepers and middling merchant-provisioners to survive this period of political repression was 
Richard Poor, a member of a Quaker family active in business between 1699 and 1713. His account 
book offers a rare glimpse into his business as a provisioner, the struggles he faced in making the 
transition towards becoming a transatlantic importer in his own right. Poor began his business as 
a shopkeeper selling perishables imported from the young Quaker colony around Philadelphia. 
Never yielding high profit margins, Poor nevertheless found the means to bring importing 
manufactured goods and textiles from Britain by the 1710s. For the rest of his life, Poor remained 
a middling merchant and provisioner, living and working in town’s secondary commercial 
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thorough-fare, High Street.185 Such families like the Poors built their family’s personal fortunes 
through transatlantic trade driven by the island’s sugar and slave economy. 
Despite this social stratification and Quaker’s practice of admitting the enslaved to their 
meetings and manumitting enslaved people in their wills, Quakers in Bridgetown and throughout 
Barbados remained enthusiastic slave-owners both before and after the period of colonial 
repression in the late 1670s and 1680s. Investment in slavery underpinned these families’ ability 
to survive a particularly repressive period that followed 1675. Writing his will in 1698, Hugh Hall 
expressed his desire to be buried “According to the Plaine … Manner of the People of God called 
Quakers” while leaving sixteen enslaved peoples by name amongst his bequests to his family.186 
Other Quakers like Forstall and the wealthy planter Lewis Morris depended on hundreds of 
enslaved workers to operate their sugar plantations.187  
Quakers and Sephardim were not the only non-Anglican minorities to thrive in Bridgetown 
during the years in which the colonial government attempt to repress these minorities within settler 
society. In 1690, Edward Prince, a “practitioner in physicks,” died leaving behind a will with 
multiple bequests. While Prince asked to be buried in the new church yard in Bridgetown, also 
asking his executors to “give unto Mr Vaughan the minister of the Presbiterian meeting in said 
town a Ring of 40 shillings price.”188 From such references, it becomes apparent that Bridgetown’s 
English community was not uniformly Anglican nor was its religious dissident community entirely 
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made up of the Society of Friends. Quakers, Presbyterians, and Sephardi Jews all shared the streets 
of Bridgetown with the island’s working poor, including those of European descent. Despite fierce 
colonial reaction to the religious diversity of the island’s free settler society in the wake of the 
1675 conspiracy, such diversity continued to mark the port’s cultural and social geographies. The 
colonial government’s reactions to the conspiracy of 1675 marked a step forward in the ways the 
colonial government intervened in governing Bridgetown in the seventeenth century.  
3.7 “The Fewer the Better”: Civic Improvement and the Decline of Indentured Servitude 
Mirroring the growing interest of the governor, counsel, and assembly in governing 
Bridgetown’s religious outsiders within settler society, individual planters and merchants 
increasingly intervened in Bridgetown’s built environment to articulate social hierarchies within 
the island’s free settler society. Over the course of this period, however, the rapid expansion of the 
island’s enslaved population brought the plight of the settler poor to the attention of the colonial 
government. Concern with the overall social health of settler society spread from the local level of 
the island’s Anglican parish system to the wider planter elite. Planters and colonial elite expressed 
these concerns in a number of ways, from planter instructions to plantation managers warning 
against the detrimental effects of the island’s poor settlers on enslaved workers’ discipline to elite 
civic projects in Bridgetown.  
Leading planters wrote publicly and privately about their distrust of indentured servants 
and poor white labor on sugar plantations. Henry Drax, the son of sugar pioneer James Drax, left 
detailed instructions for the management to his estate when he returned to England in 1679. Drax’s 
instructions ended up being circulated amongst West Indian and English planters, eventually 
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forming the basis for a popular booklet on plantation management published in 1755. Drax’s 
attitudes shed light on the growing distrust planters held towards their indentured labor in the 
second-half of the seventeenth century. “I shall Not leave you many white Servants,” Drax 
instructed his manager, Richard Harwood, “the ffewer the better.” Those Drax did agree to send 
would be “tradesmen as I Can possibly procure.” In describing how he wanted Harwood to manage 
his labor, Drax warned that he should be “Sewere in punishing all Vice and Espetially drunknese 
that being oft times the origanell of all others and is the vice the Whits are Much adicted to.”189  
By 1680, planters like Drax had formed a critical set of assumptions about indentured 
servants brought from the British Isles. The Catholicism and Irish heritage of many indentured 
servants brought over in the 1650s surely must have contributed to this evolving set of assumptions 
about the desirability of employing indentured servants in the cane fields, mills, and boiling 
houses. The few that Drax would bring over in the future would fill specialized positions as artisans 
or managerial overseers. As planters brought fewer indentured servants to Barbados and distrusted 
those they currently employed, former indentured servants who survived their indentures during 
the second half of the seventeenth-century faced an uncertain future on the island as they were 
simultaneously protected from future labor on sugar plantations but distrusted by the island’s 
propertied classes. The uncertain position and general instability of these figures within settler 
society demanded new articulations of the island’s shared white settler culture.  
The continued precarity of indentured servants in Bridgetown and elsewhere around the 
island continued to provoke parochial interventions. A significant portion of the community ended 
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up on what were called “rab lands,” parts of the island unfit for sugar agriculture but suitable for 
growing root vegetables and other provisions. On the margins of the large sugar estates, poor 
whites eked out a living from these less-profitable grounds. At least some of the island’s poor 
whites and former indentured servants turned towards the sea. In 1676, for example, the vestry of 
St John’s parish along the rocky bays of the island’s east coast tried to protect a community of 
people “which draw there principle livelihood and subsitance by there trade and occupation of 
fishing by sale of part where of they supply there necessitites and with ye remainder feed there 
families.” The vestry put together a petition condemning the “greedy and avaricious desires of 
some person who make it there Indeavor to ingross the fishing to themselves.”190  The vestry feared 
that if any one planter or planters managed to secure exclusive rights to these coastal fishing spots 
“it would inevitably bring them to so great poverty that they must either have relief from ye parish 
to supporte there families or be inforced to depart ye island.”  Through an act of planter 
paternalism, the vestry hoped to keep these communities from starving and either going on the 
parish dole or fleeing the island altogether.  
Alongside the persistent intervention of parochial governments, individual planters and 
merchants expressed their communal responsibility to the island’s white population through 
bequests to the island’s settler society and colonial institutions. Most bequests were modest 
contributions to the parish poor relief. A few were of greater size and significance. Like the poor 
relief organized by the parish, these legacy-bequests, while exceptional in their scale, suggest the 
degree in which individual planters and merchants who profited from sugar and slavery, tried to 
pour those profits into creating real and figurative symbols for a white, English community that 
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extended beyond the planter and merchant classes. The concentration of these efforts in 
Bridgetown speaks to the importance that space held for elites trying to articulate the boundaries 
and principles of white supremacy in Barbados.  
Despite expressing his disdain for former indentured servants and the carters that travelled 
Barbados’s roads in his private instructions to his plantation manager, Henry Drax tried to establish 
a “Free College” in Bridgetown for the benefit of the island’s general free settler society. While 
he’s known by historians today for his instructions and writings on plantation management, Drax, 
the scion of one of Barbados’s sugar and slave pioneers, owned considerable property in 
Bridgetown. Like his father James Drax, Henry owned a large storehouse facing the town’s main 
commercial thoroughfare, Cheapside. His estate on Barbados firmly secured and family fortunes 
well-established, Drax returned to London early in the 1680s. In 1683, he sat down to write his 
will. As a document, Drax’s will testifies to the enormous wealth his family amassed and the 
degree to which he wanted to preserve his family’s legacy. Dying childless, Drax required his 
nephew and heir Thomas Shetterden to change his last name to Drax before formally inheriting 
the lion’s share of his estate.191 Beyond ensuring the survival of his family name, Drax sought to 
leave a permanent mark on the island’s colonial society by endowing a school. 
Leaving aside £2000 sterling for his executors in England and Barbados, Drax hoped the 
money would go towards creating a “free school or College at the Bridgetown,” an act which 
simultaneously expressed his hopes for the island’s future and his own family’s position within 
the hierarchy of the island’s settler society. He hoped that this sum would go towards building this 
school three years after his decease and any remaining debts of the estate had been resolved. After 
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building the school, Drax entrusted his executors to “make such Rules Orders and Constituitions 
for the said Government and continuance of the said Free schoole or College as by them or the 
survivor of them shall be adjudged convenient.” Pre-dating the establishment of Codrington 
College by three decades, Drax’s wish to establish a “Free schoole” represented the earliest attempt 
to create an academic institution on Barbados.192 Drax, like Christopher Codrington in the early 
eighteenth century, and their counterparts in England and British North America, saw building 
schools as a grand work for the public good.  This project was a means to create a permanent 
legacy, define the local symbols of social and cultural elitism, as well as educate a segment of the 
population. Across colonial North America, the first colleges, following Harvard, represented clear 
symbols of social class. Founded close to colonial political and commercial centers, places like 
Yale, Harvard, Brown, and Columbia functioned as institutions to train perspective clergymen or 
buttress the budding political careers of colonial lawyers or statesmen.193 Drax’s plan to endow a 
College near Bridgetown seems to follow these North American patterns. 
Like Drax, Richard Barrett, a wealthy merchant and member of the island’s colonial 
assembly, tried to leave a permanent symbol and legacy in Bridgetown after his death in the 1690s 
that articulated the personal hierarchies within the island’s propertied classes. Barrett’s will, 
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unusual for its unstipulated manumission of an enslaved person, included a legacy-bequest that 
sought to start a significant public project of monumental purpose and scale. Barrett left to the 
“town of St. Michaels” a porcelain and metal “clock hand and Dyall,” valued at £400 sterling. He 
instructed his executors “to sett up the same clock in some convenient place as my executors shall 
think fitt.” 194 Mechanical clocks, a main-stay in most European cities by the seventeenth-century 
were critical parts of focusing communal life on the daily rhythms of market-places and market-
principles. The public clocks were harbingers of the industrial imposition of time-discipline later 
in the eighteenth century.195 Within the context of seventeenth-century Barbados, placing a clock 
in Bridgetown served as a way of creating a distinctive division of time from the highly regimented 
organization of time on sugar plantations. Where the rhythms of sugar cane’s growing season, 
harvesting, and processing dominated the lives of enslaved workers, the hourly movement of the 
tides and fluctuations of the river and swamp around the town defined life for workers and 
merchants along Carlisle Bay. Barrett’s public project, unrealized until the construction of a clock 
tower on St Michael’s church in the 1710s, sought to create a symbolic barrier around Bridgetown 
from the surrounding landscape dominated by sugar plantations and the specific time and work-
discipline there. Barrett’s clock served as a way of reinforcing deferential social norms through 
elaborate social posturing in Bridgetown.  
Like Barrett and Drax, many of Barbados’s planters and merchants considered Bridgetown 
an important place for social signaling. The concentration of these efforts to display public wealth 
went beyond the convenience of government and church institutions being concentrated in the 
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town, but also because of the town’s complex social hierarchy. In acerbic tones, an English 
observer in the early eighteenth century described social posturing and the role of port towns in 
such signaling. In his letters to England he included a list of the informal social distinctions used 
amongst Barbados’s elite, “the windward gentry, the Bridge Beaux, the Scotland people, and the 
Leeward folks.”196 The author specifically tied Bridgetown to an elite colonial culture of opulence 
and social posturing. In Bridgetown, such social posturing extended into religious observance and 
churches. In 1695 John Pilgrim, for instance, sought to distinguish his family’s social importance 
by requesting permission from the parish to have a separate and exclusive pew built in St Michael’s 
church.197 Such social jockeying and conspicuous consumption in Bridgetown and its churches 
helped define what it meant to be a part of Barbados’s colonial society.  
3.8 Building Bridgetown’s “Middle” From Below 
While planters and the colonial elite engaged in civic projects meant to edify members of 
the planter class and direct the development of the island’s settler society, artisans and middling 
merchants and shopkeepers in Bridgetown forged their own individual and communal success in 
the 1680s and 1690s. Their success in forging new patterns of trade and urban life laid the 
foundation for building a middling settler community in Bridgetown in the second-half of the 
seventeenth-century.  
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From tax lists and wills produced during the second half of the seventeenth century, 
colonial and parochial officials identified many of the men living in Bridgetown according to a 
specific trade as artisans. These figures, almost exclusively men, formed an important and 
understudied segment of the port’s urban population during this critical period in the colony’s 
social formation. Without being confined to any one neighborhood, artisans lived throughout the 
town, plying their trade alongside the merchants who imported provisions and manufactured goods 
from Europe and North America. The maritime economy made up a significant part of the town’s 
laboring men. In tax lists and wills from the seventeenth century, seventeen men are referred to as 
sailors or mariners. The next four most frequently referenced trades in this historical 
documentation were coopers, butchers, masons, carpenters, and joyners. In total there were 26 
identifiable trades carried out by men in Bridgetown, including one woman, Margaret Dally, 
named as a schoolmistress in the 1692 parish tax lists.198 Before the eighteenth century, artisans 
made up a significant and pervasive part of the town’s social landscape. The wills they left behind 
hint at the social strategies they used to compete in a colonial economy dominated by powerful 
merchants with transatlantic connections and immensely wealthy planters.  
Wills of urban craftsmen suggest that Bridgetown’s artisans brought with them traditional 
craft-solidarities; the legacies of trade-cultures in the provincial towns of seventeenth-century 
England that enabled certain parts of the island’s poorer settler communities to survive the social 
upheavals of the seventeenth century. In 1682, the brasier, John Richeson fell ill and had his last 
will and testaments recorded for entry into the island’s secretary’s office in Bridgetown. Not 
particularly wealthy, Richeson left most of his modest (by planter standards at least) household 
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items to his daughter-law. To some of his friends he left clothes-items and rings worth a few 
shillings each. But to a business partner, Richard Forde, Richeson left “all my workeing Tooles,” 
presumably to enable his friend and partner to carry on a successful trade in town. Not only did 
Richeson set Forde up with the tools of his trade, he allowed him “the use of my shoppe for one 
yeares tyme for his best advantage.”199 Similarly, in 1687, the blacksmith Thomas Litton left a 
fellow craftsmen a set of tools and a working space in his will. He left “John Freeman smith a 
small parcel of land in Palmetto Street to him and his heirs for ever which land I purchased of 
Anthony Freeman.” Additionally, he gave Freeman “several working tools in my custody that I 
had of his Father Wm Freeman.”200 From his will, the blacksmith Litton seems to have been deeply 
entangled as a craftsman with a family of other smiths in Barbados, the Freemans. Within this 
group of Bridgetown smiths, workspaces and tools of the trade circulated amongst themselves. 
Like their English counterparts, Bridgetown’s artisans shared space and tools within the ranks of 
their craft; a means of economic and social survival. While some of the town’s craftsmen appear 
to have deployed traditionally English means of survival and work in the colonial environment, 
others aspired to not only survive this period of social upheaval but to eventually enable their 
families to enter the planter class.  
The case of Simon Cooper is exemplary of how some of Bridgetown’s artisans and 
craftsmen pursued and achieved entrance into Barbados’s planter class. In 1668, Cooper first 
appears in Barbados’s colonial archives as a bricklayer hired by St Michael’s parish to assess and 
evaluate work done on the parish church in town. In the 1670s and 1680s, Cooper managed to 
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secure lucrative contracts from the colonial government to expand and improve fortifications in 
Carlisle Bay. Records relating to this commission shows the scale of Cooper’s operations. He 
owned a small fleet of boats, had access to a reliable source of stone material, and employed dozens 
of enslaved people to do the hard labor of transporting and placing masonry into Carlisle Bay and 
along the waterfront. While earning these commissions from the colonial government, Cooper 
appears to have continued to do work for Bridgetown’s vestry, right up to the end of his life when 
he owned a plantation in St. Michaels. In 1693, Cooper built a loft for the parish-church’s newly 
purchased and installed English pipe-organ.201  When he died sometime in 1694, he left his widow 
and daughters a ten-acre plantation and enslaved people. A small-holding by seventeenth and 
eighteenth-century standards, Cooper nevertheless possessed enough land to count himself 
amongst the island’s planter class. Cooper’s rise from Bridgetown bricklayer, hired by the parish, 
to colonial contractor and planter mirrors the rise of Irishman Cornelius Bryan into the ranks of 
the English planter class after finding himself on the wrong side of the colonial law in the 1650s.202 
In both cases, ownership of enslaved African people represented the key to social mobility.  
Alongside male-dominated shopkeepers and artisans in Bridgetown, a large group of 
widows carried on a multitude of businesses in the service sector while remaining socially 
marginalized within a patriarchal colonial society. The town’s high mortality rates, evidenced in 
Bridgetown’s parochial burial records, created a significant social block of widows with economic 
means to conduct important business in the service sector while remaining socially and politically 
marginalized from formal political power.  
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The existence of large numbers of widowed women appears to have encouraged gendered 
connections that fostered conducting business in the port’s service sector. For example, when Anne 
Turpine, “widow of St Michael’s town,” died in May 1682, she left most of her estate to her son 
Henry Turpine and a granddaughter, Anne Willoughby. To her son, Henry, Anne left him “all that 
House or Tenmt conteyaining Eight by twentie feet in length and thirties feet in breadth backwards 
which lyes between the Houses wherein I now live.” She left this house to her son and his heirs in 
perpetuity. While she gave her son and his children a house in Bridgetown, she left her 
granddaughter, Anne Willoughby “that house or Tenement commonly called or known by the 
name of the Bow Bell,” likely a tavern or public house of some sort, a critical part of the port’s 
service sector. The bequest included all the infrastructure necessary for carrying on the Bow Bell 
as a business in the service sector;  
also one new piece of Building adjoyning to itt commonly known by the name of the 
Kitchen Roome over the Kitchen and one shopp below and also fifteen foote of ground 
backward behind the Bow Bell by me reserved and taken of the Yard wch my husband in 
his lifetyme purchased from Richard Baynes. 
 
The final bequest Turpine left her granddaughter were two enslaved people, a child named 
Mingoe and a woman name Mall who she instructed her granddaughter to free from enslavement 
after seven years.203 When considering how to leave her commercial enterprises behind, Turpine 
prioritized the women in her life.    
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3.9 Conclusion 
In the mid-seventeenth century, multiple Atlantic diasporas converged in Bridgetown 
transforming the port’s social and cultural life as well as the mechanisms and structures of colonial 
governance over the town. In the years after 1660, while the island’s planters fully embraced 
enslaved labor, Quaker and Sephardi diasporas laid down significant roots in Bridgetown, fully 
establishing their communities in Barbados’s principal port and colonial capital. Alongside these 
religious communities, former indentured servants and the island’s working poor increasingly 
made their homes in Bridgetown. The concentration of these communities in Bridgetown in the 
mid-seventeenth century, strained the resources of Bridgetown’s parochial institutions. The 
stresses of the sharp rise in the town’s poor settler community as well as crises in the island’s slave 
society in the 1670s encouraged the island’s colonial government to increasingly police the social 
and cultural boundaries in Bridgetown, a key element of the port’s governance. 
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4.0 The Geographies of Slavery and Urban Governance, 1690-1710 
In October 1692, four officers in Barbados’s militia formed a commission to investigate 
reports of a plot among the island’s enslaved people to revolt and overthrow the English colony’s 
government. What followed was a month of torture, interrogations, executions, and exile for the 
accused slaves caught up in the conspiracy. With the plot unraveled by November, the colony 
arrested 200-300 enslaved people, executed 92 suspected conspirators, separating and shipping the 
rest to Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, or North America.204 The slave conspiracy of 1692 and its 
aftermath represents a brief but critical moment in the early colonial history of Barbados’s settler 
society; a crucial but overlooked turning point in the colony’s relationship to how it governed and 
policed Bridgetown. In the 1670s and 1680s, parochial institutions had begun to cede some power 
to imperial ones and Bridgetown’s remarkable, if limited, diversity became curtailed by hardening 
racial and religious lines. The threat of a slave revolt in 1692 served to further fragment power in 
Bridgetown as the colonial government looked to secure the port from the unrest and conflicts that 
marked Barbados’s slave society within a period of sustained colonial crisis in the late-seventeenth 
century.   
The colonial government’s reactions to slave mobility and urban labor in the wake of the 
1692 conspiracy laid the foundations for the way settlers and the colonial state surveilled and 
sought to control enslaved people in Bridgetown in the eighteenth century. Rather than emerging 
out of the general development of the island’s plantation economy, the emergence of these new 
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urban slave codes and practices resulted from a critical confluence of events and colonial crises, 
further emphasizing the fluidity and instability of Barbados’s slave society long into the 
seventeenth century. This chapter re-interprets the role of enslaved resistance and mobility in this 
critical port town, highlighting the centrality of the port’s social geography to the conspiracy’s 
impact on Barbados’s slave society.  
Compared to Caribbean colonies like Jamaica or the Leeward Islands, Barbados 
experienced relatively few moments of mass enslaved resistance in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. This relative quiet has led most historians of slave resistance and insurrection in the 
greater Caribbean to overlook the conspiracy of 1692 as an isolated moment of slave resistance in 
Barbados, perhaps emblematic of the general social tensions inherent to Caribbean slave societies 
but ultimately of little importance to Barbados’s colonial development. The relative quiet of 
Barbados’s eighteenth-century seems to justify this general dismissal of the importance of the 1692 
conspiracy. Barbados would not experience a mass slave rebellion until 1816, well into an age of 
revolutions that witnessed widespread revolt and insurrection against slavery throughout the 
greater Caribbean.205 Likewise, for the few historians of Bridgetown’s slave society, the 
conspiracy is told primarily as a story of a broader plantation society and enslaved resistance to 
rural institutions, rather than a critical moment in the social and political development of settler 
society’s relationship to Bridgetown. The conspiracy, situated in a period of profound upheaval in 
Barbados’s settler society, reflected an emergent attitude among settler society about the 
fundamental dangers posed by the presence of Afro-Barbadians in Bridgetown to the colony’s 
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social stability and order. The threat of black insurrection impressed upon Barbados’s colonial 
authorities the urgent need to govern and police Afro-Caribbean people in the island’s principal 
port town.   
By 1692, Bridgetown was not only a center of colonial commerce but a crucial node within 
the island’s internal and informal marketing system through which the enslaved struggled to 
survive and build livelihoods beyond the confines of the plantation system. Within Bridgetown, 
multiple social and commercial geographies converged and overlapped. Merchants, ship’s 
captains, and wealthy planters struck lucrative deals of transatlantic importance in the comfort of 
a tavern or on waterfront while the plantation enslaved, a few hundred feet away, furtively traded 
basic food staples and provisions in the town’s back streets and alleys.  
Contributing to the restructuring of the town’s social geographies was a general growth in 
the port’s population. In this feverish period, Bridgetown itself grew in leaps and bounds. By the 
late seventeenth century, Bridgetown population rose from 3000 in 1680 to over 10,000 just over 
three decades later in 1712.206 Much of this growth occurred in the town’s enslaved population. It 
was in this context of the port’s rapid population growth and the expansion of slavery into the 
port’s internal economy that colonists and the enslaved envisioned an insurrection focused on 
seizing Bridgetown, and thus Barbados, from the hands of English colonists.  
In the aftermath of the 1692 conspiracy, the colony’s Assembly and governor refined the 
island’s slave codes and laws to engineer a system of governance and policing in Bridgetown 
unique to the port and distinctive from the legal and social regimes that governed the island’s sugar 
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plantations, further fragmenting the centers of colonial power in Bridgetown, a process that had 
begun in the 1670s and 1680s. The laws that emerged in reaction to this moment of colonial crisis 
in the early 1690s produced the colonial landscapes of eighteenth-century Bridgetown that enabled 
greater surveillance and confinement of enslaved people at the center of the colony’s commerce.207 
These efforts to police Bridgetown played a critical role in the expansion of Barbados colonial 
state.208 Bridgetown’s colonial geographies and the methods colonists used to police these 
geographies in the eighteenth century are legacies of the 1692 conspiracy.  
Settlers’ attitudes towards Bridgetown changed over the course of the seventeenth century 
as the island’s social world changed and the colonial government became more involved in 
governing Bridgetown. Bridgetown was long viewed ambivalently as a space of both colonial 
wealth and prosperity as well as extreme disorder and disease. Despite the growing involvement 
of the island’s Assembly, council, and governor in governing Bridgetown, it was only until after 
the 1692 conspiracy that the colonial government began to engineer a more coherent system of 
governance and policing in Bridgetown.  
4.1 Disease and Disorder 
From the earliest written descriptions of Bridgetown, two pictures of the port town emerged 
that persisted into the early eighteenth century and played an important role in how settlers 
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organized power in the port. The first set of depictions portrayed the town as a center of colonial 
commerce, trade, and wealth; the prosperous capital of one of England’s oldest and wealthiest 
Caribbean colony. The other set of descriptions presented Bridgetown as a space of rampant 
disease, vice, and social disorder. Often authors, included both sets of representations in the same 
text. This duality found in the textual descriptions of Bridgetown remained strikingly consistent 
over the course of the seventeenth century; an ambivalence echoed by and reflected in the 
inconsistent ways the colonial government approached issues of governing and policing 
Bridgetown for much of the seventeenth century.  
For early chroniclers of Barbados’s colonial history, Bridgetown reflected both the 
extraordinary wealth of the island’s sugar plantations as well as the disorder produced by climate 
and settler society. In his account of Barbados in the mid-1650s, Antoine Biet, a French priest and 
missionary sent to Martinique and Guadeloupe, extensively described Bridgetown, noting both its 
wealth as well as scenes of disorder reflecting the island’s settler society. To give his readers a 
sense of the scale of the town, Biet counted 300-400 buildings in Bridgetown, noting that the 
majority were inns or stores filled with the island’s goods which supported the planter’s wealth. 
Biet, however, found the concentration of taverns and inns in Bridgetown a source of social 
disorder that complimented the brutality the priest witnessed on the island’s sugar plantations. He 
paints Barbados’s English colonists as irreligious spendthrifts prone to violence not just against 
the enslaved but each other. Biet found, among the poorer settlers, that “drunkenness is great” and 
that they “settle their differences by fist fighting…give each other black eyes, scratch each other, 
tear each other’s hair” And in public places, like Bridgetown, “the onlookers let them do this and 
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surround them so as to see who will be made victorious.”209 Although an outsider writing for a 
French audience, Biet’s account hit on a theme common to descriptions of the port and reflecting 
an ambivalence shared by the colonial government.  
For another set of authors, a main source of the town’s disorder was found not in the 
island’s settler society, but in the town’s disease environment. For these authors, the town’s other 
most defining feature, aside from the wealth of its trade, was the high rates of disease and death 
that cut down settlers and visitors. Crucially missing from these descriptions were the thousands 
of enslaved people who died aboard slave ships in Carlisle Bay or shortly after they were landed 
and sold by the town’s merchants.  Richard Ligon, who focused on the English colony’s extremes 
of wealth, climate, and disease, blamed the colonists’ rush for profits in building Bridgetown on a 
marsh as a cause of the town’s poor disease environment. Ligon’s account, like these other 
descriptions also praised the town’s wealth and ability to command trade in the region. Likening 
Bridgetown’s maritime trade to the busyness of London, Ligon praised the port’s capacity to attract 
trade.210 Ligon, however, goes on to warn readers that the town was “ill situate,” meaning that the 
port was susceptible to disease which he blamed on “a kind of Bog or Morass, which vents out so 
loathsome a savor, as cannot but breed ill blood.” Ligon recounted that, a month or so before his 
arrival, disease had so ravaged the town that settlers impulsively threw corpses into the swamp 
surrounding Bridgetown.211 Musing on why the settlers built a town so close to a fetid swamp, 
Ligon concluded that “one house being set up, another was erected, and so a third, and a fourth… 
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for their convenience, being near the Harbor.” Ligon believed that recklessness and a drive for 
profit rather than health animated the town’s first builders, bequeathing the town a deadly legacy 
which neither the parish nor the colonial government had taken enough action to address.   
Writing in the early eighteenth century, another French visitor to Bridgetown, Father Jean-
Baptiste Labat, likewise described the port as a space of wealth but also disease and social disorder. 
While Biet noted the number of taverns and storehouses in the port, Labat praised Bridgetown for 
projecting an air of European civility in a region Labat considered generally lacking the hallmarks 
of civilization. 
The Town is beautiful and quite large, the streets are straight, broad, proper and well laid.  
Houses are well-built in the English-style with many glass windows, and are magnificently 
furnished; in a word, all has an air of propriety, politeness, and opulence which one cannot 
find in the other islands and which would be difficult to find elsewhere. The townhouses 
are very beautiful and well-adorned. The shops and stores of the merchants are full of all 
that one could wish for from all parts of the world.212  
 
Labat describes the variety of artisans and crafts-workers that populated the town and the 
considerable commerce its merchants carried on, but acknowledges in the same text that le mal de 
Siam, yellow fever, struck down the town’s inhabitants as frequently as anywhere else in the 
Caribbean; the inescapable mark of the region’s relentless disease environment. The themes 
Europeans used to describe Bridgetown, at once a center of colonial commerce and a town blighted 
by the disease and disorder endemic to an intemperate climate, remained remarkably consistent 
over the course of the seventeenth century. Like Ligon before him, Labat considered that there was 
little the parochial or colonial government could do to address the town’s disease environment.  
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Undoubtably, the transatlantic slave trade fueled Bridgetown’s disease environment, 
further enmeshing its inhabitants with the slave trade through a service economy centered on 
caring for the ill. In the late-seventeenth century, care for the sick sailors from the slave ships 
arriving in Carlisle Bay fell to individual inhabitants rather than any single colonial institution. For 
sailors, finding care depended on building trust with the town’s inhabitants. Disease, sickness, and 
death, never far from the Atlantic slave trade that passed through Bridgetown, forged lasting 
connections between sailors and the port’s inhabitants.213 While the embarkment points of West 
Africa proved most fatal, particularly to European sailors, slave ships arriving in Bridgetown held 
cargoes of hundreds of sick and dying enslaved as well as sick and dying sailors. While merchants 
and ship’s captains tried to sell the sick to planters on Barbados or smaller ships heading for other 
colonial markets, sailors were mostly left to fend for themselves in Bridgetown, contributing to 
particular social geographies of disease, death, and care in the port.  
In November 1692, the slave ship Scepter arrived in Carlisle Bay carrying a cargo of over 
600 captives shipped from the Gold Coast and Ouidah. When she sailed from Ouidah, the Scepter 
embarked with over 800 captives.  Disease, malnutrition, and abuse killed 200 captives during the 
voyage to Barbados. After arriving in Carlisle Bay, the Scepter sold and disposed of its cargo for 
over a month. Within a month after arriving, the Scepter’s captain William Parrish had died, and 
members of its crew lay dying in Bridgetown’s taverns. Among the dying crew was Robert Adair, 
from “the shire of Galloway” in Scotland. In his will, he left gold rings for his father, brother, and 
sister-in-law. To his shipmate, a “Mr John Smith a Boatswaine,” he left the wages the Scepter 
owed its crew. Adair died on December 28, a week after writing his will. While Adair kept his 
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bequests to his family and friends aboard the Scepter, other members of the crew that died in 
Bridgetown made more lasting connections to English settlers in the port.  
A few days before Adair signed his will, Richard Mercer, from a village outside Liverpool, 
“being weakened by sickness” left his shipmate John Walls, another Liverpool native and cooper 
aboard the Scepter £5 sterling and “my best bedding… and all my wearing apparel which is aboard 
the aforesaid ship or ashore in Barbados.”214 He then left the widow Jane Wadsworth and her two 
daughters rings worth ten shillings each. While Adair sought to distribute mourning rings to his 
relatives across the Atlantic, Mercer, perhaps grateful for care administered during his final days, 
left rings to the Wadsworths in Bridgetown. 
While slave ships were infamously deadly to captives and crews alike, in Bridgetown 
disease never remained confined to one ship or sets of ships. David Evers, a mariner aboard the 
Royal Navy ship the Diamond, left bequests to both his shipmates and friends in Bridgetown, 
including the landlady he rented from in his last days. In his will, drawn up shortly after the arrival 
of the Scepter and its crew, Evers left his landlady, Mrs. Ealy, a plain gold ring “for her care and 
kindness in my sickness extraordinary.”215 Death shaped life throughout the early modern 
Caribbean, and in ports like Bridgetown, by the end of the seventeenth century the transatlantic 
trades clustered thousands of sailors together aboard ships known for their morbidity and mortality. 
Few of these sailors hailed from Barbados’s settler society but nevertheless their wills attest to the 
bonds created by care and proximity between settlers and sailors engaged in the transatlantic and 
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inter-colonial trades. For much of the seventeenth century, individuals, rather than institutions, 
dealt with the realities of Bridgetown’s disease environments.  
      Descriptions of Bridgetown’s disease environment, even those made by officers in the 
Royal Navy, rarely led to the colonial government intervening in the port. In 1702, Captain Walker, 
the commander of the English frigate the Boyne, described a harrowing transatlantic crossing made 
worse upon arrival in Bridgetown to his superiors in London. As the Boyne left England in a 
convoy with other naval and merchant ships bound for the Caribbean, “the feavour & other 
Distempers… raged amongst both the men of war & Transports.” As soon as the fleet arrived in 
Bridgetown, Walker reported, the soldiers who had fared better than the sailors in the fleet began 
to fall sick, especially “those quartered in the Bridge Town of Barbados.” Walker immediately 
blamed both the port for being “a very sickly place,” and the town’s tavern owners and inhabitants 
who housed sick soldiers and sailors for profit without considering proper care or housing. Walker 
feared that “the continuall receiving Sick persons into their houses has created an Infection not 
easily to be removed.” Recognizing the port’s strategic and commercial importance, Walker 
recommended to the Board of Trade and Plantations in London that “the Islanders would take care 
to have an Hospital at some distance from the Town,” rather than keeping the sick quartered in 
private houses on the waterfront.216 Walkers prescient recommendations fell on deaf ears in 
London as well as Barbados. It took until the 1790s for the British Royal Navy to construct a 
hospital in Bridgetown.  
Until the closing decade of the seventeenth century, such recommendations fell far outside 
how the colonial state functioned in Bridgetown. The Highway Act passed during Searle’s 
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governorship in 1654 essentially left all matters related to the town’s order, appearance, and health 
to St Michael’s parish. Parishioners bore the sole responsibility of raising funds for building and 
repairing roads and bridges. The 1654 act specifically directed St Michael’s parish to raise a tax 
on parishioners and build a gravel pathway to cut through the town’s surrounding swamp. A notice 
posted at St Michael’s parish church in September 1656 reminded parishioners to provide labor 
and tools for the parish’s surveyors of the highway and that “every man do mender his door 
according to the discretion of ye Surveyors.”217 Such notices located the responsibility for ordering 
the town not in the colonial government but in individual inhabitants and property-owners in 
Bridgetown. This arrangement persisted until the 1670s and 1680s when, as discussed earlier, the 
colonial government began to intervene in circumscribing the port’s fluid social and religious 
boundaries  
Similarly, policing Bridgetown was left to the island’s constables and justices of the peace 
with no particular law passed to deal with the port as a separate and distinctive space on the island. 
The colony’s earliest labor codes dealing with indentured servants and enslaved people 
empowered constables to “apprehend all Runaways” where-ever or however they found them and 
return them to their masters or mistresses directly. Barbados’s 1661 slave code, “An Act for the 
governing of Negroes” renewed and updated in 1688, granted expansive and near-unlimited 
powers of life and death to slave-owners and their hired overseers, drawn from the island’s poor 
white settlers. The island’s constables and Provost-Marshall, however, had the final say in 
exercising violence against enslaved people known to have repeatedly fled from or resisted their 
masters or mistresses on behalf of a colonial state invested in preserving a functioning slave 
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society. Such laws suggested that the colonial state’s authority over Bridgetown remained 
fragmented throughout much of the seventeenth-century. The island’s Provost-Marshal held 
runaways in Bridgetown’s make-shift prison, the Cage, working alongside another colonial officer, 
the Keeper of the Cage, to confine enslaved people in a complex arrangement governed by multiple 
laws and legal codes. 
 With such authority over the port fragmented, a largely un-organized group of settlers and 
colonial officers filled crucial roles imposing the slave society’s social order in spaces like 
Bridgetown. Constables, charged with the basic tasks of law enforcement under the Provost-
Marshal and Justices of the Peace, appear to have even organized town watches in Bridgetown 
during the seventeenth century without holding any specific commissions from the colonial 
government.218 No law, however, organized constables’ efforts to govern Bridgetown, and the 
servant and slave codes that did exist in the seventeenth century made no distinction between slave 
law enforcement in the port from elsewhere in the plantation colony. By the end of the seventeenth-
century, much authority over Bridgetown still remained in the hands of the parish system.  
In the wake of the 1692 conspiracy, these informal systems, unevenly spread between the 
colonial government, individual colonial officers, and parishes, came together into a set of laws 
that organized the policing of Bridgetown. The most important of these laws, “An Act Appointing 
Watches for the Respective Towns in the Island,” empowered a commission to regulate a town 
watch specifically for Bridgetown that built upon and expanded on these earlier solutions. The 
timing of these developments in the early eighteenth century in the wake of the 1692 conspiracy 
suggests a causal relationship. The 1692 conspiracy, however, must be contextualized within a 
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much broader crisis within Barbados’s slave society of even greater magnitude than the social 
upheaval and crises of the 1650s and 1670s. This colonial crisis, of which the 1692 conspiracy was 
only a part, appeared to represent an existential threat to the entire plantation system in the 1690s 
and 1700s, laying the foundation for the act which created Bridgetown’s town watch system. The 
passage of this act in 1705 signaled a departure from settlers’ previous ambivalence towards 
Bridgetown towards a growing recognition of the need for settler society to regulate and police a 
town increasingly defined by the presence of enslaved people.  
4.2 Barbados Crisis of the Late-Seventeenth Century 
To better understand the impact of the 1692 conspiracy on the colonial power structures 
that governed Bridgetown, the events of 1692 must be contextualized with a broader period of 
crisis and decline which marked Barbados’s plantation economy in the late-seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century. The 1692 conspiracy formed a single but critical part of a much broader set of 
emergencies that encompassed a colonial crisis that profoundly affected the island’s settler society 
in the 1690s and 1700s. Out of the insecurity of this moment, Barbados’s colonial society and 
political system changed its attitude towards Bridgetown and began to engineer a system of urban 
governance and policing unprecedented in English slave societies to that time. This colonial crisis, 
lasting roughly from the late-1680s to the 1710s, consisted of multiple parts.  
The first was economic and social. Beginning in the late-seventeenth century, after years 
of intensive monoculture, the economic cracks in Barbados’s plantation system began to fully 
emerge. Exhausted soil no longer yielded the crops planters had grown accustomed to. In times of 
peace, declining crop yields was not a major problem, but starting in 1688, England and later 
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Britain entered a decades long period of war with France.219 This conflict threw the island’s trade 
into utter disarray as the French leaned heavily on a war of colonial attrition that used Caribbean-
based privateers to siphon wealth from England’s colonies without spending much on outright 
conquest or naval supremacy in the region. Barbadian planters’ debts, driven by the slave trade 
and without the offsetting profits of a productive plantation sector, were unsustainable. Plantations 
collapsed and their planters fled for, literally, greener pastures.  
The second component of this colonial crisis was demographic and social. White colonists 
and planters had struggled throughout the second-half of the seventeenth century to recruit more 
white settlers and servants to fill the ranks of the island’s militias and bolster the colonial economy. 
The decades of warfare and economic disruption exacerbated this demographic decline of 
Barbados’s poor white community, heightening planters’ fears of slave insurrection or betrayal in 
the face of French invasion.  
Finally, this crisis was also political for the planter class, as the fallout of these challenges 
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century left Barbados’s legislature and colonial 
government deeply divided. Various factions of planters and merchants fought to control the 
colonial system, often bringing their grievances not just to governors but to competing interests in 
London. Unpopular governors appointed from London found themselves forced to take sides in 
these local squabbles further entrenching the political chaos. Out of this toxic stew of economic, 
social, and political crises of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Barbados’s 
colonial government took much firmer control of the practical colonial governance and policing 
of Bridgetown. 
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As early as the 1650s, the roots of Barbados’s economic troubles began with the first signs 
of soil exhaustion, the result of reckless monoculture. Throughout the seventeenth century, as the 
island’s plantations expanded to cover most of the arable land, colonists reported clear signs of 
soil exhaustion and declining yields of sugar from newly planted cane. By the 1680s, the 
environmental degradation produced by decades of intensive deforestation and sugar cane 
agriculture was unescapable to colonists. Edward Littleton, an observer writing in 1689, reported 
that planters used upwards of thirty cartloads of cow dung to fertilize a meager acre of land. 
Another English writer familiar with the colony, John Oldmixon, wrote in the early 1700s, that 
“the Soil is so impoverish’d, that they [the planters] are forc’d to dung and plant every Year.”220 
The effects of the reckless early years of the plantation sector had begun, in this crucial period of 
the late seventeenth century, to catch up to the colony’s sugar economy. While these accounts 
paint a particular dismal picture of Barbados at the turn of the eighteenth century, planters 
remained particularly adaptive and innovative in their economic responses to declining soil yields, 
investing in more in slavery and livestock to make up for declining soil fertility.221 
Rising costs of production, however, were met with declining sugar prices in London, 
furthering planters’ economic troubles. In 1640, the price of muscovado sugar was £4 per 
hundredweight. By the 1660s, that price had fallen to £2. In the 1670s, the price had fallen even 
further to 25 shillings before reaching a nadir of 16 shillings in the mid-1680s.222 Increasing 
competition from the rise of plantation economies in the Leeward Islands and the much larger 
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Jamaica began in the last decades of the seventeenth century continuing into the eighteenth century 
fundamentally marginalizing Barbados’s role as the principal sugar producer of the English West 
Indies. When over two decades of regional warfare began in 1688, London prices fluctuated 
violently as successful French privateering in the region significantly disrupted Barbados’s trade. 
Additionally, the risks posed by French privateers meant that the rates of freightage to Barbados 
rose. The economic challenges planters faced in the 1690s and 1700s bred novel solutions, some 
of which ultimately proved politically poisonous and drew negative attention to Barbados from 
London.  
Throughout the seventeenth century, Barbados’s sugar plantations were notoriously 
indebted, predominantly to merchants involved in the transatlantic slave trade. The war years of 
the 1690s and early 1700s with fluctuating sugar prices, higher freightage rates, and declining 
productivity drove planters to adopt extraordinary measures to handle the debt crisis and chronic 
shortage of currency. In 1705, Barbados’s assembly passed an act creating a paper currency based 
on securities of land and enslaved people. The colonial government issued £65,000 worth of nearly 
worthless bills. London quickly squashed the colonial law, and Barbados’s chastised colonial 
leaders withdrew the paper currency swiftly. The incident left deep political fissures within the 
colonial government that stretched in the eighteenth century, as the eminent planters and merchants 
who led the scheme found themselves excluded from the newly appointed governor’s council.223 
 
223 Robert Schomburgk, The History of Barbados: Comprising a Geographical and Statistical Description of the 
Island;A Sketch of the Historical Events Since the Settlement; and an Account If Its Geology and Natural Productions, 
1848. 
 139 
What followed was a period of worsening political factionalism that marred the island’s settler 
society well into the eighteenth century.  
Finally, over the course of the second-half of the seventeenth century, the island faced a 
demographic and social transition as the island’s white population declined and enslaved African 
and Afro-Caribbean labor expanded beyond the plantation sector. In 1655, the island’s population 
stood at approximately 43,000. A remarkably high figure for an island only 166 square miles in a 
period when the population of Massachusetts Bay colony stood at about 20,000 in 1660 and when 
around 27,000 settlers, white and black, worked the tobacco plantations of the Chesapeake Bay. 
Out of Barbados’s unusually dense population of 43,000 an estimated 23,000 settlers were white. 
The planter class remained a small but immensely powerful minority supported by a sizable poor 
white community. 175 of the island’s planters, 7% of the island’s total property-owners, claimed 
at least 54% of the island’s property.224 Most of this white population were indentured servants or 
had been recently released from their contracts, and were part of a population that boomed during 
the English Civil Wars and the upheaval of the English revolution. After reaching this height in 
the 1650s, the island’s white population slid into a steady decline. In 1684, there were 19,568 white 
settlers. By 1700, the figures suggest a population of white settlers standing at 15,400. The 
population of white settlers, the majority poor whites, would continue to fluctuate over the course 
of the eighteenth century; falling as low as 12,528 in 1712 but never exceeding 20,000.225 Despite 
increasingly lenient laws regulating the institution of indentured servitude, the decline of a poor 
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white population to work as artisans and overseers on Barbados’s plantations appeared irreversible. 
The decline of indentured servitude and the island’s poor white population in the late-seventeenth 
century mirrored and paralleled the rise of a “creole” generation of enslaved Afro-Barbadians; a 
population that made up what Hilary Beckles calls a slave labor elite.  
In tandem with the decline of a sizable free white population, Barbadian historian Hilary 
Beckles notes that the late-seventeenth century witnessed key demographic and social changes 
among the island’s enslaved population. Beckles notes three important demographic changes to 
the island’s enslaved population in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries: the 
emergence of a sizable island-born population of enslaved people, a shift in the gender balance of 
the enslaved population from men to women, and the rise of a slave labor elite.226 The slave labor 
elite, according to Beckles, were predominantly island-born who came to occupy key occupational 
positions within the plantation complex. These privileged occupations afforded these creoles better 
opportunity for  
manumission, improved nutrition, literacy, better medical and material care, right to 
‘respected’ family life, access to skilled/supervisorial work, remuneration, socio-sexual 
relations with free persons, possession of property, unsupervised off-plantation 
movements, and greater sociocultural autonomy.227 
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As the island’s pool of free white artisans and overseers shrank, it appears that planters 
turned towards entrusting enslaved Afro-Caribbean labor with artisanal occupations requiring 
greater degrees of mobility and independence. Growing mobility likely increased enslaved 
people’s access to Bridgetown’s markets, contributing to the expansion of the island’s informal 
networks and social geographies.  
In Bridgetown, African and Afro-Caribbean slavery expanded into the urban economy in 
the same period. Illustrative of these slow demographic and social transformations is the case of 
John Blake, an Irish merchant who settled in Bridgetown in the mid-1670s. Initially settling in 
Barbados alone, Blake’s wife and children joined him in 1675 and brought with them an Irish 
woman to work as a domestic servant “washing starching making of drinke and keeping the house 
in good order.” Blake, however, wrote to his brother on Monserrat that the young Irish woman 
was “most vitious” and needed, in his opinion, to be kept under the “most sever correction,” 
meaning frequent physical punishment. Eager to rid himself of the Irish servant, Blake had an 
enslaved African or Afro-Caribbean woman “brought to knowledge” so he could be “without a 
white maid.” 228 Such decisions underpinned the changing demographics and social geography of 
Bridgetown in the closing decades of the seventeenth century.  
The expansion of slave labor into the urban economy likely drove much of the growth in 
Bridgetown’s population during this period. In the 1680s, Bridgetown had become one of the 
largest English towns in the Americas with a population of 3000, second only to Boston in 
Massachusetts. By 1712, the population had grown to nearly 11,000, making the town the largest 
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urban center in the British Americas for a brief window of time. Enslaved people made up the bulk 
of this demographic expansion in Bridgetown. This trend of a growing enslaved urban population 
accelerated over the course of the eighteenth century. According to one estimate, Bridgetown’s 
enslaved population grew from 13,000 in 1715 to 17,000 by the end of the century.229 The growing 
size of the port in the late-seventeenth century contributed to the growing necessity of the colonial 
government to intervene in the town’s governance.  
For the island’s colonial elite, these changes in the island’s plantation economy and settler 
society in the late-seventeenth century proved profoundly destabilizing, convincing some that the 
island was entering a period of irreversible decline. Within this context, the colonial government 
began to assert more direct authority over Bridgetown through creating a new system to police and 
defend the town from the threat of enslaved insurrection. The conspiracy of 1692 was the most 
immediate spark that drove this colonial reaction and the creation of these new systems of policing 
and governance.  The reports given to Barbados’s governor James Kendall can reveal much about 
the cultural paradigms which framed how settlers described and wrote about slave conspiracies, 
particularly the social geographies that troubled the planter elites most.230 The report on the 1692 
conspiracy is rife with references to Bridgetown’s unique social geographies that emerged over 
the course of the seventeenth century and had long posed problems for the colonial government. 
The entanglement of these urban social geographies in one of the most serious plans for enslaved 
insurrection in Barbados’s early colonial history helped significantly further colonial interest in 
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policing enslaved people in the port. From this period of colonial crises in the late-seventeenth 
century, including the 1692 conspiracy, the geographies of colonial power in eighteenth-century 
Bridgetown fully emerged.  
4.3 The 1692 Conspiracy: Mapping the Social Geographies of Slavery and Resistance in 
Bridgetown 
In October 1692, Major John Duboys applied to the island’s governor James Kendall for a 
commission to form a four-man court martial which investigated, tortured, and executed hundreds 
of enslaved people caught up in the 1692 conspiracy. The report that resulted from Duboys’ 
commission mapped the geography of the conspiracy, sketching the outlines of the plot; revealing 
its goals to claim Bridgetown, burn the port, and turn the island’s fortifications against the ships 
anchored in Carlisle Bay. The report is a map, not only of the conspiracy itself, but of the informal 
networks that crisscrossed the island in the late-seventeenth century. This map of the island’s 
informal social systems and networks converged, like the roads represented on officially-
sanctioned maps of the island, in Bridgetown. The formal purpose of the court martial given to 
Duboys was to conduct a “trial of all such Negros, who shall be impeached for consulting and 
contrieving Mutiny, Rebellion or insurrection against their Maities Subjects in this Island.” The 
report that resulted from these efforts mapped a social world that troubled a colony wracked by 
disease, mortality, disrupted trade, and declining plantations.  
Organized mostly as narrative, following Duboys’s report of the conspiracy allows us to 
map the outlines of these informal systems and networks extending from the island’s plantations 
into Bridgetown. Duboys’s story starts in Bridgetown with the Cage, the open-air prison at the 
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center of Bridgetown used to hold runaways. To explain how colonial officials learned of the plot, 
the report describes how Duboys seized two men, Ben and Sambo, “who were in Consultation 
about breaking the Prison for the relief” of other enslaved people held in the Cage. Duboys had 
only just committed Ben and Sambo to the Cage when a third Afro-Caribbean man, Hammon, 
appeared in Bridgetown. Caught giving Ben and Sambo “advice that they should not discover any 
thing,” Hammon was brought to Duboys and questioned. Fearing for his life and under the duress 
of torture, Hammon confessed to the three’s involvement in a plot to “cut off all the Menkind in 
this Island.” The location of this discovery in Bridgetown, specifically the Cage, is indicative of 
how colonial officials had used particular infrastructures in Bridgetown to confine and 
circumscribe different forms of bound labor on Barbados since the 1650s.  
Since the 1650s, the Cage stood in the center of Bridgetown as a small, open-air prison and 
served a critical role in controlling enslaved mobility in Barbados by holding runaways from the 
island’s plantations. Reflecting planter concerns over labor mobility in the mid-1650s, Governor 
Searle initially built the Cage in 1655 to temporarily hold riotous sailors viewed as a disruptive 
element within a landed settler society.231 By the 1660s, it served new purpose as the island’s early 
servant and slave codes directed the island’s constables to bring men and women suspected of 
being plantation runaways to Bridgetown for temporary confinement. By the end of the 
seventeenth-century, the Cage stood as a potent symbol of planter control over enslaved labor, but 
also a physical space that could foster conspiracies and illicit “Consultation” between enslaved 
individuals hoping to “break the Prison for… relief.” Finding the source of the conspiracy in 
enslaved people confined in Bridgetown, particularly in the Cage, reflected not only the colonial 
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landscapes that emerged earlier in the seventeenth century, but the alternative geographies the 
enslaved created atop these landscapes. 
With the first reports of the conspiracy established around the Cage, Duboys questioned 
and tortured Ben and Sambo in Bridgetown, revealing for the colonial officials the crucial role 
played by the slave labor elite in the informal networks and geographies in Bridgetown. To push 
Ben and Sambo to confess and reveal the extent of the plot, Duboys ordered the two hung in chains 
until “starved to death” in Bridgetown, a public reminder of colonial power in the port. The two 
lasted four days before they “resolved to make a Clear Confession of the whole matter, provided 
they might be taken downe & promised Life.” Sambo died shortly after his “confession,” but Ben 
lived to impeach “all those he had Spoke to as also those whom others had engaged to their Party,” 
revealing a particular social profile critical in how such informal geographies emerged in 
Bridgetown.  
The confessions mapped the state of the island’s plantations in the late seventeenth century, 
where a class of slave labor elite had access to tools and spaces like the plantations’ stables while 
working in relative positions of power and independence. Following Ben’s confession, Duboys 
and his commissioners arrested hundreds of enslaved people, predominantly the slave labor elite 
who enjoyed a greater degree of mobility on Barbados. The conspiracy ranged geographically 
across the island’s plantations but captured a large swath of the island’s slave labor elite, 
“Overseers, Carpenters, Bricklayers, Wheelwrights, Sawyers, Blacksmiths, Grooms, and such 
others that have more favour showne them by their Masters.” This group of slave labor elite, 
according to the confessions, would form “four Regiments of foot and two regiments of horse,” 
the horses stolen directly from the master’s stables. Enjoying the greatest degree of trust and 
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freedom on the plantation estates, the slave labor elite also had the greatest access to Bridgetown 
and the island’s internal marketing system based in the port.  
By identifying enslaved people involved in the conspiracy as those with “more favour 
showne them by their Masters,” the report outlined the social geographies centered in Bridgetown 
and used by enslaved people to communicate, trade, and survive the island’s plantation slave 
society. By the end of the seventeenth century, Bridgetown’s markets facilitated both the 
transatlantic circulation of plantation-produced commodities as well as the island’s internal 
marketing system; an informal commercial network that helped above all else feed the island’s 
overwhelmingly malnourished enslaved population.232 The enslaved faced grueling conditions of 
forced labor and rampant disease exacerbated by severe malnutrition. In this context, enslaved 
people congregated in Bridgetown to find and barter goods for food. Some resorted to begging. 
Benjamin Lay, a sympathetic and unusually observant writer described the groups of enslaved 
people that gathered around his shop in the early eighteenth century. Lay, writing later in the 
eighteenth century, recounted how his wife, Sarah, would give the enslaved provisions from their 
shop in Bridgetown spoiled from the island’s hot climate. After giving away food in the shop, Lay 
brought “more of the same sort and thrown it into the Street… yet the poor Creatures would come 
running, and tearing, and rending one another to get a part… their poor Bellies were so empty, and 
so ravenous.” These rushes happened on Sunday, the island’s principal day for marketing in 
Bridgetown. Lay recounted how the enslaved left plantations for the day,  
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come down to Town, many Hundreds of them, they that could get or steal any Thing, a 
little Sugar, or Cotton, Ginger, Aloes, Rum, Cocoa-Nuts, Pine-Apples, Oranges, Lemmons, 
Citrons, old Iron, Wood for Firing, steal any Thing out of Houses, Yards or anywhere, or 
any Thing that was not too hot or too heavy, and bring it to Market.233  
 
The journey from plantation to town was no easy feat either. The enslaved could get “no 
Truck in the Country” some fell down and fainted on the way to Bridgetown “being perished with 
Hunger and hard Labour the Week before.” Bridgetown’s informal internal markets were located 
on the same streets where merchants and planters carried on the island’s transatlantic and inter-
colonial trades in sugar cane products and enslaved people.  
The identification of the conspirators as members of the island’s slave labor elite suggested 
a crucial link between the use of emergent informal networks and marketing in Bridgetown with 
the circulation of conspiracies and plots to overthrow the colonial government. The enslaved 
trouped to Bridgetown every Sunday alone, in pairs, or small groups in a desperate scramble to 
use the island’s largest market to eke out survival. Just as the enslaved marched to Bridgetown 
every Sunday, the writers of the report on the 1692 conspiracy took seriously the threat that the 
enslaved might march, armed with their masters’ tools and horses, to seize the island for 
themselves and wreak a bloody vengeance on its settler society.  
As Duboys went on to detail the conspirators plans to seize control of the island from the 
planters, he made that link between these emergent social geographies in Bridgetown and the slave 
labor elite explicit in his description of the social geographies that supported the spread of the 
conspiracy. Duboys’s report claimed the conspiracy would start on the plantations with the 
insurrection moving to Bridgetown where the plotters had well-placed allies in the militia that 
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guarded the town. The first key ally was “an Armourer in ye Magazine,” an enslaved Afro-
Caribbean man working for the island’s militia system central to the colony’s defense. At the right 
moment, the armorer would kill the militia captain commanding the colony’s armory in 
Bridgetown, seize the magazine’s powder, firearms, swords, and ammunition to supply the rebels. 
For betraying this position of trust, Duboys’s commission hung the man in chains until dead. This 
enslaved armorer was hardly the only enslaved person to aid in the island’s defense in the 1680s 
and 1690s, a fact not missed by the commissioners that investigated the 1692 conspiracy.  
The link Duboys made in the report between the conspirators and the key locations within 
the island’s militia reflected the recent reality that Barbados’s defense depended on enslaved labor, 
requiring their presence in Bridgetown in such critical spaces like the town magazine. The presence 
of enslaved people in such vital colonial infrastructures in Bridgetown had emerged quite recently 
with the pressures placed on the island’s militia in the context of the Nine Years War. With fewer 
poor white settlers to serve in the island’s militia in the late seventeenth-century, the colonial 
government pressed hundreds of enslaved men into the island’s service, primarily to dig trenches 
and build fortifications along the coast. On June 10, 1691, the colony’s assembly ordered that 
every plantation send one out of every five servants or slaves to the coast to aid the militia “for 
entrenching such places as required the same” for the span of one week. The law applied to any 
planter owning over 20 acres, enough to encompass a significant portion of the island’s planter 
class.234 The early 1690s and the onset of war with France saw mass upheaval in the island’s labor 
system with mass mobilization of not only the militia made up of the island’s poor whites, but also 
enslaved labor pressed into colonial service to fortify the coasts and aid in defending the island.  
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As the report described the next part of the plot to overthrow the colonial government in 
Bridgetown, Duboys identified a threat to colonial order in the continued presence of outsiders 
like the Irish in the port and the island’s fortifications. Having armed themselves out of 
Bridgetown’s magazine and armory, the conspirators, according to Dubyos’s report, would 
infiltrate the fortifications on Needhams point near the town to gain control of Carlisle Bay. “The 
Stratagem they resolved on for gainening the forts was this, they resoved to procure four or five 
Irish men to their Party Who were to be Sent into Needham’s fort, with money to buy drinke for 
ye Montrosses.” The plot planned to use Irish allies to inebriate the fortification’s gunners and 
guards, and then open the gates for the rebels waiting in “the many bushes high Corne” and other 
blinds surrounding the fort. Barbados’s colonial government and settlers had long feared the 
presence of Irish servants who often aided French invasions of the Leeward Islands in the 
seventeenth century, but the colonial government also had reason to doubt the loyalty of the 
montrosses that manned the guns in the fortifications around Bridgetown. Unlike the members of 
the colony’s militia, the gunners that commanded the cannon in the fortifications around 
Bridgetown received payment for their service. The colonial assembly, however, was not always 
prompt in paying the gunners. A decade or so later, in 1714, the gunners of St Michael’s divisions 
responsible for manning the fortifications around Bridgetown requested that the assembly to pay 
two years’ salary to a gunner, Joseph Young.235 Paid by the cash-strapped colonial government, 
the island’s gunners could be just as easily and cheaply bought with booze. The threats of outsiders 
like the Irish in Bridgetown, long a feature of the town’s social and cultural geography, as well as 
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the strains placed on the colonial government during times of war, presented new threats for the 
commissioners in the face of insurrection.  
Having mapped the key spaces and figures in the conspiracy, Duboys turned to describing 
how the conspirators planned to use fire.  Fire was traditionally used to destroy crops of sugar 
cane, and in the context of Bridgetown, reflected a linking of planters’ and merchants’ greatest 
fears. According to Duboys’s report, after having bought their way into Needham’s fort with the 
help of Irish allies, the rebels planned to burn much of Bridgetown to the ground, fulfilling a long-
standing fear of the colony’s planters. Since the 1640s, servants and slaves had, according to the 
planters, set the island’s sugar cane on fire in destructive acts of resistance. Some of the earliest 
colonial laws addressed planters’ fears of fire destroying the pressure sugar cane crops. Fire in 
Bridgetown had proven just as destructive. The fire of 1668 had destroyed the town’s supply of 
gun powder and ammunition along with thousands of pounds worth of goods. Bridgetown, like the 
island’s plantations, was no stranger to fires, and all elements of settler society knew the chaos 
created by such disasters, particularly in the context of the island’s ports.  
According to Duboys’s report, the conspirators did not confine their attack on the island’s 
colonial government to the island and its port, but turned to the ships anchored in Carlisle Bay, 
linking the geography of the port and island to maritime spaces just offshore. After burning the 
port and seizing Needham’s fort overlooking Carlisle Bay, the plotters planned to turn the forts’ 
guns on the ships harbored in Carlisle Bay “to batter all ye ships out of their Harbour,” clearly 
displaying knowledge of Carlisle Bay’s important role in the networks of communication and 
empire that sustained Barbados’s colonial system. The enslaved plotters, watching the wartime 
mobilization of Barbadian society in the late 1680s and early 1690s, recognized the strategic 
importance of the ships anchored in Carlisle Bay. From Hammon’s confession, Duboys learned 
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how the plotters tracked the comings and goings of English naval forces to time the uprising.  
According to these confessions, the plotters were repeatedly stymied by the fortuitous arrival of 
English forces on Barbados. The first planned date for the plot was:  
sometime after the going off of Sr Timothy Thornhill from this Island, but your 
Excellency’s   arrival with their Majesties Squadron of Ships put so great a Stop to it that 
few were Spoke to and the more said until the Expedition designed under Colonel Salter 
for Guadalupe then put on a fresh and the time was the night after the fleet sailed from 
hence but Admiral Wright with the fleet appearing from Guadalupe, diverted our men’s 
going from hence and so put a Second stop to their hellish design.236  
 
The enslaved, as the summary of Hammon’s confession suggests, observed and tracked 
naval movements in and out of Bridgetown closely, following the ups and downs of English 
imperial fortunes in the region. Their plan to bombard the ships in Carlisle Bay likewise suggests 
that the enslaved recognized not only the military power of English naval vessels, but also their 
capacity to circulate news and militia from neighboring English islands to the north. 
Duboys’s report on the 1692 conspiracy not only documented the forced confessions of the 
conspirators and the planters’ fears of insurrection, but also mapped Bridgetown’s overlapping 
geographies of settler and enslaved mobility that emerged over the course of the late seventeenth 
century. The report, fixated on these social geographies and their potential for facilitating 
dangerous enslaved mobility, also marked an inflection point in settler society’s attitude towards 
Bridgetown. The decade that followed the 1692 conspiracy witnessed the colonial government 
engineering a system of laws and statutes to govern and police Bridgetown. The instability of the 
last decades of the seventeenth century had produced multiple colonial geographies as various 
institutions struggled to deal with the port’s complex and overlapping labor systems and 
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communities. In the late-seventeenth century, new alternative geographies employed by the 
enslaved for survival entered into this space, which Duboys’s report on the conspirators 
acknowledged and identified as a critical threat to the island’s colonial order.  
4.4 Policing Bridgetown 
While the 1692 conspiracy’s impact appears to have been decidedly local in its scope and 
scale, its nevertheless had a profound impact on the colonial government’s relationship to 
Bridgetown, particularly the laws and institutions governing and policing the port. As had been 
the case for much of the seventeenth century, such moments of crisis and instability changed the 
colony’s relationship to Bridgetown by reconfiguring the balance of colonial power in the town, 
placing greater authority over the port into the hands of colonial officers away from the parish 
system. The immediate wake of the 1692 conspiracy was predictable but its consequences were 
felt long into the 1700s. Like other instances of slave conspiracies throughout the early modern 
Atlantic world, the planter class’s immediate reprisals were swift, brutal and intended to terrorize 
the enslaved Afro-Barbadian population.237 Duboys’s court martial had the ringleaders broken, 
gibbeted, burned, and dismembered in Bridgetown, the intended target of their efforts and site of 
the conspiracy’s discovery.  
Studies of enslaved resistance often stop the story of an individual uprising or conspiracy 
there, with the planter class imposing a new regime of militarized terror. In such narratives, 
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slavery’s order is restored and insurrection temporarily repressed or dispersed to find rebirth 
elsewhere. The events in the years and decades after, however, are often of equal or greater 
importance, as scholars like Tervor Burnard and David Garrigus have discovered with the legacies 
of Tacky’s Revolt and the Macandal poisonings of the  late 1750s and 1760s in the greater 
Caribbean plantation colonies of France and Britain.238 Likewise, in Barbados, the conspiracy of 
1692 had profound implications for how the colony would come to govern spaces like Bridgetown.   
 Between 1692 and 1715, planters and colonists embarked on a project of codifying and 
regulating how they governed and policed the town’s black population, distributing the 
responsibility of population control from the exclusive hands of individual planters and colonists 
into colonial state authorities. The colonial state took on the majority of surveilling, disciplining, 
and controlling enslaved populations through regulating black marketing and hucksters, creating 
a comprehensive system of town watches, and erecting new fortifications around Bridgetown to 
protect against enslaved insurrection. Colonists’ beliefs in Bridgetown’s capacity to foster disease, 
disorder, and insurrection drove these efforts to strengthen the apparatuses of the colonial state in 
its role as municipal government.  
The first elements of this legislative project were put in place almost immediately after the 
conspiracy’s discovery in October 1692 when the colonial assembly banned the sale of liquor and 
other alcohol to enslaved people. Planters feared alcohol fueled multiple forms of enslaved crime 
and resistance, including planning insurrection. The new law explained in the preamble that “many 
enormities have been committed, and mischiefs hatch and contrived Negroes and other Slaves, 
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when opportunities have been given of meeting, and excessive drinking thereat.” Observing 
enslaved communal life from afar, the planters saw how alcohol served a vital role in the rites and 
rituals that sustained enslaved African and Afro-Caribbean communities throughout the early 
modern Caribbean. Given the centrality of alcohol to Afro-Caribbean ritual and communal life, 
rum and other liquors drove a part of the island’s internal marketing system in Bridgetown 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.239 The law, entitled “An Act for prohibiting 
the selling of Rum, or other strong Liquors to any Negro or other Slave,” however, predominantly 
targeted the economic activities of white inhabitants, mostly concentrated in the island’s ports, 
who sold alcohol to enslaved people in the Sunday markets. Any colonist or visitor found guilty 
of breaking the new law paid twenty shillings for each offence or received ten lashes administered 
by public “Whippers” in Bridgetown. The new law ensured that economic boundaries between 
poorer whites and enslaved peoples were violently enforced in the town’s marketplace.240  
The planters then took steps to reimpose the harsh penalties that had previously existed to 
punish long-term runaways from the island’s plantation in an attempt to limit the fugitivity that 
sustained many of the informal networks connecting Bridgetown to the rest of Barbados. In 1688, 
in the last major amendment to the island’s slave code, the planters relaxed the laws governing 
desertion and absences from the island’s plantations. They removed a clause from the Act 
governing slavery that made desertion lasting over a month punishable by death. It took until the 
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immediate aftermath of the conspiracy for planters in the assembly to re-assess this decision and 
return this clause to the island’s slave code in a conscious effort to limit enslaved mobility and the 
short-term maroonage endemic to Caribbean slave societies by the late-seventeenth century.    
In the wake of the conspiracy, planter concerns about enslaved mobility and changing 
occupational patterns prompted proposals to limit the use of enslaved people as maritime labor in 
small coasting vessels, revealing a growing interest among the island’s planters and merchants to 
regulate labor systems used in spaces like Bridgetown and Carlisle Bay. In 1695, a group of 
planters and merchants in the colonial assembly proposed a law entitled “an act prohibiting negroes 
to be employed in wherrys or shallops.” On the face of it, the proposal addressed settlers’ fears of 
poor white population decline and social marginalization in Barbados by focusing on limiting 
enslaved labor employed in the small crafts used to load and unload ships in Carlisle Bay. The 
proposed act criticized how owners of “wherries and shallops… doe to the discouragement of 
white men, Employ negroes chiefely in their Shallopps.” Their proposal argued for establishing a 
quota for coasting crafts, similar, in some ways, to the Navigation Acts requirements that English 
sailors form a majority crews in English ships. The proposed act would require shallop owners to 
“hire and Employ in the service of said Shallop two white men at the Least.”241 While the assembly 
ultimately rejected the proposal, the proposed act reflects a growing interest among the planters 
and merchants of the colonial assembly in regulating the port’s labor systems. 
This interest in governing Bridgetown only intensified over the next decade, reflecting a 
lasting change in how merchants and planters in the colonial assembly thought about the role of 
the colonial state in urban-maritime spaces like Bridgetown. By December 1704, after disastrous 
 
241 TNA, CO31/5/fol. 28.  
 156 
years of imperial warfare, bitter colonial politics, and widespread economic misfortune among the 
planter class, a group of Bridgetown merchants and sugar planters in the assembly presented the 
finds of a “Grand Inquest for the body of the Island” to the temporary governor, William Sharpe. 
While framed as an island-wide investigation into the most pressing issues facing the colonial 
economy and society, the commissioners ended up focusing primarily on the conditions of 
Bridgetown. Such a critical examination into the material conditions of the port led by the colonial 
government rather than the parish reflected a keen interest in governing Bridgetown, breaking with 
the division of power that placed the parish system as the port’s primary government.  
While earlier descriptions of Barbados had blamed the town’s ills mostly on proximity to 
an unhealthy climate, the “Grand Inquest” blamed the town’s problems on the material conditions 
of the built environment and proposed ways the colonial government could solve such problems. 
The capital’s streets, according to the report, were filled with “beastlyness and filthiness.” 
Tottering buildings, abandoned and neglected by absentee owners, threatened to collapse on 
inhabitants.  The port, in their opinion, had fallen into such a state of disrepair and neglect that it 
could only prove to inhabitants “unhealthy as well as uneasie in their persons and Consequently 
very uncomfortable to themselves.” The streets, according to the commissioners lacked proper 
drainage, leading to flooding and pools of stagnating water threatening to damage buildings 
foundations and the valuable commodities merchants stored in them. The island’s propertied 
classes, obliged to do business and attend government in a town they now apparently associated 
with dirt, disease, and disorder, hoped to use this inquest as a means of encouraging new projects 
and laws to revitalize the port and, by extension, the island’s colonial economy. The 
commissioners of the “Grand Inquest,” drawn from the island’s elite propertied classes, painted a 
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strikingly bleak portrait of the island’s colonial capital, one that focused on the port’s capacity to 
foster disease and disorder.242  
The commissioners’ fixation on disease and disorder, particularly Bridgetown’s 
“beastliness and filthiness” expressed fears not only of the town’s material conditions but of its 
social conditions as well, tying projects of urban renewal to policing enslaved people in the port. 
In the eighteenth century, planters and masters around the early modern Atlantic world associate 
enslaved African and Afro-Caribbean people and labor with material degradation and excrement; 
an association born from masters’ use of enslaved labor in plantation society’s dirtiest and most 
dishonored jobs. The inquest, as an expression of municipal interest in the port, expressed settler’s 
negative associations of Bridgetown’s material condition with slave labor and mobility in the port 
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.  
Out of the concerns expressed in the “Grand Inquest” of 1704 emerged a law that sought 
to address both the problems of Bridgetown’s material conditions as well as enslaved mobility in 
the urban-maritime landscape of the port. This new act regulating a renewed and organized town 
watch blended the concerns about enslaved mobility raised by Duboys’s commission into the 1692 
conspiracy and the port’s material conditions raised by the “Grand Inquest” of 1704.  “An act 
appointing watches for the respective towns in the island” had two stated purposes. The first was 
to control crimes against property, which planters often associated with the marketing activities of 
enslaved populations. As the preamble explained in language rife with code language describing 
fears of enslaved crime and mobility:   
there hath been of late great Neglect in setting and keeping Watches within the several 
Towns of this Island so that many Robberies, Felonies, Burglaries, have been committed 
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and many suspicious persons wander about the said Towns in the Night-time, without 
control or Question. 
 
The second purpose of the law was to address the issues of sanitation and material order in 
the town. The town watch would direct and enforce where and how the town’s inhabitants disposed 
of “dung, stinking provisions, sweepings of their houses, or other Nusances,”243 the sort of 
“fylthiness” the members of the commission had associated with the diseases that plagued 
Bridgetown periodically throughout the 1690s and 1700s.  The tactics the assembly used to 
organize the town watch extended and modified the military organization of the island’s militia 
system onto Bridgetown’s urban landscape.  
The new act broke with the island’s long-standing division of urban governance that placed 
the parochial vestry of St Michaels as the primary and nearly exclusive government for 
Bridgetown. The new act turned instead to the colony’s Justices of the Peace and constables, 
extending their authority into Bridgetown. The first clause of the newly passed act ordered that 
“the several Justices of the Peace within the Precincts of St Michael, shall meet in their usual Place 
of Meeting upon the First Tuesday after publication of this Act…” and there consult with “the 
several Churchwardens” of the town’s urban parishes and their “Parish-Books, Accounts, and of 
Assessments, and Levies on the Houses within the several towns.”244 By working with parish tax 
and levy records, the Justices of the Peace would create “an equal division of the Towns,” just as 
each set of plantations in the countryside formed companies for the island’s militia.245 The solution 
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blended the authorities of the parish churchwardens with the activities of colonial law enforcement 
exercised by the Justices of the Peace.  
After dividing the town into smaller precincts, the law established how the town watches 
would be armed and the nature of their duties. The officers – Constables - of the town watch were 
chosen by the parish Justices of the Peace and commanded men sent by the town’s property-owners 
to serve in the patrols, a system mirroring the colony’s militia system. Just as planters were 
responsible for keeping an indentured servant or poor white inhabitant for every ten acres, the law 
ordered  
every Master or Mistress of a Family, or Shop-keeper, and every owner of a House or 
Store-house within the Town of St Michael, to the Value of Fifteen Pounds per Annum, or 
more, for every such Store-house, and also every Owner of a Store-house of the like Value 
within the said Town of St. Michael, and is a planter and hath a Plantation in this Island, 
though the said Store-house be not rented out, he having no Person dwelling therein, shall, 
and the very of them beforementioned, are hereby required to send an able Man every 
eighteen Night246  
 
But while colonists in the island’s militia were required to purchase and maintain their own 
red coats, black hats, muskets, ammunition, and cartridge boxes, the men serving in the town watch 
were to be provided with “a good Sword, Watch-Bill, or Half-Pike,” militarizing the port’s streets. 
Keeping strict guard, the watches had the authority to “take up all wandring suspected idle Persons, 
who cannot give a good account of themselves, and their Business.” If they came across anyone 
“endeavouring to break open any House or Houses, or fire the same; or if any Person shall with 
Force and Violence resist and oppose the said Constables and Watches” they had the authority to 
resort with deadly violence. The act paid particular attention to the watches’ duty to arrest anyone 
attempting to start fires, an echo of the fears of urban conflagration stoked by the 1692 conspiracy.  
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Beyond policing and surveilling the port town at night, the newly established town watches 
enforced the new standards of urban cleanliness, linking policing to regulating the town’s material 
conditions which had traditionally been the role of the parochial government. The final clauses of 
the new law establishing a town watch forbade any person within Bridgetown’s streets from 
throwing “at any time, by Day or Night, into any Street, Lane, Alley, or other Place within the said 
Towns, any Dung, Stinking Provisions, Sweepings of their Houses, or other Nusances.” Justices 
of the Peace, constables, watchmen, clerks of the market, were “strictly required and enjoyned” to 
report or arrest settlers or enslaved people breaking the new law. Those found guilty of violating 
the new sanitary regulations risked paying a fine of twenty-shilling in pounds sterling. If any of 
the watchmen or constables turned a blind eye to inhabitants littering the streets, they faced the 
same fine.247 Although the act relied on a unique blending of parochial and colonial authorities to 
police and govern the town and did not result in the intentional creation of a municipal government 
as such, it did represent a watershed in how settlers surveilled and policed black bodies in 
Bridgetown.  
Planters efforts to govern Bridgetown did not stop with the creation of a renewed and 
organized town watch, it continued with further restriction on enslaved mobility. In 1708, the 
assembly passed a measure “to prohibit the Inhabitants of this Island from employing, their 
Negroes or other slaves, in selling and bartering.” Targeting the white and black hucksters plying 
their goods to supply the island’s internal marketing system “quick-stock, Corn, Fruit, Pulse… 
Milk, Horse-meat, and Firewood,” the law levied heavy fines on white buyers of goods sold by 
enslaved sellers. Black sellers of such goods, whether on behalf of their masters or acting on their 
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own, faced corporal punishment of twenty-one lashes on their backs executed by a Justice of the 
Peace at the site of the violation. In the context of Bridgetown’s crowded markets, this meant that 
the law had the potential to transform the market into a site of colonial violence against the 
enslaved. Recognizing the difficulties of stopping the small commerce and marketing between 
poor whites and black people in Bridgetown, the law ordered the clerks of the market to hire two 
men at the rate of fifteen pounds a year to “diligently inspect the Tippling-houses, Huckstering 
shops, Markets and all other suspected places within or near the said Town,” adding another group 
of police onto the town’s streets and into its taverns and public houses.248 Finding it nearly 
“impossible altogether to discourage and find out such evil practices,” the assembly expanded the 
power of the colonial state in Bridgetown in an effort of controlling the port’s economy. Alongside 
the act establishing a town watch, it sought to bring the town’s settler population and propertied 
classes together in an effort of civic renewal and obligation towards policing the boundaries of the 
island’s slave society.  Squads of settlers patrolled the port’s streets, markets, and taverns, and 
were not the only symbols of the colonial state’s interest in urban renewal and control.  
In the early years of the eighteenth century, planters’ efforts to govern and police 
Bridgetown extended into improving the port’s principal fortifications, signaling a new interest in 
guarding the port from insurrection rather than just foreign invasion. The 1692 conspiracy and 
Duboys’s report had raised issues about the security of the island’s fortifications from the dangers 
of slave insurrection. Disloyal Irish and enslaved workers in the town magazine and Needham’s 
point could be removed and punished; outdated and poorly engineered fortifications would remain 
susceptible to the attacks of a slave uprising if one were to occur. Duboys included in his report to 
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the governor recommendations for solving some of these tricky problems.  Duboys noted that 
around the walls and near the gate to Needham’s point, Bridgetown’s most important fortification, 
“many bushes high Corne and other blinds” could successfully hide rebels looking to surprise the 
fort.249 Duboys’s recommendation was limited to removing and clearing the dense undergrowth in 
front of the fort.250 As the wars of the early eighteenth century raged on in this context of planters’ 
attempts to revitalize Bridgetown, planters turned towards British royal engineers to help build 
new fortifications around the port.  
Bridgetown’s fortifications had long been viewed as inadequate for defending the island, 
yet it took until the early years of the eighteenth century for the colonial government to enlist 
British Royal Engineers to improve the town’s forts. British royal engineer Talbot Edwards arrived 
in Barbados during the closing years of Nine Years War and offered an unsparing assessment of 
Barbados’s forts to the Secretary of the Lords of Trade and Plantations, Edward Blathwayte. Sent 
to assess the island’s defenses, Edwards dismissed them out of hand. “Some places they call Forts 
which have neither moats nor pallizadoes about them… and have such sorry guns in them… that, 
should they ever come to make use of these works, would serve only to deceive ye island, but not 
to defend it.” His concerns for Barbados’s security ran deep, “They have nothing to secure 
themselves but a small Trench they have sunk of about seven foot broad by five foot deep all next 
ye sea, and as this is a very slight defence, soe it is washed downe almost every year with ye 
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rains.”251 If the problems with the island’s fortifications were of serious concern to British 
Engineers and the imperial government, Edwards’ solutions were grandiose to the point of 
absurdity. 
Edward’s proposals, while unrealistic given the constraints on the colony’s finances, did 
signal the colonial government’s serious interest in strengthening the port’s defenses from 
insurrection originating in the island’s sugar plantations. Edwards’ proposal for a new fortification 
to defend Bridgetown envisioned a massive structure that would house no less than 500 pieces of 
cannon and 4,000-5,000 British soldiers.252 At the time of Edwards’ report, Needham’s point, the 
island’s largest fort, had only 40 pieces of ordinance overlooking Carlisle Bay.253 Edwards 
dreamed to build a fort that would rival any defensive structure in Europe, referencing his plan, “I 
believe it is ye first piece of fortification as ever was contrived with such large flanques, being 300 
foot in length, and the greatest Engineers in Europe has never yet brought them higher then 
200ft.,.” Facing immense financial pressure and stress after years of costly warfare, Barbados’s 
colonial government and assembly rejected Edward’s ambitious plans, citing the decline of the 
island’s white population, high taxes, and continuing costs of defense. Barbadian planters 
considered any additional tax to be simply unacceptable. Edwards and the island’s colonial 
government agreed, however, on the need to adjust the orientation of Barbados’s defenses from 
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away from the sea towards internal threats to “check the insults of the negroes as to be the grand 
place of retreat.”254 
The compromise between the cash-strapped colonists and the overly ambitious Edwards 
was St Ann’s fort, built on an elevation above Bridgetown to protect the port from foreign naval 
forces and local insurrection from inland. St Ann’s location above and outside Bridgetown shifted 
the center of Bridgetown’s defensive infrastructure away from Needham’s point and the coast.  
Colonists invested in rebuilding a platform on the northern edge of the town to complement the 
new defenses, near the old colonial seat of Fontabelle. The colonial assembly invested in placing 
cannons, ordinances, and armed guards to the east of Bridgetown near the new governor’s mansion 
at Pilgrim’s plantation. These fortifications formed a ring around Bridgetown with St. Ann’s, and 
oriented as much towards the island’s interior as towards the sea and foreign attacks. In addition 
to the strategic value these fortifications had to the port’s defense, they also served as symbols of 
the planters’ power concentrated around the port to deter the mobility of enslaved people seeking 
a degree of freedom in Bridgetown’s markets. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The contours of Bridgetown’s social and colonial geographies did not fundamentally 
change between 1690 and 1710. The colonial politics of governing Bridgetown, however, changed 
enormously during this period. At the start of this period of colonial crisis, decline, and renewal 
on Barbados, St Michael’s parish played a central role in governing the port. The 1692 conspiracy 
254 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 18, 1700, no. 954. 
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and the broader crisis of the colony’s plantation economy in this period changed how planters 
related to Bridgetown, ushering in a new system of governance and policing in Bridgetown. New 
laws passed in the aftermath of the 1692 conspiracy laid the foundation for a system of surveillance 
and colonial terror that marked the boundaries of slave society in Bridgetown expanding the power 
of Barbados’s colonial state. 
These new laws and the emergence of a new system of urban governance in Bridgetown 
were predominantly reactions to emergent patterns of enslaved mobility and resistance in 
Barbados. The relationship between the 1692 conspiracy and the process of urban renewal in 
Bridgetown confirms what Emma Hart and Trevor Burnard have identified about the urban 
histories of eighteenth-century Kingston and Charleston. In the context of these plantation 
societies, urban renewal focused on addressing the needs of these places to police enslaved people. 
Studies of this eighteenth-century effort of urban renewal in the eighteenth century British 
Atlantic, however, often focus on how the movement broadened political participation and spread 
ideas of civic participation through the creation of new municipal governments and institutions. 
These studies have thus produced narratives that envision urban renewal of the kind experienced 
by Bridgetown in this particularly unstable period as a part of an expanding, transatlantic urban 
middle class. The case of Bridgetown, in a transatlantic context, reminds us that such projects of 
urban renewal often rested on a foundation of racial capitalism partially engineered on Barbadian 
plantations in the seventeenth century, and had as much to do with the protection of property and 
social order as it did the growth of an urban middle class. 
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5.0 Bridgetown’s Builders: The Parish, Merchants, Planters and Barbados’s Building 
Industry 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth century, English settlers in Barbados and the rest of the 
Greater Caribbean performed a delicate balancing act, constructing a profitable colonial landscape 
marked by comfortingly English architectural and cultural forms while adapting life to the harsh 
realities of hurricanes, earthquakes, tropical heat, and the constant social violence of racial 
slavery.255 The builders whose structures marked and defined these landscapes adapted to the 
necessities of the environment while seeking to profit from the demands of a colonial market in 
constant need of housing and infrastructure. As the site of tense political and social negotiations 
and conflict throughout the seventeenth-century, settlers’ need for stability in Bridgetown’s built 
environment was perhaps greater than anywhere else on Barbados.  
Housing remained a constant need for Bridgetown’s 10,000-plus inhabitants in the late-
seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The largest period of growth in the town’s permanent 
inhabitants took place towards the end of the seventeenth century. As discussed in chapter three, 
between 1680 and 1712, Bridgetown’s population grew from 3000 to 11,000 year-round 
inhabitants, greatly increasing the need for housing in the port.256 While the structures of municipal 
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government in Bridgetown remained in flux for much of the seventeenth and earlier eighteenth 
century, Bridgetown’s builders nevertheless created a local industry to meet these housing needs. 
In Bridgetown, like elsewhere in British Caribbean, such builders developed what Lois Nelson 
calls “creole architectures”: local adaptions of English architectural forms to tropical 
environments. Just as the form of Bridgetown’s buildings displayed evidence of creolization, 
Barbadian conditions and developments created a creole building industry capable of meeting the 
housing demands of a vibrant Atlantic port.  
In the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century, as the colonial government began to 
create a system of municipal governance and policing, the parish became a critical patron 
establishing the port’s building industry. Despite an early attempt in the 1660s to regulate the 
town’s builders and built environment, the colonial government made little sustained effort to 
regulate multiple actors who engaged with the town’s earliest building industry. The port’s earliest 
builders were elusive figures in the colony’s early history, predominantly marginal and 
marginalized within Barbados’s settler society. Unlike other members of the island’s propertied 
classes, they left little trace in the colonial archives. This changed with a series of parish projects 
in the 1690s and 1700s, that consolidated control over public projects into the hands of a select 
group of artisans and Bridgetown’s inhabitants. In the eighteenth century, however, these parochial 
builders were joined by a new generation of merchants and sugar planters who embraced building 
in Bridgetown as a profitable arm of their economic activities. This merge of building for profit 
with the production of sugar forms an underappreciated part of the transformation of plantation 
estates and operations that occurred over the course of the eighteenth century.  
The history of Bridgetown’s urban growth and development provides a useful lens for 
studying the ways vernacular building industries took root and adapted not only to unfamiliar 
 168 
environments but to complex institutional settings in the greater Caribbean and Atlantic world. 
Throughout the British Atlantic world, local building industries created the vital infrastructures 
that enabled settlement and expanded markets into a growing web of transatlantic commerce and 
capitalism, including in plantation societies like Barbados. The builders of Charleston, for 
example, according to Emma Hart, “were working within a British paradigm, they operated 
according to the habits of their metropolitan counterparts,” producing in the South Carolinian port 
a recognizably British provincial town.257 Bridgetown’s building industry followed a different 
trajectory than its mainland counterpart in South Carolina, emerging much earlier in the 
seventeenth century and reflecting not only local environmental conditions but the particular 
institutional and social pressures of Barbados’s sugar plantation colony. Rather than representing 
a pure extension of an urbanizing British provincial world, Bridgetown represents a local, 
Caribbean departure from this Atlantic trend.  
While these sources reveal a great deal about the island’s building industry, the scale of 
this sector of Barbados’s colonial economy remains elusive. Precise figures for the number of 
artisans and laborers involved, free and enslaved, white and black, are difficult to determine for 
Barbados. While precise figures remain out of reach, the importance of the industry can be 
measured in terms of the town and island’s housing needs. Plagued by fire, hurricane, and the 
extremes of tropical weather, buildings in Bridgetown and Barbados more broadly required 
constant repairs and reconstruction.258 In the densest of the island’s settlements, thousands of 
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buildings surrounded Carlisle Bay from the 1660s onward. The fact that so little of this seventeenth 
and eighteenth-century material culture remains is a powerful testament to both the destructive 
potential of the region’s climate as well as the imperatives behind the emergence of the island’s 
building industry during this period and in years afterward. This chapter attempts to answer long-
neglected questions about who built Bridgetown’s infrastructure and who, if anyone, profited from 
their construction, repair, and reconstruction. The political and social struggles that marked the 
history of Bridgetown’s governance shaped the trajectory and particularities of the town’s building 
industry in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries. 
5.1 A Parish Problem and the Colony’s Concern 
In the 1660s, problems regulating Bridgeton’s built environment remained largely the 
concern and responsibility of the town’s parochial system. The town’s complete destruction in 
1668, however, briefly became a concern of the island’s governor leading to an ultimately 
unsuccessful effort to regulate the town’s nascent building industry.259 These efforts, while largely 
unsuccessful, became one of the earliest attempts of an English colony to regulate an urban 
building industry. Borrowing from metropolitan laws meant to rebuild London after the Great Fire 
of 1666, these efforts focused on regulating materials used to reconstruct the town’s storehouses 
and buildings. Within a few years, however, the colonial government abandoned these efforts. 
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While short-lived, these attempts illustrate the persistence of the parochial system as the sole 
authority over much of the port’s social and economic life.   
The island’s earliest acts governing the Highways dated from the 1650s, and established 
the critical role played by the parish system in regulating and organizing Bridgetown’s built 
environment.260 Parishes used their resources to create specific offices to deal with the problems 
of building public roads and ways. The parishes’ surveyor of the Highways organized the work 
and labor needed to build and maintain this public infrastructure so vital to the circulation of people 
and the products of sugar cane in the island’s plantation economy. The labor used in such projects 
was drawn largely from those same sugar plantations. In Bridgetown, the Surveyors of the 
Highway faced an even greater task than their rural counterparts. In St Michael’s parish, the 
surveyors were also responsible for policing the town’s inhabitants, requiring each owner of a 
house or store to tend to their doorsteps and keep the streets of the busy and crowded commercial 
port clean.  In addition to overseeing these issues particular to the port, the parish also needed to 
keep the town’s bridges stable and sound enough to bear the loads of sugar carts that carried 
plantation products to the island’s principal port.261 By the restoration of crown governance in 
1660, the parish system had emerged alongside the sugar plantation as a key and vital institution 
responsible, among other things, for the regulation and maintenance of the built environment in 
Bridgetown.  
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Given the parish’s role in maintaining Bridgetown’s urban built environment, it is 
unsurprising that when news arrived in 1666 of London’s Great Fire, the parish quickly took 
action. As a significant colonial port and major sugar exporter to London, Barbados in the 1660s 
was closely attuned to metropolitan developments, particularly the merchants who lived and 
worked in Bridgetown and made up the parish’s governing body, the vestry. When news arrived 
in Bridgetown of London’s Great Fire in the fall of 1666, the parish convened a special meeting 
of the vestry. There, they decided to take measures to make the town ready and prepared to address 
the familiar early modern scourge of urban fire. They directed Major James Beake, a prominent 
merchant in town, to purchase and bring over from England “a couple of Water Engines for the 
use of the parish and a dozen leather buckets and three hookes.”262 With little authority beyond the 
oversight of the town’s streets, the parish roads, and bridges, the vestry turned to the port’s 
wealthiest inhabitants to secure the special equipment deemed necessary to prevent or fight fires 
that devastated townscapes throughout the urban early modern world. For the parish to function as 
an institution governing the port, it depended on the wealth and involvement of the town’s 
wealthiest sugar merchants and slave traders. When the risk of urban fire remained just news 
circulating around the Atlantic world and not an actuality, this arrangement served the parish 
system well.  
The extraordinary event of a violent fire in Bridgetown two years later, in April 1668, 
helped make the parochial concern with fire-prevention an interest of Barbados’s colonial 
government. Barbadian settlers, particularly Bridgetown’s merchants who lost so much in the 
conflagration were quick to pick up on the resonances between the two unusually devasting fires.  
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John Bushel and James Bond, merchants and partners in Bridgetown shared a storehouse not far 
from the waterfront and publicized the fire to their correspondents in London. They told the readers 
of their publicized letters that “fire in our Town… burnt and consumed almost all the whole 
buildings thereof, save only a very few houses,” in the short space of a few hours after flames 
ignited the colony’s central magazine and store of gunpowder. The subsequent explosion caused, 
according to the eyewitnesses, “great terrour and damage.” Bushel and Bond exploited their 
reader’s taste for descriptions of the Caribbean’s unusual climate and geography by speculated 
that “it might have caused a very great Earthquake (which Islands of this Nature are much subject 
unto).” The explosion “dispersed the Fire and shattered all the houses, that the whole Town became 
presently a prey to its flames.” 263 These dramatic reports made it in the London Gazette late in 
1668 alongside calls for imported timber to help the efforts to rebuild the shattered and traumatized 
town.264 Reports calculated that the fire razed around 800 buildings and destroyed, in the process, 
most of sugar, molasses, and rum stored in the warehouses and wharfs lining Carlisle Bay. The 
fire may have cost the island’s inhabitants £400,000 island-currency in damages and nearly wiped 
out the colony’s reserves of arms, armaments, and munitions.265 The scale of the damages, the loss 
of the island’s arsenal and the timing of the catastrophe during the Second Anglo-Dutch war 
demanded the governor’s intervention. In this moment of crisis, the parish’s problems in 
Bridgetown now became the colony’s concern.  
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In October 1668, the colonial government passed an act for rebuilding St Michael’s Town; 
an early attempt to regulate the island’s building industry and a significant departure from the 
established authority of the parish over the port. The act borrowed from crown edicts passed in 
London after the Great Fire to insist that inhabitants rebuild Bridgetown in stone, rather than the 
wood and timber that defined much of the town’s earliest structures.266 In the wake of the London’s 
great fires and the dictates of Charles II’s government in London, urban authorities throughout 
Great Britain embraced regulations to build towns and cities in stone and brick.267 The laws 
governing the reconstruction of London went further to delineate the size of streets and heights of 
buildings. In their efforts to regulate Bridgetown’s reconstruction, Barbados’s colonial authorities 
sought to emulate metropolitan authorities who embraced strict building regulations in the wake 
of London’s major seventeenth century fires, but faced a vernacular built environment and building 
industry more indebted to local constraints than urban visions articulated in Britain.  
In Barbados, before the mid-seventeenth century, buildings in stone or brick were rare. Up 
until the 1650s, builders on plantations and in the towns had abundant supplies of wood on the 
island itself as planters continued to clear land and carved out fields for sugar cane.  By as early 
as the 1660s, when the last accessible forests were cleared and fields planted with sugar cane, 
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settlers needed to import timber. The town’s ship owners and merchants regularly organized 
timbering expeditions to Suriname and the indigenous-held islands of the eastern Caribbean, the 
sources of vernacular industries and trades in the region.268 The new act to rebuild St Michael’s 
town, with its insistence on enforcing the use of stone, faced the geographic and economic 
constraints particular to the region. Such constraints doomed the colonial government’s early 
intervention into regulating the town’s building infrastructure and preserved the vestry’s authority 
over the town. 
Barbadian planters, merchants, and builders faced geographically and economically-
specific challenges to finding cheap sources of stone and brick. Barbados, a colony in the middle 
of a revolutionary adoption of mass sugar cultivation, had few settlers engaged in quarrying and 
brick-making, despite the abundant white coral limestone found throughout the island.269 Settlers 
more frequently mined stone available along the coasts for ship’s ballast rather than construction, 
a practice that worried colonial officials tasked with defending the island from French, Dutch, and 
Spanish attacks by sea. In 1665, at the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch war, colonial 
authorities passed a law “to prevent the raising, digging, breaking up, or taking away of any Stones, 
in any part of the Sea, or Seashores before this Island.”270 A few years later, after the Bridgetown 
fire and recognizing colonists’ use of these rocks along the eastern coast, colonial authorities 
temporarily relaxed the prohibition against mining coastal rock formations, briefly placing the 
needs of the island’s building industry above strategic considerations. In their efforts to enable 
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Bridgetown’s builders to construct a new town of stone, the colonial government briefly set aside 
concerns over defending the island’s coasts.  
 Despite loosening regulations against mining stone from the island’s coasts, the demand 
for imported timber remained high throughout the seventeenth century, suggesting that Barbados’s 
early building industry continued to favor using wood over brick or stone. Inhabitants appeared to 
prefer the loose building restrictions of the merchant-led parochial government over the new 
colonial laws issued by the governor. Months after the April fire, advertisements in London 
newspapers looked to attract merchants willing to supply timber to Barbados on easy terms for 
inhabitants hoping to rebuild the town quickly and cheaply. When reporting on the state of the 
English colony in the early 1680s, however, governor Dutton, praised the rebuilt town. “The cheife 
Town in the Island is… partly built of Brick, but most of Stone with handsome Streets,” suggesting 
that at least some builders in Bridgetown took the laws of the late 1660s as serious guidelines.271 
Dutton, a new arrival to Barbados in the early 1680s, praised the town for being built “after the 
English fashion for commodiousness and decency,” in his reports back to the Board of Trade and 
Plantations in London.272  
Despite these governors’s praise of Bridgetown, they took few steps to regulate the island’s 
building industry, leaving much of the practical governance of the port town to parochial 
authorities. Their disinterest in regulating the town or its builders suggests that the Act to Rebuild 
St Michael’s town in 1668 was the product of an exceptional moment; the convergence of colonial 
interests influenced by the metropolitan experience of a particularly violent urban fire in the 
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island’s only urban center and principal market town. Nevertheless, it provides a unique window 
into the state of the island’s building industry in the early years of the seventeenth century and the 
limitations of colonial institutions to effectively regulate or control its practitioners. What little we 
can learn of these earlier builders, particularly those who sought to profit from development and 
construction in Bridgetown, suggests that the town’s early building industry was driven by figures 
traditionally ignored by narratives that chart the rise of the island’s plantation economy.  
As the smoke cleared from Bridgetown in September 1668, merchants like John Bushel 
and Francis Bond surveyed the damage, noting the tremendous costs to the island’s trade. Nearly 
a years-worth of products drawn from crops of sugar cane went up in flames with the town’s 
storehouses. In their public letters to London, Bushel and Bond used these calculations to impress 
upon their mercantile readers the dire needs of the colony and signal the commercial opportunities 
available to those willing to supply its merchants with trade.273 They were not alone in tallying up 
the costs of the fire and using the disaster to further their aims and interests. The island’s governor, 
William Willoughby and his council drafted a letter to Charles II’s government, emphasizing the 
grave danger posed by the loss of guns and armaments stored in Bridgetown.274 Using the 
conflagration, they begged the crown to renew their investment in the island’s defenses and ease 
the costs of defense placed on the island’s planters. While Atlantic merchants like Bushel and 
Bond and the island’s governor articulated their stakes in the efforts to rebuild Bridgetown in 1668, 
they were not alone in spotting the opportunities that appeared in the ashes and smoke. As deeds 
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from the period show, local builders, largely on the margins of Barbados’s planter and mercantile 
elite, played a crucial role in rebuilding Bridgetown after the fire of 1668.  
A host of lesser known figures sought out and found opportunity for profit in the unique 
circumstances of Bridgetown’s post-fire development. Leaving behind only sparse trails in the 
archives, they nevertheless helped rebuild one of England’s wealthiest colonial ports. One of the 
reasons why such actors and their activities as post-disaster developers remain obscure is that most 
failed to lay down permanent roots in Barbados during the second-half of the seventeenth century. 
While they played pivotal roles in this exceptional moment of crisis and development, they either 
had no interest or ability to translate whatever gains they made in redevelopment into the mainstays 
of the colonial economy: sugar and slaves.  
Packed closely together by the waterfront and wharfs, the April fire spared few of the 
storehouses lining Bridgetown’s main commercial thoroughfare, Cheapside. Named for the 
London commercial center, the main street in Bridgetown had been the home of the town’s 
principle merchants and a good number of colonial leaders since the 1640s. Daniel Searle, a 
London merchant and the Protectorate’s chief agent in the 1650s kept his governor’s residence 
along the street at the center of town.275 So close to the waterfront, the parish taxed the houses and 
inhabitants of Cheapside at higher rates than many of the town’s other streets in the late 
seventeenth century.276 Later in the century, English merchants monopolized the thoroughfare, but 
at mid-century the street was home to wealthy merchants from a variety of communities and 
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occupations. One of Searle’s neighbors in the late 1650s was Nathaniel White, a “Churgyon and 
practitioner of Physick,” signaling the occupational diversity of Cheapside in the early years of the 
town’s life as a vital Atlantic port.277  
Such figures like the “Churgyon” White, held onto their property well into the 1660s as the 
port’s social and cultural geography grew in diversity and complexity. Nathaniel White held a 99-
year lease on a 20-foot wide parcel of land fronting on Cheapside, located next door to the 
governor’s mansion in the 1650s. Dated from December 10, 1673, White’s presence in Bridgetown 
can be traced from the waning days of the English Commonwealth, a moment of uncertainty in 
the colonial government as Searle’s grip on colonial power faded and was replaced by a string of 
influential planters that hoped to lead the island through the restoration of Charles II.278 White 
received the lease from one of the island’s earliest settlers, Captain James White, a planter who 
held titles to land in the port. Long after Searle’s governorship ended.  Nathaniel White stayed in 
Bridgetown, holding onto to the Cheapside property until the November following the town’s great 
fire.  
Reflecting the town’s growing religious and cultural diversity, following the town’s fire in 
1668, White transferred his lease to Abraham Levi Rezio, a Sephardi man with few connections 
to even the island’s Jewish community and even fewer to the rest of the island. While Nathaniel 
White’s presence in Bridgetown can be traced through wills and deeds connecting him to multiple 
merchants from Speightstown and Bridgetown. References to White’s occupation as a Surgeon 
and practitioner of Physick signals his place in Barbados’s settler society. Levi Rezio, by contrast, 
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is mentioned in only one set of deeds connected to White’s plot in Bridgetown and subsequently 
disappears from the island’s historical record. Levi Rezio’s name is absent from the island and 
town’s earliest census in 1680, suggesting that his presence in Barbados was fleeting and 
temporary.279 Figures like Levi Rezio reflect the growth of a segment of Bridgetown’s population 
that, alongside the town’s growing social and cultural diversity laid down few roots in the port. 
Even if Levi Rezio’s presence on Barbados was temporary, his interests in Bridgetown 
depended on building durable commercial relationships and, literally, solid foundations. As 
discussed earlier, Sephardim proved successful at forging such commercial connections in 
Bridgetown, particularly in the 1660s. In the months following the April fire, Levi Rezio began 
buying properties not just facing Cheapside, but others facing a parallel street. His plans, from the 
deeds we have access to, reveal a slow consolidation of properties at the center of the town from 
largely Anglican merchant-settlers. When Captain William Withington, an established planter and 
officer in the island’s militia, acquired a property sold off by one of the island’s marshals to pay a 
merchant’s debt, he sold the newly acquired property to Levi Rezio for an unknown sum. With 
Withington’s parcel in hand, Levi Rezio struck a similar deal with Nathaniel White for the valuable 
Cheapside property on November 24, 1668. In short order, a relatively unknown and little noted 
figure on Barbados managed to acquire two valuable properties at the center of the colony’s 
principle commercial town and capital. If he depended on English settlers to acquire this valuable 
plot of land, he turned to the island’s Sephardi community when he looked to sell. When he sold 
the plots in February 1670, it was to Antonio Rodrigues, a figure of some stature and connection 
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among the island’s Jewish community. 280 In his business dealings, the most lucrative commercial 
relationships for Levi Rezio remained within the town’s Sephardi community.  
Rodrigues capitalized on Levi Rezio’s earlier work joining and developing this property in 
Bridgetown. Levi Rezio, according to the deeds describing the property, “did erect and build a 
large stone house … since the town of St Michael’s aforesaid was burnt by fire.” In addition to 
acquiring these separate plots of land in Bridgetown, Levi Rezio managed to muster enough labor 
to build the large stone house despite his relatively weak ties to the island’s settler society. While 
these deeds allow us to trace the property-owners who developed the town, they say nothing to 
answer crucial questions about the labor builders like Levi Rezio used in this construction project. 
Having acquired the plot of land from Levi Rezio in February 1670, Rodrigues sold the large stone 
structure - perhaps a storehouse given its location near the waterfront – to an English settler, 
Nathaniel Clare, for the much larger sum of £500 sterling and ten guineas. In the year or so that he 
had possession of the plot of land, Levi Rezio acted as a developer, consolidating properties, 
acquiring specialized labor and stone material, and building a new structure in line with island’s 
legislation governing the town’s re-building in stone.281 Levi Rezio’s actions in Bridgetown and 
his relative marginality even within the island’s Sephardi community presents an interesting 
counter-point to the typical roles held by Sephardim in the early modern Caribbean.282   
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Builders like Levi Rezio present an alternative model for Bridgetown’s Sephardim in the 
seventeenth-century. As previously discussed, much of Bridgetown’s Sephardi community 
established long-lasting commercial ties to Barbados during the seventeenth century despite the 
anti-Semitism of their neighbors and restrictions placed on the community by the colonial 
government in the 1680s. Such commercial bonds and connections to a wider Atlantic mercantile 
diaspora allowed figures like Rodrigues to establish a permanent presence in Bridgetown helping 
to build a community that lasted into the nineteenth century. Levi Rezio departs from this model 
of the diasporic merchant translating commercial connections into a settled presence in plantation 
societies like Barbados. Rather, Levi Rezio appears in the archival record as an opportunistic 
builder of new urban structures who engaged in a limited set of projects in Bridgetown and simply 
left Barbados.  
The scarcity of references to Bridgetown’s earlier builders makes the deeds describing Levi 
Rezio’s project an unusual glimpse into who stepped into the void left by the fire of 1668. In these 
early years of Barbados’s slave society, figures like Levi Rezio existed on the margins of 
Barbados’s plantation society within an urban-maritime society that allowed such transient figures 
to carve out new opportunities provided by the needs for builders. Figures like Levi Rezio took 
advantage of moments like the town’s efforts to rebuild with permanent stone rather than 
temporary timber. In the late-seventeenth century an entirely different set of builders became more 
closely enmeshed in the island’s Anglican planter establishment, transforming the town’s nascent 
building industry. Unlike Levi Rezio, they found ways to establish a permanent presence on 
Barbados as settlers capable of consistently profiting from building infrastructure. Key to their 
success was the patronage of the island’s parochial institutions, particularly in Bridgetown where 
the need to build monumental architecture for the colony was at its greatest.  
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5.2 Building for the Parish 
In the 1730s, a generation after Copen’s depiction of Bridgetown from the sea, an 
anonymous artist attempted to render Barbados’s capital in paint. Like Copen’s earlier depiction, 
much of the town is an indistinct blur of houses and buildings with a few key exceptions again 
reflecting the priorities of the painter wishing to please his patron with a flattering view of the 
colony. With the viewer’s perspective situating inland, however, wind-mills and fields of sugar 
cane ring the town while on the edges of the town stand fortifications flying the flag of Great 
Britain. At the edge of the town, towards the center of the painting stands St Michael’s church with 
its nave and tower looming large over the town. The church’s steeple is clearly the tallest structure 
in the town, both a symbolic gesture of the parish church’s continued importance in Barbados and 
a recognition of the structure’s reality as a central location in the island’s social geography.283 
From the 1690s to the early 1720s, at the moment when the parish began to cede further control 
over governing Bridgetown to the governor and assembly, St Michael’s vestry devoted a great deal 
of time and resources to building the structure that appears so prominently in this anonymous 
painting. The volume of work these building projects required changed how the parish conducted 
its business with the town’s builders. 
Over three decades around the early eighteenth century, St Michael’s parish entrusted a 
small group of artisans to build a church that reflected the dignity and wealth of the island as well 
as the continued relevance of the parish system in a moment when the colonial state took a more 
 
283 Anonymous, View of Bridge Town and Carlisle Bay in Barbados with the Governor going to Church and attended 
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active role in governing Bridgetown. Gaining their trust, this group of builders went on to build 
roads, bridges, and infrastructure vital to the town’s commerce.  The patronage of the Anglican 
parish in Bridgetown, played a pivotal role in establishing the town’s artisans as public builders 
enabling some to join the ranks of the island’s planter class. 
The island’s parish churches, as critical centers of social, economic, and political power in 
seventeenth century Barbados, had long presented opportunities for the island’s builders in the 
seventeenth century. The earliest reference to the mason-turned-planter Simon Cooper comes from 
the parochial records of the mid-1660s. Simon Cooper, a prominent mason tasked with re-building 
the colony’s fortifications in the 1680s, had his start assessing the newly built St Michael’s church 
decades earlier.284 In the 1660s St Michael’s parish decided to relocate their church from the 
northern edge of town to the south-eastern corner closer to where the colony’s legislative assembly 
met and the port’s central markets did business.285  In this central location, the island’s governors, 
leading planters, and merchants met on Sundays and to mark the critical moments in the island’s 
Anglican religious life. From its pulpits, the island’s clergymen justified the island’s social and 
colonial order as loyal expressions of Anglican establishment overseas. The church also served as 
the meeting-place for the vestry that governed much of Bridgetown’s settler society. As a critical 
center of social, religious, and political power on Barbados, the church, unlike much of the town 
in the 1660s, was constructed in stone, had a tiled roof, and sported lead gutters and pipes to re-
direct the torrents and rains that washed out the island every rainy season. Most of the artisans who 
constructed this building and did this work in the 1660s remain unknown, but by the 1690s when 
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the parish sought to improve and expand this structure, its builders had become established figures 
in the town’s settler society.  
Such projects began in the 1690s as a generation of wealthy and generous Bridgetown 
merchants left elaborate bequests to the parish. Like Richard Barrett’s clock, John Mills left £350 
sterling to St Michael’s parish to buy an organ for the town’s church. Signaling the merchant elite’s 
interest in linking their local Anglican religious leadership to the metropole, Mills’ bequest 
specified that any organ be purchased from London. Placing the organ in the old church structure 
meant significantly altering its interior; this project was dependent on the contribution of the 
town’s artisans and served to strengthen the ties between the parish and the town’s middling 
classes. Two years after Mills left the parish the money to buy an organ, the vestry settled a contract 
with the artisan Latimer Richards to build an ornate loft to hold the newly acquired organ and 
establish St Michael’s church as the centerpiece of the Anglican colonial religious establishment. 
While the 1690s had been a destabilizing decade for Barbados, one in which the colonial 
government began policing Bridgetown, the parish turned towards the town’s middling classes to 
help project the institution’s wealth and power.  
Reacting to the uncertainty of the 1690s, the parish focused on creating an ornate church 
that borrowed architectural elements from a wider British Atlantic world. While the artisan 
Latimer Richards’ occupation remains unknown, the specific project of building the loft depended 
on knowledge of multiple crafts and architectural styles borrowed from around the Atlantic world. 
Specifically, as a carpenter, Richards build a 26-foot-long loft running along the church’s western 
end. Likewise, he built two sets of stairs needed to access the organ and the loft. Intent on 
ornamenting the church’s interior, the parish commissioned Richards to build ten elaborate 
Solomonic columns. The contract to build a loft, set of stairs, and the decorative columns not only 
 185 
speaks to the town’s access to a market of skilled artisanal labor that possessed knowledge of broad 
European architectural and ornamental trends, but also the parish’s interest in this uncertain period 
to enhance the appearance of its most important structure. Paying Richards £100 sterling in £25 
sterling installments, the vestry trusted Richards to supply the labor and knowledge for such an 
ornate project while the parish promised to find “all manner of materials convenient for the work.” 
286  Building for the parish was both profitable for Richards and critical for the parish to maintain 
its relevance in a rapidly changing Barbados.  
Still, some of the labor needed to install the organ could not be met through Bridgetown’s 
market of artisans and craftsmen forcing the parish to turn to England for specialized labor to help 
bolster the appearance of the parish church. By 1697, Richards had finished the organ loft, but it 
remained empty. Without an instrument to fill the space, the vestry formed a three-man committee 
to negotiate with William Brookes, “merchant in London… to procure an able Organ for the Parish 
of St. Michaels. 287” Finding the instrument alone was not enough, however, and the vestry 
instructed the committee to make sure that Brookes bring over “some able person to come over 
with the said Organ who understands the setting up of such an Instrument Ordered.” 288  While the 
vestry made an attempt to find the labor needed to actually set up the organ in the newly built loft 
in 1697, it took nearly a decade later in the early 1700s that the vestry actually needed to pay a 
parishioner, the sexton Edward Wilson, to conduct regular maintenance and provide the labor to 
work the Organ’s bellows.289 Even while decades of warfare disrupted the island’s trade and 
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plantation economy, destabilizing its settler society, the parish remained focused on bringing a 
pipe organ to Bridgetown to edify the parish church.  
Such projects continued into the 1710s as the parish sought to navigate its place in a town 
transformed by a decade of uncertainty in the late seventeenth-century. These projects and 
investments in parochial infrastructure established a cadre of parish-sanctioned builders and 
contractors both establishing the parish as a new source of economic influence just at the moment 
when its power as a political institution in Bridgetown began to significantly fade. In the 1710s, 
the parish’s attempts to build a tower to house a clock and bells left to the town in Richard Barrett’s 
will met with similar success as the project to bring in a pipe organ by tapping into this robust 
labor market, further establishing a cadre of parochially-sanctioned builders and contractors. In 
1711, the vestry organized a committee of leading figures in the town and colony’s settler society 
to organize the work of contracting with some of the island’s builders to realize the model of a 
tower produced by Colonel Christian Lilly, a Royal Engineer stationed on Barbados at the height 
of the War of Spanish Succession and responsible for the unenviable task of reforming the island’s 
hap-hazard system of fortifications.290 The committee settled on a mason, Thomas Godfrey, paying 
him £205 sterling for work “carefully and honestly performed by him or his masons.” 291  
By 1715, Godfrey and his masons had finished the work on the new stone tower, and the 
parish continued to solicit labor from the town’s builders, further entrenching the relationships 
between the merchants that represented the parish in the vestry and the town’s artisans. In August 
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1715, the parish settled a contract with Benjamin Crocker who, like Godfrey, was a builder and 
relatively unknown figure in the town’s settler society. Despite this relatively marginality, Crocker, 
again like Godfrey earned the parish’s trust to complete a project of some significance to the island 
elite. The parish paid Crocker £35 sterling for his work “carrying the steeple five feet higher than 
his agreement and for making the Cornishes.” They made a further set of agreements with Crocker 
based on their recognition that the builder had “done his work with diligence.” They gave him 
scaffolding material for “his own proper use” after the church was painted and white-washed as 
had “been usual” as long as any scaffolding material had been returned to its rightful owner.292 
Crocker’s case hints at the growing entanglement between the vestry and the town’s community 
of builders in the early eighteenth century. The vestry was building relationships of trust based on 
their experience with different artisans, establishing practices for compensation, and relying on 
networks of builders to provide material for parts of the job site like scaffolding.  
The work on St Michael’s church continued into 1716, bringing more of the town’s builders 
into the parochial project and even changing the way the parish preserved its records. Towards the 
end of 1715, the vestry directed the committee tasked with finishing the church steeple to find 
“some good workman to erect a Spire on the steeple of thirty-five feet high and eight or more 
square as they shall judge convenient.” In addition to building a spire, the vestry contracted with 
another artisan and “other workmen for hanging the Bells and doing whatsoever is necessary for 
finishing the Steeple forthwith.” Later that year, the parish needed more artisans to build a set of 
wheels to mount the church bells in the steeple. By 1717, the parish had ordered its secretary to 
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include copies of the contracts made with the town’s builders in the vestry’s minute books creating 
a more complete record of the parish’s relationship to this labor market.  
One artisan, the carpenter Thomas Fields, clearly benefited from this new relationship 
between the parish and the town’s builders. Late in 1717, the parish commissioned Field to “raise 
and erect for the complete hanging five Bells within the tower belong to the sd Parish Church,” 
completing the parish’s largest project. Fields, as the lead carpenter on finishing the last step of 
building a tower and steeple in stages for the parish. By November 1718, Fields would build the 
frames from which to hang the bells in the steeple, then in January the bells would be installed and 
the carpenter’s work on the steeple completed. Finally, on January 15, Fields would build a set of 
stairs to the steeple. Unlike earlier contracts, Fields benefitted from a clearly delineated timeline 
preserved in the vestry records as a matter of parochial interest.293 Such a contract also preserved 
the parish’s promise to provide the artisan with critical material, “all such Timber, Boards, Bolts, 
Barrs, Nails, and whatsoever materials shall be wanting for and towards the accomplishing and 
perfecting the work.” Along with having the vestry provide these materials, they paid Fields £200 
sterling. The relationship between Fields and the parish appears to have benefitted and satisfied 
both as Fields continued to accept works from the vestry well into the 1720s. Fields exemplifies 
the ways in which these parish projects changed how the parish related to the town’s builders.  
These projects, persisting into the 1720s further strengthened the relationship between the 
town’s builders and the parish. In the mid-1720s, the parish turned again to Fields repair the town’s 
aging infrastructure. In July 1724, a month or so before the start of hurricane season, the vestry, 
“taking into consideration the ruinous condition of the Causeway and Bridge over the swamp,” 
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looked to fund some necessary repairs to one of the town’s main arteries into the island’s interior. 
They turned to Fields and another carpenter, Philip Constable, to repair the bridge and causeway 
leading into town for £70 paid in installments.294 Later, in 1725, the vestry again sought out Fields 
to oversee work on another part of the town’s infrastructure. In May 1725, the parish signed 
another contract with Fields to secure the road leading from Bridgetown to the governor’s 
residence, Pilgrim.295 Unlike the church project, however, the work was much lighter and less well 
paid. The vestry directed Fields to provide planks and field stones to secure the road leading from 
the town and up through the gulley that led to Pilgrim in return for the modest sum of £10. Finally, 
in 1727, the vestry drafted another contract with Fields to repair minor damages and paint the 
church steeple for an unspecified sum tying the carpenter back to the project that started his career 
working with the parish. This relationship between Fields and the parish had its roots in his work 
on helping to finish the church steeple and persisted for around a decade cementing the carpenter’s 
place in the island’s settler society.  
The longevity of this decade-long relationship between Fields and the parish hinged on 
Fields’s ability to earn the trust of the vestry leadership and tap into the island’s market in enslaved 
workers. First, trust played a role. In 1717, Fields’s first contract with the parish stipulated that the 
vestry would not issue full payment unless it was satisfied that Fields had followed the parish 
timeline precisely and that the work was “accomplished, finished, and perfected.” Fields’s 
subsequent employment surely depended on his ability to satisfy parish standards and expectations. 
Trust, however, was not enough for Fields to cement such a relationship. In 1725, while Fields and 
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another carpenter, Philip Constable were finishing the work on the bridge and causeway leading 
into town, the vestry assessed the funds needed to settled their debts with the two carpenters. They 
considered “the sd wharff work negro hire and scaffolding,” while calculating what they owed 
Fields and Constable. Fields and Constable’s success in securing and finishing the project for the 
parish turned on their ability to secure enslaved labor through hiring-out from larger slave-owners 
in Bridgetown and Barbados.  These builder’s access to enslaved labor speaks to the broader 
connections they held in the island’s settler society beyond the town’s parochial elite. Unlike 
earlier builders like Levi Rezio, a marginal and relatively marginalized figure in Barbados, Fields 
secured his status as a builder by forging relationships with the wealthy merchants and sugar 
planters that controlled the island’s largest markets and parish system.  
The variety of projects and responsibilities of the parochial government in and around 
Bridgetown in the early eighteenth century ensured that the parish relied on multiple builders in 
addition to figures like Fields. For example, Crocker, who had helped build the church steeple, 
earned another parish contract when the church’s main structure needed repairs. In July 1719, 
shortly before hurricane season, the vestry struck a deal with Crocker to rebuild the eastern gable-
end wall of the church. Crocker had apparently built the first wall but it had been “Crakt and 
Damnified by the Weather.” Having accessed the damage with the help of “skillfull and 
understanding workmen,” the parish concluded that this “misfortune was in no wise to be attributed 
to his want of skill or knowledge in the said work.”296 Crocker had kept their trust and in return he 
agreed to rebuild the wall, windows, and arches a second time. Likewise, the carpenter Philip 
Constable who helped Fields rebuild the weather-worn bridge and causeway into town in 1725 
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earned more work from the parish. In addition to propping up the town’s rotted infrastructure, 
Constable helped the parish uphold the colony’s commitment to racial violence. In March 1726, 
they paid Constable £5 sterling for building “the Gibbet or Gallows to execute the negro 
condemned to be hanged in chains for having murdered a whiteman.”297 The extensive projects 
under-taken by the parish in the early eighteenth century cemented the parish’s relationships with 
multiple artisans and builders in Bridgetown. 
Building for the parish was more than just good business for Bridgetown’s builders; it was 
an avenue for a group of Bridgetown’s artisans to earn a place in Barbados’s settler society. Far 
from early actors like Levi Rezio who left few traces in the archives, these figures translated the 
parish’s need for their labor into a more permanent presence in Bridgetown. For Fields, this 
relationship and his presence in the town spanned from 1718 well into the 1720s, at least a decade, 
long after he completed his first project with the parish, the church steeple. In the coming decades, 
however, builders like Fields gave way to merchants and sugar planters who more effectively 
turned the town’s development and construction into a profitable arm of much larger estates and 
business enterprises.               
5.3 Building in Their Own Right: Merchants Turned Builder 
Just as the parish drove the development of the town’s building industry, the Royal Navy 
in Bridgetown and naval warfare of the late-seventeenth and early eighteenth century created a 
new generation of colonial merchants in the port. This new generation of local merchants built 
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much of their mercantile wealth on an array of local maritime activities. While a period of intense 
instability within Barbados’s landed settler society, this period of uncertainty created fortune for a 
group of Bridgetown’s inhabitants. For many of this new generation of local merchants, they 
anchored their wealth in Bridgetown, eventually buying and developing landed estates in the port.  
The naval warfare of the late-seventeenth century differed in scale and purpose than the 
wars that shaped the Caribbean earlier in the seventeenth century.298 With the establishment of 
sugar colonies and valuable slave trades from Barbados in the south to Jamaica in the north, the 
value of the English West Indian trade was well established by the late-seventeenth century.  This 
transformed wars of conquest into wars of commercial competition primarily driven by the need 
to protect or open up new avenues of trade and reliant upon local privateers in the region. In 
particular, the French had engineered a strategy driven by privateering in the warfare of the late-
seventeenth century. As the oldest established plantation society, Barbados’s trade was a key target 
of the region’s commercial warfare between France and Britain, which both increased the presence 
of the English Royal Navy in Bridgetown and encouraged local solutions to the challenges posed 
by the new commercial warfare. As early as 1692, the island’s assembly outfitted two sloops to 
patrol the island’s coasts to ward off French privateers from Martinique, providing new 
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opportunities for ship-owners in Bridgetown.299 Locally-owned and manned sloops were regularly 
taken up “in the country’s service.” What such “country’s service” looked like varied, providing 
merchants and ship owners in Bridgetown multiple avenues through which to profit from the 
uncertainty and instability of nearly two decades of naval warfare in the region.  
The pressing need of the colony’s governor and council to communicate with other English 
colonies to coordinate defense and track the movement of enemy fleets provided one avenue 
through which ship-owners from Bridgetown and around the Atlantic world could profit. In the 
1690s and 1700s, captains of ships regularly petitioned the assembly for compensation after having 
been commissioned by the assembly or governor to carrying intelligence from island to island. 
Some petitioners, like Boas Bell came from outside of Barbados. Bell, for example, was a captain 
and owner of Bermuda sloop pressed into service to circulate intelligence on French movements 
in 1694. When he arrived in Barbados having delivered new intelligence, Bell petitioned 
Barbados’s governor to honor a gratuity of £20 sterling promised by the government of 
Bermuda.300 Other ships were needed to defend the island’s coasts and keep guard for French 
privateers waiting offshore. In February 1695, the governor’s council settled its debts with the 
ships it employed in the island’s service in the previous two years paying reimbursements to three 
brigantines and a sloop. The sloop Charles and its Captain Samuel Browne earned £43 and five 
shillings while Captain Thomas Sherman of the brigantine Larmeir received £25 and five shillings.  
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Complicating these efforts to outfit their own ships to defend the island’s coasts and shore-
up the inadequacies of the Royal Navy in this period, a robust market in privateering from Carlisle 
Bay drew much of the wealth and opportunity. The concentration of privateers in Bridgetown 
meant that the market for maritime labor in Bridgetown remained extremely competitive 
throughout the eighteenth century and that the port became a market for ships, naval supplies, and 
armaments during times of war. In November 1703, the vice-admiralty court in Barbados, led by 
the island’s governor, documented the arrival of 11 ships and sloops taken as prizes.  Each prize 
represented a windfall for the captains, crews, and investors.301 In 1707, Captain Willoughby of 
the sloop Elizabeth earned £277 sixteen shillings and nine pence from the sale of a French prize – 
a sloop - and its cargo of muscovado sugars in Bridgetown’s prize court.302 The sale of ships and 
sloops added to the value of a prize and provided ample opportunities for local owners to take 
advantage of a robust market in newly captured ships. Aware of the value of privateering activities, 
Barbados’s governor and assembly approved and revised several acts encouraging privateering 
from their ports and harbors beginning in the 1690s and 1700s.303   
The colonial government’s attempts to outfit such ships to defend the island’s coasts from 
French privateers depended not only on willing merchants and ship-owners to provide vessels but 
a pool of maritime labor to draw sailors willing to serve aboard Barbadian ships paid and 
commissioned by the colonial government.  However, most of the sailors on Barbados preferred 
serving in privateers. Anticipating the resumption of hostilities between France and England in 
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February 1702, Barbados’s colonial government gave the Madera, a brigantine owned by Charles 
Thomas, a commission of 5 to 6 weeks to patrol the waters around Barbados and protect the 
island’s trade. Barbados’s colonial government required Thomas to outfit the ship at his own 
expense. The colonial government gave Thomas money to maintain a crew of no more than 80 
sailors. Thomas, however, struggled to fill his ships with the 80 men provided for in his 
commission. Shortly after taking his commission, Thomas complained to the governor that few 
sailors wanted to serve aboard the Madera, preferring instead the prize shares earned by privateers 
leaving from Carlisle Bay. 
To help the island’s ship owners and merchants engaged in maritime trade, the colonial 
government resorted to passing new laws meant to keep sailors from deserting ships that arrived 
in Carlisle Bay for privateers. After 1696, imperial authorities in London had given Barbados’s 
governors the sole power to issue warrants to impress local sailors to serve in the ships of the Royal 
Navy.304 Clearly, however, the colonial government and the merchants that served it struggled to 
man their own ships during times of commercial warfare and lucrative privateering. In 1701, 
Barbados’s governor’s council debated how best to prevent the desertion of soldiers from 
merchantmen. Members of the council noted how, in times of war, the “Seamen as soon as they 
have received their pay at this port… desert from their Proper Ships.” The colonial government 
recognized that lack of maritime labor delayed ships from sailing from Bridgetown and cost the 
merchants interested in these voyages.305  
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While the colonial government offered opportunities to profit through holding prize courts 
for privateers and commissioning merchants to send their ships to defend the coast, times of war 
paradoxically encouraged Bridgetown’s merchants to engage in illicit trade with the French, 
Dutch, and Spanish colonial neighbors. Alongside the forced exchange of sailors between the two 
islands in the1690s, smuggling along the island’s coasts increased as pressures on transatlantic 
trade fostered circum-Caribbean smuggling with Barbados. The island’s settlers carried on illicit 
trades along the island’s coasts, beyond the reach of customs officials in ports like Bridgetown 
where the long-established mercantilist infrastructure existed to track and trace the goods arriving 
in Barbados’s principal port. In his report to London in 1699/1700, Barbados governor Ralph Gray 
described the difficulty of catching and identifying smuggled goods into Barbados. When 
questioned about whether the island had received any goods pirated by Captain Kidd, Gray 
admitted that smugglers could “easily have sent them hither undiscovered by little Vessells who 
make it a trade to runn Goods here, which tis impossible for me to prevent with one single ship,” 
that Gray had at his disposal at the time.306  
Despite some settlers’ commitment to privateering, merchants in Bridgetown continued to 
profit from illicit trade with their neighbors in the circum-Caribbean. Prominent figures in 
Barbados participated in illicit commerce during times of war. In the early 1710s, a prominent 
clergyman on Barbados, William Gordon went himself to Martinique to buy French wines and 
brandy to sell in Barbados in a sloop that Gordon was a part-owner of. As a merchant, Gordon 
apparently had trading interests and connections that spanned from Barbados to Martinique as well 
as the smaller island of Granada. When a frigate of the Royal Navy captured a sloop flying Dutch 
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flags and loaded with a cargo of cocoa in 1703, the prize court in Barbados learned the sloop, 
named The Charles the Second, was actually owned by a Bridgetown merchant, Manual Manasses 
Gillegan.307 This smuggling and illicit trade stretched from Martinique to Curaçao and the 
Venezuelan coast, and had prominent members of Barbados’s settlers involved by the beginning 
of the eighteenth century.   
While Gray’s comments suggest that colonial governors in the 1690s and 1700s generally 
discouraged smuggling, a lucrative and illicit trade between Barbados and Martinique flourished 
with the consent and aid of the island’s colonial government under the guise of prisoner exchanges. 
With the continuation of illicit smuggling between Barbados and its neighbors in the circum-
Caribbean, the cartels signed between Martinique and Barbados paved the way for Flags of Truce 
ships to cover for further clandestine trade as part of Barbados’s efforts to care for prisoners of the 
region’s commercial warfare. In 1703, governor Sir Bevil Grenville ensured that six pounds of 
beef or fish and four pounds of biscuit were delivered to each French prisoner held in Barbados 
every week. He ordered that these prisoners were held in adequate conditions in the almshouse of 
St George’s parish where they awaited a return to Martinique or Guadeloupe in “Flags of Truce,” 
sloops and other vessels commissioned by the colonial government to ferry prisoners back and 
forth between Martinique and Barbados. At times in the early eighteenth century, there were 
upwards of 1500 English prisoners in Martinique brought in from around the circum-Caribbean.308 
Barbados’s colonial government continued to organize and direct the accommodations, 
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provisioning, and exchange of prisoners even when the practice rose suspicions and sanctions by 
metropolitan authorities.   
This element of Barbados’s illicit trade did not go long unnoticed by authorities in London, 
sparking inquiries but no effective end to the practice. In 1710, the practice of prisoner exchanges 
through flags of truces began to raise suspicion of clandestine trade with the French despite 
colonial attempts to justify the prisoner exchanges. When Mitforde Crowe left London in January 
1710 to assume the governorship of Barbados, his instructions warned him to look into the practice 
of carrying “a Clandestine and Illegal Trade” under the cover of flags of truce with Martinique. 
London’s instructions to Crowe included warnings about Barbados’s illicit trade with the Dutch 
and Danish ports of the Greater Caribbean, specifically Curaçao and St. Thomas.309  Crowe was 
to “make Strict Enquiry into the Truth of the several Matters of Fact” and when finding the 
principal settlers involved, he was to bring legal proceedings against them. Despite these orders to 
investigate, the practice of smuggling and illicit trade carried on both in Flags of Truce and in 
Barbadian ships, and efforts to curb these practices came to little with few merchants receiving 
any punishment for the widespread practice.  
Beyond fueling the illicit trade carried in Flags of Truce, the presence of French and 
Spanish prisoners demanded provisions, housing, and above all, care. Since such prisoners fueled 
illicit trade between the island’s, settlers and the colonial government shared an interest in keeping 
such prisoners well-cared for. In Bridgetown and Barbados, settlers fell into familiar patterns of 
caring for maritime labor in this new form of commercial warfare in the region. Treated like sick 
English sailors returning to Barbados from West Africa, the colonial assembly paid for individual 
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settlers to provide care to imprisoned French sailors.  Bridgetown inhabitant Hannah Sympson 
earned £10 Barbados-currency from the colonial assembly “for nursing a frech prisoner for 10 
weekes past” in May 1696.310  
In the early eighteenth century, Bridgetown’s doctors earned contracts from the island’s 
colonial government to provide medical care to the French and Spanish prisoners that came to the 
island in privateers and ships of the Royal Navy. Kept in impromptu, improvised prisons in houses 
scattered through Bridgetown and the surrounding areas, the colonial government took 
responsibility for maintaining the health of these prisoners from Martinique, Guadeloupe, or 
France. Drawing from the island’s doctors, physicians, and surgeons, the colonial government 
found practitioners willing to provide care for these prisoners for a fee. In 1718, Patrick Horne, 
described as a “Practitioner in Physick and Chirurgery,” presented a petition to Barbados’s 
assembly “to pay unto Doctor Patrick Horne the Arrears due to him on Account of the French 
Prisoners dureing the late Warr.”311    
 Provisioning British soldiers and sailors gave some planters and merchants opportunities 
for reaping the benefits from times of uncertain war. Provisioning contracts and prizes from 
privateering ventures helped gain the fortunes of some of the wealthiest sugar merchants and 
planters of the eighteenth century. As S.D. Smith has noted, the pre-eminent West Indian fortunes 
of the Lascelles family rested on supplying and provisioning naval expeditions organized during 
the War of Jenkins Ear in the 1730s and 1740s. The patriarch of the Lascelles fortunes, Henry 
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commented that victualling “through good management… I chiefly made my fortune by it.”312 
Alongside the Lascelles commissioning house in London which carried on the business of the 
sugar trade, provisioning the navy during times of war supplemented slave trading, ship-owning, 
and money-lending to Barbadian planters. The relationship between planters, provisioning, 
privateering, and profits emerged in the last decades of the seventeenth century helping to 
transform Barbados’s relationship to maritime labor. 
David Minvielle and Benjamin Bissell are emblematic of this new generation of merchant 
who benefited from the maritime opportunities opened up by war and uncertainty early decades of 
the eighteenth century. In the early eighteenth-century, their turn to the sea hinged on making 
development and construction in Bridgetown a profitable arm of their commercial enterprises, 
becoming builders in their own right. Such figures emerged from the uncertainty of the 1690s that 
provided new opportunities for Bridgetown’s merchants to benefit from a variety of maritime 
activities. Alongside their growing investment in local maritime activities that emerged from 
nearly two decades of warfare in the region, figures like Minvielle and Bissell depended on 
particular infrastructures in Bridgetown.  In addition to their mutual investment in urban-maritime 
property and their relationship as neighbors in Bridgetown, Minvielle and Bissell died less than a 
year apart, presenting the two as further illustrative of the changing opportunities presented to 
Bridgetown’s propertied classes in the early eighteenth century. Bissell wrote his will in December 
1748 and Minvielle followed a few months later in July 1749. Neither was particularly wealthy by 
the standard of Barbados’s great sugar fortunes nor politically powerful members of the planter 
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class that long monopolized the island’s Assembly and Council.  Both men, however, shared a 
comfortable position in Barbados’s settler society just outside the highest circles of colonial 
authority and power stretching back to the 1710s.   
Despite their differences as merchants and settlers, both Minvielle and Bissell shared an 
interest in development and construction of urban properties in Bridgetown. Their wills 
demonstrate the important, if differing, roles they assigned to such urban properties. While 
previous generations of Bridgetown’s builders were shadowy figures occupying the fringes of the 
island’s settler society, Bissell and Minvielle were firmly in the center of this colonial world. 
Minvielle was a transatlantic merchant, engaged in the slave trade, albeit in a relatively limited 
capacity. Bissell invested in urban development to supplement his activities as a ship builder and 
carpenter in Bridgetown support the port’s maritime activities The presence of these names in the 
island’s records late in the eighteenth-century attest to the success and longevity of these two 
families, the Minvielles and Bissells, in Barbados. In the early decades of the eighteenth century, 
Minvielle and Bissell became builders in their own right, using their investments in urban 
construction and development, alongside slave-trading, sugar planting, and ship-building, to enrich 
their families and secure their place in Barbadian colonial society. 
            The success of Bissell and his family depended on his investment in urban property in 
Bridgetown as well as his connections to wealthier merchant families. One of the earliest 
references to Bissell in Barbados, establishes his role as a key proprietor in and around Bridgetown.  
In 1719, Bissell, identified in the deed as a merchant, sold 40,538 square feet of land on the 
southern outskirts of Bridgetown, “butted and bounded by the highway leading to Oistins” to 
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George Lillington, a planter in nearby St. James parish.313 The unusually large plot of land appears 
to have stretched along the shore of Carlisle Bay near the ‘Indian Bridge.” In December 1722, 
Bissell struck a deal with Henry Lascelles, a key founder of one of Barbados’s most notorious 
sugar and slave fortunes. Bissell leased Lascelles 4117 square feet of land along a part of town 
already known as “Bissell Street” for £1000 currency. With the property, Bissell transferred the 
rights to ten buildings, “or Dwelling houses,” that he had rented out. His connections to the island 
ran deep. In 1729, Minvielle’s wife, Elizabeth, inherited her widowed mother’s estate in 
Bridgetown. Bissell established a profitable estate on Barbados grounded in the development and 
management of not only urban land but buildings and structures he rented to the town’s inhabitants. 
In this role, Bissell established himself with the island’s colonial elite striking deals with families 
like the Lascelles and earning the rank of Major in the island’s militia by at least 1729. Bissell’s 
rank as a major in the island’s militia established the family as a member of the island’s colonial 
elite, which was indicative of the new opportunities provided by urban development in Bridgetown 
during the early eighteenth century. 
In comparison to Bissell, David Minvielle had a much lower profile in Barbados, but 
nevertheless turned maritime activities, investment in Bridgetown, and connections to other 
merchants into means of entering the island’s planter class. Minvielle’s name suggests a Huguenot 
background that would have set him apart from the island’s predominantly English settler elite. In 
Minvielle’s will, his strict instructions for a frugal, sparse funeral, suggests a commitment to a 
religious tradition outside the island’s flashier Anglicanism. Minvielle wished “to be interrd in a 
plain black'd deal coffin without rings scarfs gloves or burnt wine and with the company only of a 
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few of my particular friends.” 314 Despite his potential status as an outsider, by the early 1740s, he 
established himself as an active merchant engaged in the island’s transatlantic trade. In September 
1741, the clerk of the Assembly brought forward a petition from “Minvielle and Co.” for half the 
draw-back on the excise tax paid on a cargo of imported Madeira wine.315 Minvielle and his 
associates sought to recover approximately £18 currency paid in customs because they had taken 
advantage of a Barbadian law that remitted half the customs paid on cargoes re-exported to other 
colonies in the region. Minvielle had sold the cargo of Madeira to William Whitaker who had in 
turn loaded the cargo on the sloop Katherine for re-export to nearby Dominica. Such maritime 
activities allowed Minvielle to support his family on Barbados, who in turn enabled Minvielle to 
operate both a sugar plantation and commercial enterprises in Bridgetown. Minvielle’s family was 
key to his estate’s operation with his mother, Sussanah and brother Elias residing Bridgetown, 
while he lived on a sugar plantation with his wife, Mary and six children. 316 By 1749, when 
Minvielle died, he left members of his family a sprawling estate that included ships, storehouses 
in Bridgetown, and a sugar plantation in the interior, indicative of Minvielle’s commercial 
successes on Barbados.  
While Minvielle’s profile and connections in Barbados’s settler society did not rival 
Bissell, a high-ranking officer in the island’s militia, Minvielle’s wealth came from a much wider 
array of sources, suggesting that Bridgetown’s merchants could derive wealth and power in 
multiple ways in the early eighteenth century.  The year he died, the parish assessed Minvielle’s 
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holdings in Bridgetown on Backchurch street at the modest sum of £30 currency. In addition to 
these urban properties, Minvielle owned a functioning sugar plantation, profitable enough to 
ensure that he could leave his widow the lump sum of £1000 currency in the year following his 
death and the same sum to his daughters when they reached the age of 20. Tied to his ownership 
of a sugar plantation, Minvielle likely owned anywhere from 50-100 enslaved people despite only 
naming two enslaved men as part of his bequests. In addition to his likely ownership of a large 
number of enslaved people needed to efficiently operate a sugar plantation, Minvielle’s urban-
maritime properties demanded more. His will references multiple categories of enslaved workers 
tied to his property in Bridgetown: “wherry negroes, fishing negroes and shallop and store 
negroes.” His maritime interests extended farther then the coasting shallops, fishing vessels, and 
shallops he owned in Carlisle Bay. In 1743, David Minvielle owned a sloop with a crew of six, the 
Young David, that carried 13 enslaved captives from Barbados, to the York River in Virginia and 
Kingston before returning home to Bridgetown. Likewise, the Minvielles owned shares in a New 
England-built Brigantine slaver, the Thomas. At 70 tons, the Thomas, built in 1747, made three 
voyages to Gambia returning with 114-130 enslaved people per voyage. Some were sold at market 
in Bridgetown while the Thomas went on to take others to Charleston, South Carolina. His interests 
in slave trading formed the cornerstone of his estate in Barbados.  
While Minvielle owned ships, Bissell made most of his wealth building them. When he 
died, Bissell did everything in his power to ensure that his heirs and executors could continue the 
trade and work that built his fortunes in life. This effort, in turn, depended on his executors’ ability 
to preserve his estate’s access to skilled slave labor.  
I do order and appoint that all and every of my negro slaves from and immediately after 
my decease be kept and employed in their severall trades and occupations as they were 
wont to be in my life time and that my shop and yards be from time to time kept stockt 
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with all manner of utensills fitt for the carrying on the ship carpenter's trade as they used 
to do in my life time…”317 
 
Bissell’s land-holding bolstered the wealth acquired from building and repairing ships and 
boats in Bridgetown. By 1748, Bissell had resumed direct ownership of “all those… ten Tenements 
scituate lying and being in Bissell street.” Unlike Minvielle, Bissell lived in a house on Carlisle 
Bay, outside of Bridgetown, but by no means on an operating sugar plantation. While the contours 
of their estates differed widely, both Bissell and Minvielle similarly engaged in construction and 
development in Bridgetown.  
For a sugar planter like Minvielle, development and construction in Bridgetown was 
limited to repairs. In his will, Minvielle ordered his executors to “repair my buildings in town but 
not build new ones without absolute necessity.” 318 In the final account, Minvielle’s priorities were 
firmly in his plantation estate with construction and maritime activities taking an important but 
secondary role. He gave his executors free reign to construct any new buildings “as they shall see 
most to the advantages of my estate” while limiting any development of his estate in town to 
repairs. Likewise, Minvielle sought to shed most of his estate’s maritime assets. He ordered his 
executors to sell “all my Wherry's flying fish boats, Shallops, wherry negroes, fishing negroes and 
shallop and store negroes immediately after my decease.” While Minvielle prioritized his 
plantation estate, Bissell encouraged his executors to continue his efforts to develop his properties 
and estate in Bridgetown.  
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For a ship-builder and carpenter like Bissell, his interests lay in his ability to profit from 
the development, construction, and possession of buildings in Bridgetown representing the close 
linking of maritime activity and urban development, and social status in Bridgetown in the early 
eighteenth century. Bissell’s rents appear to have been, if not his primary source of wealth, a 
crucial component of it. In Bissell’s will, he released only one person from paying rent owed to 
his estate, William Putnam, for “a certain Tenement which he now lives in belonging to me.” 319 
In addition to keeping his shops and ship-yard on the waterfront stocked and staffed with enslaved 
labor, Bissell ordered his executors to invest in the development and maintenance of his urban 
properties. Recognizing the importance of his rents, he ordered them to keep the houses he owned 
in good repair and rented out. He went on to express an interest in expansion, ordering his 
executors to purchase a vacant lot he rented adjacent to his shop and yards in town “for the further 
and better enlarging the lands I now live upon.”  
5.4 Xmas Gang and the Building Industry Transformed 
If Bissell and Minvielle are emblematic of this generation of Bridgetown’s merchants 
turned-builders, the sparse records surrounding the town’s building industry in their hands raises 
questions about labor, structure, and organization. How did figures like Minvielle, Bissell, and 
other merchants organize the island’s building industry in an urban setting? Here, the case of 
Thomas Harper is illustrative of the methods available to this generation of builders in Bridgetown. 
Enmeshed in the island’s slave trade and sugar industry, this generation of merchant-builders relied 
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on and organized the urban building industry around the island’s predominant labor-organization; 
the slave labor gang.  
Early in 1729, Thomas Harper, a neighbor of Bissell and Minvielle, prepared to leave 
Barbados for a voyage to London secure in his position within Barbados’s settler society. Harper 
was, like his neighbor Minvielle, a transatlantic merchant and ship-owner who engaged in the 
island’s lucrative slave trade. When Harper left for London, he left without knowing the outcome 
of his last slave trading venture. In June 1729, Harper’s New England-built, 45-ton, 8-gun ship, 
the Industry, captained by Edward Davies arrived in Carlisle Bay carrying 129 enslaved West 
African captives.320 Like Bissell, Harper served in the island’s colonial institutions that governed 
the port. In 1717, Harper served St Michael’s parish as a Churchwarden and Surveyor of the 
Highways. Both positions came with great responsibility and presumably, the trust and approval 
of his fellow parishioners and served a critical role in the ways settlers governed the port town and 
exercised political power on the island in the seventeenth century. As a Churchwarden Harper 
settled contracts with workers hired by the parish and handled parochial finances.321 As a Surveyor 
of the Highways, Harper organized and oversaw the parish’s efforts to maintain its infrastructure, 
including in Bridgetown itself.322 
Like many of his neighbors in St Michael’s parish, including Minvielle, Harper had an 
estate in both Bridgetown and a sugar plantation in the surrounding country. His investments in 
both the town and sugar economy speaks to the diversification of the island’s economy in the early 
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eighteenth century. By the island’s standards, Harper’s sugar plantation was on a modest scale, 
containing only 31 acres. His properties in Bridgetown included valuable sites in Cheapside “near 
the market place” and Backchurch street.323 Harper kept houses for rent at these sites and other 
places described as “stores” and “yards” presumably spaces dedicated to storing and marketing 
either imported goods for settlers or the enslaved people his ships carried to Barbados. While 
Harper possessed an estate that spanned the bridge between urban and rural, he made in his will 
his interest in preserving the solvency of his sugar plantation. His executors were to “sell my two 
houses in Bridge towne.” While Harper designed his will in such a way as to turn his estate in town 
into liquid capital, he continued to invest in urban development and construction.  
While Minvielle’s will suggests that planters rarely siphoned labor from their plantations 
to further their building projects in Bridgetown, Harper expressed an interest in using assets from 
his sugar plantation to further his projects in urban construction and development. Less than a year 
before his voyage to London, Harper began the lengthy process of building a wharf on waterfront 
property he owned in Bridgetown. While the project to build a wharf was not in itself unusual, the 
detailed instructions he left his executors provide a rare window into the ways sugar planters like 
Harper organized the labor needed to execute such construction projects.  
3dly My will is that xmas Gange be sent up to my plant but xmas to stay in towne to follow 
the Negro men in ye yard who are to be imploy'd for one year after my decease in finishing 
the Wharfe. My will is that all my Coopers that will fetch 50 pounds each be sold the others 
after one year be sent to my plantation and my cask made at the plantation. None of my 
masons carpenters or sawyers to be sold but after one year to be sent to my plantation and 
sooner as wanted there, my will is that all my lumbering goods be sold in one year after 
my decease, if not an allowance must be made to the Tennant until sold for my will is that 
one year after my decease, my house, stores, yards, and wharfs be hired out for the most 
that can be got324 
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From the language in this unusually detailed bequest, we gain insight into how Harper 
organized the labor and material involved in construction project and the value he placed on urban 
development and properties. His approach suggests that in the early eighteenth century, the 
boundaries between plantation and urban-maritime enterprise was blurring further in Barbados, 
with critical implications for the island’s enslaved population, increasing enslaved mobility within 
the island’s economy.  
Gang labor flourished in the island’s sugar plantations and took root in town through urban 
projects like Harper’s wharf over the course of the eighteenth century. References in this bequest 
to “Xmas” and “Xmas gang” emphasize the resilience of gang labor beyond the sugar plantation. 
Like the jobbing-gangs that circulated from plantation to plantation in the last quarter of the 
century, Harper’s slave gang led by Xmas moved back and forth from various parts of his estate; 
from the urban to the rural and back depending on the needs of Harper’s efforts to build a wharf. 
The movement of enslaved labor, whether from plantation to town, or from Harper’s ownership to 
being sold elsewhere, marks Harper’s relationship to the labor necessary for carrying out this 
project. Likewise, the material used for the project, “lumbering goods,” were needed until the 
project ended; about a year or so from the date of the will. Through Harper’s project, we see 
Bridgetown being increasingly integrated into the island’s sugar plantation economy and labor 
systems in new ways.  
Harper’s detailed bequest also hints at how Harper evaluated the potential for profit in 
urban development and construction, underscoring the emerging relationship between sugar 
plantations and Bridgetown’s builders in the early eighteenth century. His instructions to his 
executors follow the same principles followed in Bissell’s will: leave as much of an urban estate 
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intact to extract rents from Bridgetown’s more modest or temporary inhabitants. While Bissell’s 
will focused on the value placed on the collection of rent, Harper hinted at the value in enslaved 
builders as a source of future productivity in other construction projects on a sugar plantation or 
in Bridgetown. While Harper expressed a hope that his most valuable enslaved coopers might fetch 
as much as £50 currency on Barbados’s slave market, he ordered his executors to preserve the bulk 
of the work force that built his wharf. The “masons carpenters or sawyers” were to return to 
Harper’s plantation after the project’s conclusion or when necessity dictated. As the case of Harper 
and the Xmas gang suggests, building in Bridgetown in the early eighteenth century became an 
activity embraced by a wider variety of actors, further entangling the port’s social and economic 




In 1731, Samuel Kiemer published the first edition of the The Barbados Gazette in 
Bridgetown. It was Barbados’s first newspaper, a milestone in the island’s settler society and 
colonial culture. His offices located in Bridgetown, Kiemer had close access to “the freshest 
Advices Foreign and Domestick;” meaning news from around the Atlantic world and circum-
Caribbean of importance to the island’s trade and commerce. From the near-by offices of the Royal 
Navy, Keimer obtained lists of ships arriving in Carlisle Bay from across the Atlantic world. On 
November 6, 1731, earliest edition of The Barbados Gazette we have, two sloops from New York 
and Bermuda entered Carlisle Bay that week, while customs cleared six sloops for ports in 
Virginia, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Bermuda. Kiemer also advertised “Goods lately 
Imported from London” for local merchants and sold his books on his own account.325 In this early 
edition, Kiemer advertised two dictionaries, “A New English Dictionary,” and “A Military and 
Sea-Dictionary;” topics of great interest to merchants participating in transatlantic trade in a port 
frequented by the Royal Navy.  
As a snapshot of Bridgetown’s elite mercantile community in the eighteenth century, 
Kiemer’s newspaper presents a familiar picture of a port town entrenched and situated within 
British Atlantic networks of information, commerce, and mercantile empire.326 Bridgetown’s 
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seventeenth-century history, however, reveals this eighteenth-century picture of a British Atlantic 
port was far from an inevitable outcome of the town’s commercial, political, and social 
development.  
During its first three decades of settlement, Bridgetown acquired the basic commercial 
infrastructure of an Atlantic port, a process driven by substantial Anglo-Dutch trade. Dutch 
merchants feature prominently among the port’s earliest merchants, builders, and owners of 
landed-property near Carlisle Bay. The migrations, informal trade networks, and uncertainties of 
the 1630s and 1640s produced Bridgetown’s first commercial landscape and infrastructure but left 
the structures of colonial governance in the port weak despite the growing power of London-tied 
planters and merchants in Barbados’s emergent sugar plantation and forced labor economy. 
Cromwell’s Western Design and English visions of greater mercantile integration with colonies 
like Barbados, spurred local actors to construct the physical and legal infrastructure of 
mercantilism in Bridgetown during the tumultuous years of the 1650s.  
Starting in the 1660s, the arrival of multiple Atlantic diasporas transformed the island’s 
settler society and significantly shaped the structures and institutions that governed Bridgetown. 
Alongside the remarkable growth of the island’s slave trade that forcibly brought tens of thousands 
of enslaved Africans to Barbados, the free migration of Quaker and Sephardim entrenched the 
cosmopolitanism of the port’s free and mercantile communities. Alongside these Atlantic 
diasporas, local displacement of former indentured servants and poorer whites presented new 
challenges of governance in Bridgetown. Up until the mid-1670s, the vestry and individual English 
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settlers addressed how an English settler society would regulate such social and cultural difference 
within a port setting. Colonial crises of the mid-1670s - a hurricane and island-wide slave 
conspiracy – brought these issues, localized in the port, to the attention of the island’s colonial 
Assembly, governor and council, laying the foundation for further colonial governance over 
Bridgetown.  
The last decade of the seventeenth century colonial state governance over Bridgetown 
consolidated significantly. For Barbadian planters and merchants, the end of the seventeenth-
century marked a moment of decline and acute colonial crisis in which the colonial government 
responded by creating a system of governance in Bridgetown that targeted the informal economies 
and networks of enslaved Afro-Barbadians. Part of a general period of economic decline of the 
plantation economy and an extended period of regional privateering that damaged the island’s 
trade, this period of colonial crisis culminated with a serious threat of slave conspiracy in 1692. 
The 1692 conspiracy revealed the centrality of Bridgetown’s social and physical geography to the 
informal economies and networks built by enslaved Afro-Barbadians over the course of the 
seventeenth-century. These entangled crises prompted fierce colonial reaction that trained the 
colonial state’s power and authority towards re-engineering the port’s built environment and 
structures of governance. The results of these projects were the creation of a colonial landscape in 
Bridgetown focused on punishing and controlling the movements of enslaved peoples. 
In the eighteenth-century, Bridgetown was the location on the island where the colonial 
state most clearly and visibly intervened in the lives of the colony’s enslaved peoples.327 This 
 
327 Marisa J Fuentes, Dispossessed Lives: Enslaved Women, Violence, and the Archive  (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 20. 
 214 
relationship to Bridgetown emerged over the course of the seventeenth century, advanced not only 
by the development of the plantation economy, but also by political struggles local to the port and 
colonial state reaction to moments of perceived and real crisis. Specifically, the challenges posed 
to colonial governance by Bridgetown’s motley and transient communities shaped the trajectory 
of this history. In Barbados, crisis, instability, and the growth of urban governance went hand-in-
hand.  
The town’s eighteenth-century history may further bolster the thesis that moments of crisis 
spurred innovation in colonial governance over Bridgetown. In 1766, fire tore through the tensely 
built streets of the port, echoing the 1668 fire nearly a century earlier. Unlike the largely ineffective 
measures taken by the colonial government in the wake of the 1668 fire, in the aftermath of 1766, 
Bridgetown underwent its most significant restructuring and re-design of its basic lay-out. Out of 
the ashes of the fire, the colonial government empowered a commission for “opening new streets, 
and altering others already open; and for prescribing the rules for the manner of building and 
particularizing the materials with which the houses shalt be built.”328 The new act and 
commissioners widen the town’s narrow streets and got rid of the town’s most narrow alley-ways, 
significantly altering the appearance of the port.329 Such commissions represented a crucial part of 
the revolution in urban governance that shaped provincial towns and ports through the British 
Atlantic world in the eighteenth century.330 While the context of growing urban governance in the 
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British Atlantic may be key to explain the differences between colonial reactions to fire in the 
1660s and 1760s, the 1760s were a particularly fraught moment for the sugar and slave societies 
of the Caribbean that introduced a sea of changes in West Indian plantation colonies.331 
 Likewise, in the 1780s, as the American war for independence up-ended the British West 
Indian economy and disrupted the island’s trade causing significant hardship among the island’s 
enslaved populations, colonists fixated on the lives and presence of enslaved and free(d) Afro-
Barbadians in Bridgetown. In 1784, a few years after a devastating hurricane destroyed much of 
the port, the island’s newspaper, then called The Barbados Mercury, published the writings of 
Bridgetown’s all-white voluntary fire companies. In response to the growing number of small 
wooden structures rising up along the town’s outskirts by the enslaved people jobbing in the port, 
members of the town’s white volunteer fire departments addressed the colony through The 
Barbados Mercury decrying the settlements as a fire hazard, dangerous to the town’s health, and 
calling for the colonial government to tear down and remove the housing; a drastic call for colonial 
state intervention in the town’s built environment.332 Further study of Bridgetown’s eighteenth-
century may confirm the dynamic of colonial crisis and urban governance evidenced in the 
seventeenth-century.  
Mirroring the growing intervention of the colonial state in Bridgetown’s governance over 
the course of the seventeenth century, maritime labor came to figure prominently in the island’s 
white settler society. Planters and colonial elite’s attitudes towards maritime labor and their 
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eventual embrace of white sailors roughly coincided with developments in the port’s systems of 
governance. The timing of when colonists embraced maritime labor suggests that like systems of 
urban governance, these changes were driven by moments of crisis.  
Closely following the growing intervention of the colonial state in Bridgetown’s 
governance over the course of the seventeenth century, in the early eighteenth-century planters 
began to re-invest plantation profits into the town itself, reversing scholarly consensus about the 
relationship between plantation and town in slave societies like Barbados.333 In the seventeenth-
century, Bridgetown’s builders came from the island’s middling-classes of artisans. Through the 
patronage of colonial institutions like the parish system, these builders, in the late-seventeenth and 
early-eighteenth century found a measure of success in urban construction buying into the planter 
class like the mason-turned-planter Simon Cooper. In the early decades of the eighteenth-century, 
as the island’s plantation economy continued to stagnate, planters like Thomas Harper began re-
investing the urban development in the port.  
In the seventeenth-century, building Bridgetown introduced novel problems of colonial 
governance. Driven by the complex port communities and transient historical actors that shaped 
urban-maritime spaces like the port, the colonial government in Barbados was slow to assert its 
authority over such spaces. Rather than being driven exclusively by the development of the island’s 
plantation economy, moments of acute crisis and instability drove colonial institutions to create 
new systems of colonial governance in Bridgetown. This seventeenth-century history underscores 
 
333 For a similar inversion of this narrative see: Hart, Building Charleston : Town and Society in the Eighteenth-
Century British Atlantic World. 
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the instability and uncertainty that plagued early Barbados whose historical stability recognizably 
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